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PREFACE
A close look at more recent development programmes with the goal to improve 
rural livelihoods reveals that support services for small farm households remain 
the key of any initiative. The support of ‘extension’ in its conventional sense has 
apparently lost importance as it is often associated with ineffi cient or even lacking 
government structures, or with programs of vast outreach that are beyond bilateral 
scale. Further, the range of services required by rural people has changed in a 
way that agricultural extension – understood in a traditional way – can respond 
to only part of the demand. As a consequence many services are now delivered 
by local private partners or project structures. However, only little has been 
undertaken to develop concepts to address the sustainability of such services, 
and the institutional set-ups providing them. Therefore, recent discussions on 
rural service provision target topics like privatisation of public services, the role of 
service provision in poverty reduction strategies, and fi nancing of services in times 
of budget constraints. Such issues are discussed in many development agencies 
as well as in the policy dialogue.
Stimulated by discussions within the frame of the Neuchâtel Initiative, an interest 
group of development agencies, the present document studies emerging new 
paradigms on the fi nancing of extension and explores a range of innovative 
approaches. It aims at understanding the extent to which these new paradigms 
and the resulting new approaches can offer viable solutions towards sustainable 
government and private extension services, while highlighting the role of 
development partners. The term “extension” is here understood in its wider sense 
and includes ‘advisory and other services’ that help rural families to make the best 
possible use of the productive resources at their disposal. The considerations 
and insights of this study are, overall, applicable to a wide range of services that 
aim at increasing economic productivity, but rather not, to the provision of social 
services. 
Acknowledging that many activities in development cooperation have the nature 
of ‘services’ or ‘extension’ when working directly with rural people, readers are 
encouraged to convey their own experiences and conclusions to the authors. 
This would contribute substantially to further develop the emerging insights about 
innovative approaches into viable concepts. 
Peter Bieler
Agricultural Advisor
SDC, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Berne, Switzerland
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1Executive summary
Introduction
(1)  Extension services for agriculture and natural resource management in 
developing countries have so far been largely government and donor 
fi nanced. Dissatisfaction with effectiveness and effi ciency of services as well 
as fi nancial constraints of governments, and a reconsideration of the role of 
governments in general, have led to a discussion on alternative approaches 
to fi nancing extension. New paradigms like e.g privatisation, and fi nancial 
participation of users, are emerging, and innovative approaches to fi nancing 
extension are explored.
(2)  This publication studies the extent to which the new paradigms and the 
resulting new approaches can contribute to better extension services, based 
on theoretical considerations and analyses of practical experience.
(3)  The publication deals with fi ve core themes: • who should fi nance what in 
extension, • fi nancial participation of extension users, • mechanisms to direct 
public funds (supply-side and demand-side fi nancing), • fostering private 
extension services, and • options for large public extension organisations.
(4)  The understanding of extension underlying this study is a pragmatic one: 
extension offers services that support people in rural areas in making the 
best possible use of the resources at their disposal in order to improve their 
livelihoods.
Who should ﬁ nance what in extension?
(5)  Market forces offer a range of extension services that are fully privately funded 
without any public fi nance intervention. These services have strong private 
good characteristics and the clients tend to be better-off farmers.
(6)  Generally speaking, market forces fail to offer services with public good 
characteristics, in remote areas, for many poor clients, and services that deal 
with ecological issues and longer-term economic viability. There are public 
interests in seeing that some of the services not provided by market forces are 
made available. To ensure that this happens, public funds are necessary. 
(7)  There is no scientifi c rule to defi ne what are public interests. These need 
to be negotiated by the members of societies – from the local to the global 
level. In general a high degree of public interest is assigned to ecological 
sustainability, some degree of socio-economic equity and poverty reduction, 
capacity building and the development of innovations.
(8)  In principle every extension service should be fi nanced by those who have an 
interest in it, i.e. by the direct users in case of services in the private interest, 
and by public bodies in the case of services in the public interest. In many 
extension services there is a mix of private and public interests, and thus they 
should be fi nanced by a mix of public and private funds.
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Financial participation
(9)  Participation of extension clients in the fi nancing of services is an emerging 
paradigm. Substantial experience has been gained in putting it into practice. 
Financial participation can take different forms, e.g. • fees for services 
provided by public or private extension organisations, • membership fees in 
producer organisations that offer extension services, • levies on marketed 
produce that are earmarked for extension, and • profi t-sharing arrangements 
between clients and extensionists. 
(10) Practical experience shows that fi nancial participation results in more 
effective services and higher adoption rates of new practices, changes the 
relations between extensionists and farmers to a more equal one, and fosters 
empowerment and ownership. It is unlikely that fi nancial participation helps to 
reduce public expenditure for extension substantially, while maintaining the 
level of services. It tends to lead to changes in the types of services demanded, 
from production and staple crops towards market integration and cash crops. 
Services with ecological and social benefi ts are hardly demanded.
(11) Although often also poor farmers are willing and able to pay for useful and 
profi table services, fi nancial participation is likely to exclude certain potential 
users from access to services.
(12) Financial participation is desirable for all services that have some degree 
of private interest because of its positive effects. However, while introducing 
fi nancial participation, emerging consequences should be closely observed, 
and mitigating measures be taken in case of effects that compromise public 
interests.
(13) Before deciding to introduce fi nancial participation, its feasibility and 
desirability need to be assessed. Careful change management is necessary 
to make fi nancial participation acceptable to the stakeholders. A major 
challenge for fi nancial participation is to design services that are clearly and 
obviously useful for the clients. Often this challenge demands competence 
building for the extensionists.
Directing public funds for extension: supply-side and 
demand-side ﬁ nancing 
(14) Public funds can be channelled directly to an extension organisation (supply-
side fi nancing) or fi rst to the clients who then pay the extension organisation 
for the services provided (demand-side fi nancing). Supply-side fi nancing is 
currently much more common, since most public extension organisations and 
donor-funded NGOs are supply-side fi nanced.
(15) A rather new form of supply-side fi nancing came up in recent years: service 
mandates. These are service contracts between a government administrative 
body and private extension organisations or independently operating public 
extension organisations.
(16) Service mandates are used to provide services in the public interest without 
maintaining public extension organisations, to foster the establishment of 
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private sector service providers that ultimately leads to a market for extension 
services, and because private service providers are thought to be more effi cient 
and effective. Service mandates between public bodies have the purpose to 
promote effectiveness and effi ciency of services. Service mandates tend to 
encourage accountability of service providers to the contracting body and not 
to the user, unless fi nancial participation is included.
(17) Service mandates can only result in more effective and effi cient services 
if • contracts and M&E are mainly result- and less activity-oriented, • if the 
fi nancing conditions enforce result-orientation, • if users are involved in 
defi ning the contents of services, choice of extensionists, and in evaluation 
of services, • if there are suffi cient competent extensionists, and,  •  if exten-
sionists have access to training opportunities.
(18) Demand-side fi nancing for extension services is a rather new concept, and 
thus experience is rather recent. Demand-side fi nancing mechanisms are 
used for different purposes. They can be part of a strategy to foster markets 
for extension services, because they have little distorting effects and allow 
business-like relations between clients and service providers. They can be 
used as a means to promote demand-orientation and accountability of service 
providers to clients. Demand-side fi nancing empowers clients if it includes 
their responsibility for management of projects and funds. Finally, demand-
side fi nancing mechanisms can be used to transfer purchasing power to allow 
access to services for otherwise excluded clients in market-based systems.
(19) Demand-side fi nancing is appropriate for services with a high degree of 
private interest. Often competence development on the side of the clients, 
as well as the service providers, is necessary to enable them to demand 
and supply useful services. Demands by rural people are usually based on 
their immediate experience, and little innovative demands can be expected. 
Thus demand-side fi nancing systems may have to include an innovation 
development component. The administration of demand-side fi nancing 
systems is often complex and expensive. There are three important success 
factors: fi nancial participation, thorough control, and competition between 
service providers. 
(20) Donors, governments and NGOs may feel uncomfortable with the idea of 
demand-side fi nancing, because of a certain loss of power associated with it. 
Clients may resist demand-side fi nancing because they are reluctant to take 
on the necessary responsibilities.
Fostering private extension services
(21) Fostering extension organisations in the private commercial sector is 
an alternative to channelling public and donor funds to public extension 
organisations and NGOs. These organisations offer services to their clients 
for payment. Besides farmers, public bodies representing public interests can 
be clients of such service providers, e.g. through service mandates. Through 
demand-side fi nancing mechanisms these service providers can be made 
accessible to a clientele that would normally not use the services.
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(22) Support to private extension organisations often has the more or less explicit 
goal of developing markets for services. It often takes the form of capacity 
building on the supply-side, and of reducing the price of services for some time 
(e.g. through vouchers). Such interventions have a good chance to succeed 
in increasing the number and quality of service providers, as well as services 
offered and used. However, the temporary reduction of the price of services 
does usually not work as desired: once the subsidy is withdrawn, demand 
drops and a move towards better-off clients takes place. Before attempting 
to develop service markets, one needs to understand the reasons why the 
service markets do not function under the given frame conditions.
(23) Another form of private extension organisations that can be fostered with 
public funds are set-ups of producer organisations. These offer the potential 
of real ownership. However, often very poor farmers are excluded from 
membership and the related benefi ts. If a producer organisation succeeds in 
being truly useful to its members and raise substantial own funds, it has good 
chances for fi nancial and organisational sustainability.
(24) Price premiums paid in produce markets for a certain quality of product (e.g. 
organically grown crops) can be used to fund extension services required to 
achieve this quality. Often this specifi c quality is guaranteed by a trade-mark 
or label. This approach is used for example with organic products for export 
from developing to industrialised countries.
(25) Input suppliers commonly are sources of advice and information for many 
clients. The cost of these advisory services are factored into the price of the 
products. This approach can be used to foster simple extension services 
related to specifi c products that are of public interest: Suitable persons are 
trained in the production and marketing of such a product (e.g. seed, nursery 
plants). It is in their business interest to motivate as many people as possible 
to buy their products, for instance by providing advice to their clients on how 
to use the products successfully.
Options for large public extension organisations
(26) In many countries reforms of public extension organisations are underway. 
Common options that include changes in fi nancing mechanisms are 
privatisation and decentralisation. Less common are service mandates 
between different public bodies, and public/private partnerships.
(27) A key question for reform is whether public or private extension service 
providers are better. We believe that quality and effectiveness of services 
are more determined by accountability mechanisms and organisational 
management than by the public or private nature of institutions. Therefore, 
generally speaking, reforms that make public extension services more 
effective are just as promising as privatisation. 
(28) Privatisation can be implemented by simply dismantling the public organisation, 
or through a controlled privatisation process. Managed privatisation by way 
of conscious transformation of public into private entities, and preparation of 
actors for their new role, is a better option than just dismantling. The latter 
often amounts to a shift of the responsibility for extension from national 
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governments to the international community, because where public extension 
organisations have been dismantled, services for small farmers are usually 
taken up by donor-funded NGOs.
(29) Decentralisation of the responsibility for extension to different local levels 
such as districts or municipalities is often taking place within a general move 
for decentralisation. Issues that require particular attention and solutions in 
decentralised systems, are e.g. • the capacity to manage extension at the 
local level, • service quality, because links to research, access to training 
opportunities, and institutional learning are no longer functional. 
Some cross-cutting insights
(30) Public funds in extension are necessary and justifi ed. However, reforms in 
fi nancing mechanisms are required to utilise the public funds effectively and 
in line with public interests. New approaches to fi nancing extension offer only 
partial ways out of the dilemma of fi nancial constraints, the need for public 
funds in extension, and sustainability of services.
(31) Most new approaches to fi nancing extension are based on pluralistic and 
decentralised extension landscapes. These need special arrangements for 
learning and exchange. These include e.g. training opportunities, links to 
research institutions, and opportunities for mutual learning and experience 
exchange.
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Why discuss the ﬁ nancing of extension?
1.1 Dissatisfaction with conventional approaches 
to ﬁ nancing extension
When development practitioners in the South and the North discuss the fu-
ture of extension services for agriculture and other areas of natural resource 
management (e.g. animal husbandry, forestry, range management, conservation), 
their thoughts now soon turn to the question of fi nancing of services. The reason 
is that there is increasing dissatisfaction with the conventional approaches to 
fi nancing extension that are largely based on services fi nanced with public money 
(governments and donors) and delivered by public extension organisations and 
NGOs, to the extent that donor and government decision makers increasingly 
wonder whether extension should remain high on their priority list. Following are 
the main causes of this dissatisfaction:
Redefi nition of the role of government. A world-wide political discussion 
is taking place about revising the role of the state and redefi ning task-sharing 
between actors in the public and private sectors. In essence, it is postulated that 
governments should not be involved in tasks that can be carried out as well by the 
private sector, but concentrate on ensuring a favourable policy environment and 
on regulatory functions. 
Dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of publicly funded extension. A lot 
of the common publicly funded extension services – offered by public extension 
organisations and NGOs – are criticised for low effectiveness. A major reason is 
that these services do not respond suffi ciently to the rural people‘s real needs 
because they focus to a major extent on production increases. However, nowadays 
even small farmers produce some commercial crops, and agricultural develop ment 
focuses more on farms as a source of income than on subsistence production. 
Therefore services for better market integration and farm enterprise management 
have become more important than production advice only. 
An unsustainable funding base. Governments in many countries have built up 
public extension organisations with donor money. Donors are no longer willing 
to bear the operating costs of these organisations. Many governments cannot 
generate suffi cient revenue to afford them. Also many NGO extension services 
and other non-public entities have no sustainable funding base and depend to a 
large extent on donor funding. 
Dissatisfaction with the position of rural communities. Free services, in 
particular when they are provided by donor-funded NGOs, place farmers in the 
position of benefi ciaries or recipients of charity. Development practitioners wonder 
whether this position does not obstruct the building of confi dent and self-reliant 
rural communities.
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1.2 Emerging new paradigms and approaches
Prompted by this dissatisfaction new paradigms on the fi nancing of extension are 
emerging and a range of innovative approaches are being explored, with various 
motivations, in many different parts of the world, on a large country-wide scale as 
well as on a small scale in limited areas. 
The emerging paradigms and the innovative approaches mainly take the following, 
mutally not exclusive, directions: 
Privatisation and withdrawal of the state from extension. In many countries 
public extension organisations have been or are being dismantled or privatised. 
This is based on the belief that private extension services are more effective, and 
that extension services result mainly in private benefi ts and should not be funded 
from public sources.
Financial participation of farmers. In many places some payment for extension 
services by farmers is being introduced. It is thought that this will reduce overall 
expenses of the state for extension, make services more demand-oriented and 
effective, and promote a sense of ownership.
More effective use of public funds for extension. Some proposals are based 
on the recognition that there is a general public interest in the availability of useful 
extension services, and thus public funding of extension is justifi ed. The search for 
improvements based on this belief takes the direction of using the available funds 
more effectively and effi ciently, to address the dilemma between the public interest 
in extension services and the empty treasuries in many developing countries.
Ownership and accountability through producers‘ own extension services. 
These interventions are guided by the belief that effective extension is best 
achieved by extension organisations directly controlled by the users. According 
to this line of thought, solutions are sought mainly in services owned and managed 
by producer organisations.
1.3 Aims of the present publication
We believe that the design of the fi nancing mechanisms plays an essential role in 
addressing the causes of dissatisfaction with the conventional approaches. And 
we would like to understand to what extent the new paradigms and the resulting 
new approaches are really capable of offering viable solutions.
Therefore we analysed practical experience with a selection of innovative ap-
proaches to fi nancing extension, whose central objective is to improve the li veli-
hoods of rather small farmers (as opposed to services for large-scale commercial 
producers). In particular, we chose approaches that
• employ fi nancial participation of users,
• use public funds in innovative ways,
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• promote private service providers,
• offer reform options for large, conventional public-sector extension or ga ni-
sations.
The approaches were examined with respect to: 
• effects and critical issues that need to be taken into consideration,
• insights for good practices in their implementation. 
At the conceptual level we draw conclusions on the justifi cation and limitations of 
the emerging paradigms. 
This study should provide development practitioners such as extension planners 
and designers, extensionists, programme offi cers in donor agencies, policy ma-
kers, etc. with practical insights on which to base decisions about the design of 
extension systems. It should help them to choose among different options and 
base their choices on experience gained in different places. It should also provide 
arguments for policy discussions, and encourage new initiatives with innovative 
fi nancing approaches guided by fi rst-hand experience. 
The study cannot, and does not intend to, provide blueprints or universal truths, 
but should serve as a basis for individual judgement. Each reader has to assess 
which issues raised here are relevant to his/her own situation, and why. Our own 
insights and conclusions can give hints where obstacles and opportunities may 
be hidden.
A limitation of this study is that most practical experience is rather recent. Con-
sequently, it is not yet possible to make a clear comparative analysis of the 
feasibility of different approaches under specifi c conditions. Analysis of expe-
rien ce so far, however, allows identifi cation of critical issues and good practice for 
various approaches. It also allows to identify further questions that will be exciting 
to pursue once a more mature body of experience is available. 
1.4 Structure of the publication
Various ways of access 
The publication can be accessed in different ways: Apart from reading from 
beginning to end, like any normal publication, the chapters with the core themes 
can be read more or less independently. Further there are links that allow to follow 
thematic connections across chapters. To achieve this some redundancies in 
information were necessary. 
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Overview of the publication structure
At the end of each core chapter a summary of lessons on the respective topic is 
given.
Presentation of case examples
The deliberations in chapter 4-7 are based on insights from various case examples. 
A table in the beginning of each chapter lists all the cases that contributed to the 
insights on that theme, and provides links to the locations in the document where 
further information on these cases can be found. Conclusions drawn from specifi c 
case examples appear in numbered boxes. More general links between insights 
and case examples are given beside the respective text. Annex 1 presents all 
the case examples that were used for the study in more or less detail (depending 
on importance and available information), including the respective sources of 
information. 
1.5 Methodology
We embarked on the study with an initial review of literature, and an intensive 
search for interesting cases with non-conventional approaches to fi nancing ex-
tension. Our intention was to fi nd 3-4 examples of mature experience from which 
convincing insights on a few key approaches could be derived. However, we found 
no cases that satisfi ed our demands, since most experience is still quite recent. 
Also the approaches used vary greatly, and we felt that all the key issues cannot 
Why discuss the fi nancing of extension (chapter 1)
Framework for analysis of approaches to fi nancing extension (chapter 2)
Five core themes
■ Who should fi nance what in extension (chapter 3)
■ Implications of fi nancial participation of extension users (chapter 4)
■ Mechanisms for directing public funds: supply-side and demand-side 
fi nancing (chapter 5)
■ Fostering private extension services (chapter 6)
■ Options for large public extension organisations (chapter 7)
Some cross-cutting insights (chapter 8)
Case examples, underlying extension concept, public/private goods (an-
nexes)
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be illustrated by a few examples. Therefore, we decided to work with a larger 
number of case examples, compile whatever insight can be gained from each 
of these cases, and combine these insights to more general conclusions on the 
approaches. 
We synthesized information from a variety of sources, i.e.
• literature, 
• personal discussions with many persons who have expertise in questions of 
fi nancing extension in general, or are closely involved with case studies, 
• short visits to programmes,
• an Internet debate, 
• workshops with practitioners from various programmes and organisations. 
The emphasis given to different issues and themes was partly determined by their 
relevance in the view of the authors, but also by the availability of experience and 
information.
Because most of the ideas presented cannot be allocated to a particular source, 
reference to particular publications is made only rarely. All the publications 
men tioned in the literature list have contributed in one way or another to this 
document. 
Persons and organisations who made direct contributions to the publication are 
mentioned in the acknowledgements.
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extension
2.1 Introduction
For the discussion of non-conventional approaches to fi nancing extension, it is 
helpful to fi rst defi ne what is meant by „extension“ itself and by an „approach to 
fi nancing extension“, and to take stock of the available options. This allows to 
understand the deliberations and insights of this document within an analytical 
framework.
This section therefore fi rst presents briefl y a pragmatic explanation of the under-
standing of extension underlying this study, followed by an overview of the main 
elements that defi ne an approach to fi nancing extension, and the different shapes 
that each of these elements may take. 
2.2 The understanding of extension underlying 
 this document
People in different places, organisations and positions have many different ideas 
about the purpose, the functions and the tasks of extension. Their understanding of 
extension may range from a vehicle for transferring modern production technology 
from researchers to farmers, to provision of inputs and credit, advisory services 
aimed at increasing farm income, or an approach for broad-based participatory 
community development. 
Our pragmatic view of extension is that its chief objective is to provide support 
services to people in rural areas so that they can make the best possible use of 
the resources at their disposal. These resources include cropland and gardens, 
forest and rangeland, as well as labour, capital, knowledge, skills, experiences and 
social relations. The focus is mainly on advisory services and development of skills 
and knowledge, and less on the provision of material inputs and credit. Extension 
services understood in this way are effective if they result in increased income or 
otherwise improved livelihoods of the clients. At the same time the interest of the 
public (e.g. in farm products free of pesticide residues, or protection of forest areas) 
and of future generations (e.g. in long term soil conservation, or conservation of 
biodiversity) must not be compromised. In many, but not all, cases extension has 
an objective of increasing social equity and addressing disadvantaged groups 
adequately. 
In annex 2 the underlying 
extension concept is 
explained in more detail.
2
Framework for analysis of approaches to fi nancing extension
14
2.3 Deﬁ ning an approach to ﬁ nancing extension
2.3.1 Elements of an approach to ﬁ nancing extension
The fi nancing mechanisms are the core feature of an approach to fi nancing ex-
tension. They include:
• the sources of funds, 
• the directions in which the funds fl ow, and
• the mode by which the funds are collected. 
The design of the fi nancing mechanisms is shaped by the following elements:
• the clients or users of the extension services,
• the extension services provided,
• the context and framework conditions, and
• the extension organisations that provide the services.
Combinations of these elements make up approaches to fi nancing extension, as 
illustrated below.
FINANCING
MECHANISMS
I I
I
Clients/usersli /
APPROACH TO FINANCING EXTENSION
Sources o
f funds
Flow of funds
Col
lec
tion
mo
de
Servicesi
Extension
organisation
i
i iContext
Elements of an approach to fi nancing extension
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2.3.2 Financing mechanisms
Sources of ﬁ nance
A distinction is usually made between public and private sources of fi nance. The 
term „public“ is often used synonymously with „national government“, but in fact 
multilateral institutions and donor countries are public as well, and thus they also 
belong to the category of public sources of funds. 
The table below gives an overview of possible public and private sources of funds 
for extension.
Public and private sources of fi nance for extension
Fund ﬂ ow directions
Funds may fl ow from a source of funds to a service provider, who then provides 
services to target groups. This means fi nancing of services via the supply-side.
Alternatively, public funds can be channelled directly to clients, who then use the 
money to buy services from a service provider. With this mechanism the services 
are fi nanced via the demand-side.
SERVICESI
DEMAND-SIDE FINANCING
$
$
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Users/clients/ li
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Users/clients/ li
SERVICESI
$
SUPPLY-SIDE FINANCING
Fund flow directions
Public sources Private sources
• Donor country grants
• Multilateral institution grants
• General revenue, national level
• General revenue, local level
• Commodity export taxes
• Other earmarked taxes
• ...
• Farmers’ personal resources
• Community and producer organisations
• Processing, marketing and export 
enterprises
• Input supply enterprises
• Consumers
• Charitable donations
• ...
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Questions of fund fl ow direction are important in the case of public funds. In  chapter 
5 different systems of demand-side and supply-side fi nancing are described. 
Hot and cold money
In the case of private sources of funds the mode of collection is important. The 
following table shows some of them. 
It is helpful to distinguish between „hot“ and „cold“ money. The more directly money 
comes out of individuals‘ pockets the „hotter“ it is. In general, people perceive the 
payment of a fee immediately after receiving a service as more painful than when 
the same amount is concealed in a levy on marketed produce. 
Considerations about hot and cold money are particularly relevant when dis cussing 
fi nancial participation by clients, and the establishment of private extension service 
providers. 
2.3.3 The clients
Obviously, there is a great diversity of potential extension clients. These include, for 
example, poor farm families, large commercial farmers, farmers‘ interest groups, 
women farmers, market actors, rural entrepreneurs and many more. 
However, not only the immediate users of a service are clients of extension. Any 
person or group of people with a major interest in a certain extension service can 
be considered a client. In the case of extension services that lead to higher farm 
profi ts, it is obvious that the clients are individual farms. In the case of advice on 
management of common pasture and rangeland, for instance, the clients would 
be one or several village communities. A processing and marketing enterprise 
may be a client of extension services that help farmers to improve the quality of 
their products. With respect to advice on rational pesticide use on vegetables, 
consumers are the main clients. In the case of services for biodiversity conserva-
tion, the international community is the main client.
Thus, besides those using an extension service and benefi tting directly and ob-
viously from it, the wider public as consumers or as people with an interest in 
Chapter 5 – Mechanisms for 
directing public funds
Chapter 4 – Financial partici-
pation
Chapter 6 – Fostering private 
extension services
Modes of collection
• Fees for services
• Membership contributions in community or producer organisation
• Levies on marketed produce collected by producer or commodity organisation
• Deduction from price paid to producers by processing or marketing enterprises
• Margin on the price of inputs 
• Charges for a quality label
• ...
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sustainable ecosystems or more equitable opportunities, may also be regarded 
as clients. This understanding of clients implies that often several clients benefi t 
from one extension service. 
2.3.4 Extension service providers
Extension services are offered by very diverse organisations in the public and the 
private sectors. The table below provides an overview of the most common types 
of extension service providers grouped into four categories.
Overview of extension service providers
The demarcation lines between these categories are not always clear. In particular, 
the distinction between private profi t-oriented and not-for-profi t organisations is 
often diffi cult, and sometimes irrelevant.
2.3.5 Extension services
Thematic areas
The areas that extension services may cover are vast, as implied in the underlying 
understanding of extension given in section 2.2, and indicated in the overview of 
possible thematic areas in the table below.
Public and semi-public 
institutions
• National extension organisations
• Local extension units
• Commodity boards
• Universities and research institutions
• International development organisations
Private profi t-oriented actors • Consulting enterprises
• Processing/marketing enterprises
• Input supply enterprises
• Traders
• Private universities and research institutions
Private not-for-profi t 
organi sations
• NGOs
• Religious organisations
Producer organisations • Farmer associations and unions
• Commodity grower associations
• Community and village organisations
Framework for analysis of approaches to fi nancing extension
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Pure production advice (as in the traditional concept of extension) is becoming less 
important, whereas marketing and farm enterprise management, and issues re la ted 
to sustainable management of natural resources have rapidly gained importance 
in the last one or two decades. Notably, this is also true in case of services for the 
poorest farmers with only a limited degree of commercial production!
Types of extension services
The majority of services offered by extension organisations fi t in one of the fol-
lowing four types: 
Training. Arranging and providing training to client farmers and other sectoral 
actors to enhance their knowledge and skills in technical, economic, managerial 
and organisational matters.
Providing information. Gathering, processing and disseminating relevant in-
fo rmation from different sources, e.g. about promising new practices, places to 
obtain certain inputs, market prices, new laws, rules and regulations, and many 
other subjects. 
Assistance in problem-solving. Assisting farmers in recognising bottlenecks, 
analysing problems and their causes, and developing solutions. 
Facilitation and animation. Facilitating and encouraging individual and joint 
in itiatives, e.g. for organisational development, access to means of production, 
development of local innovations, exploitation of emerging opportunities, negotia-
tion with authorities, and many other processes.
Links to other actors. It is not suffi cient for an extension organisation to offer the 
above mentioned types of services in direct interaction with rural people. In order 
for extension to be able to fulfi l its purpose, it needs to ensure functioning links 
between the primary extension clients and other actors in the rural knowledge 
and support services system – e.g. research, supply of inputs and credit, markets, 
policy makers. 
Thematic areas of extension services
• Production (crops, animals, inputs such as seed, seedlings, etc.)
• Marketing
• Processing
• Farm enterprise management (fi nancial and economic)
• Organisational development (e.g. producer associations, joint marketing, water 
allocation)
• Land and water management (e.g. soil conservation techniques, irrigation 
management)
• Land use planning and management (e.g. rangeland, pastures, forests)
• Biodiversity conservation
• ...
Framework for analysis of approaches to fi nancing extension
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2.3.6 Context
The context in which an approach to fi nancing extension is embedded is shaped 
by a variety of factors that all have a fairly important infl uence on the functioning of 
approaches to fi nancing extension (and on extension approaches in general).
Factors shaping the context
• Policy environment
• Institutional landscape
• Importance of agriculture in the national and local economies
• Fragility of eco-systems
• Agro-ecological systems
• Production systems and agrarian structures
• Socio-economic and cultural structures
• Specifi c agricultural and natural resource management problems
• ...
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3.1 Introduction
Some development thinkers currently question whether public funds should con-
tinue to be invested in extension services. This thinking is based on the notion 
that extension services required by the agricultural sector would be provided by 
market forces, i.e. the private sector, if there is no publicly subsidised competi-
tion. 
Others believe that in certain situations market forces do not work in the public 
interest (market failures), and that therefore investment of public funds in exten-
sion services is justifi ed. 
This chapter reviews these beliefs and refl ects on whether public funds for ex-
tension are justifi ed, and, if yes, for what kind of services. Therefore, fi rst some 
thoughts and experiences about the functioning of market forces in the case 
of extension services are outlined, and private and public interest in extension 
services are analysed. It is then concluded that there is a case for investment 
of public funds for extension services, and that there is a case for mixed funding 
of most extension services. Finally, some suggestions about how to determine 
public and private interest in extension services practically are given.
Note that the discussions in this chapter deal with the issue of fi nancing exten-
sion only, and not with the question whether services should be delivered by 
private or public organisations. Private extension organisations can well provide 
services that are publicly funded, and public extension organisations can provide 
privately fi nanced services (through payment by users or through private bodies 
contracting the services of public extensionists). Thus fi nancing and delivery are 
two different issues that need to be looked at separately.
3.2 Private goods, public interests and extension
Economic theory suggests that market forces do lead to the economically most 
effi cient allocation of resources, and that governments should only intervene 
where markets fail to regulate supply and demand of goods and services in a way 
that is in the public interest. In other words, intervention with public funds should 
occur only when leaving things up to the market would result in undesirable 
outcomes from the point of view of an entire society. What are the implications of 
this theory in the case of extension services?
The economic concept of 
pri vate and public goods is 
explained in annex 3.
3
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3.2.1 What market forces offer
A look at the range of arrangements through which extension services are pro-
vided on a commercial profi t-oriented basis shows what kind of services market 
forces offer on their own, without public fi nance support.
Organisational arrangements
Private commercial extension organisations and consulting fi rms are fairly 
com mon in industrialised countries, where formerly public organisations have 
often been privatised. In developing countries, privately funded, profi t-oriented 
ex tension enterprises are not (yet) very common, but they nevertheless exist in 
many places. Also producer organisations, marketing or processing fi rms, or sub-
sector associations at times provide fully privately funded extension services. 
It has been estimated that about 5% of extension services in developing countries 
are provided by the private commercial sector (Feder et al. 1999). 
Also some public organisations offer services on a commercial basis, although 
often not at full cost – some on their own initiative, others as a result of initiatives 
from outside. Besides extension organisations, this concerns also universities, 
research institutions, etc. In various places extensionists of public extension or-
ganisations charge for services unoffi cially, in cash or in kind. 
In some cases a kind of share-cropping agreements between farmer and exten-
sionists has been concluded. The farmer contributes land and labour, whereas 
the extensionist contributes his/her advanced knowledge and sometimes inputs. 
The benefi ts arising from the extensionist‘s contribution are shared.
Extension services in sub-sector production and marketing chains (e.g. for cof-
fee, tea, cocoa, cotton, milk, tobacco, fruits and vegetables for export) are often 
fi nanced by levies on marketed produce. There are many long-standing exam-
ples of subsector-based extension set-ups in developing countries. The services 
provided largely have private good characteristics, although frequently not only 
at an individual but at a group level (all those involved in producing, processing 
and marketing the concerned type of product). 
Producer organisations often fi nance the provision of extension and other serv-
ices to their member at least partially through membership fees.
In contract growing arrangements of processing and marketing enterprises fi -
nancing of extension through a deduction from the price paid to the famers is 
common. Such arrangements with small farmers have a reputation of being ex-
ploitative rather than supportive. 
Input companies and retailers include advice on how to use their products in their 
interaction with clients, and link product promotion and extension services. The 
cost of these extension services are incorporated in the price of the products. 
This is commonly done by fertiliser and pesticide suppliers, but also by providers 
of seed, tree saplings, tools or machinery. In a similar way credit institutions 
Case 25 – Cotton mana ge-
ment enterprise, Peru
Case 1 – INTA, Nicaragua
Case 30 – Public exten sio-
nists, Tansania, Nigeria, etc.
Case 20 – Farmers‘ federa-
tion Fouta-Djallon, Guinea
Case 3 – ICAFE, Costa Rica
23
Who should fi nance what in extension?
incorporate the cost of advice in the price (interest) of loans. Extension linked to 
input supply can be a positive phenomenon, e.g. when a seed producer explains 
to farmers how to make the best use of vegetable seed. On the other hand, 
extension linked to input supply may have undesirable ecological side-effects if it 
is provided by suppliers of agrochemicals and chemical fertilisers, because they 
want to increase the sales of their products and inevitably have a tendency to 
recommend rather more than less of their application. 
Price differences between different product qualities are used to indirectly fi -
nance extension services that allow farmers to produce the required quality. This 
is commonly done by various kinds of market players and exporters. A special 
case of fi nancing extension through quality premiums is trademarks or labels for 
a specifi c quality, e.g. organically grown products. 
Services offered and clients served by market forces
All these arrangements that provide extension services based on private funds 
and market forces have two things in common:
• They provide services with private good characteristics, that result in di-
rect benefi ts for the paying clients, and  
• they tend to serve mainly relatively better-endowed commercial produ-
cers and producer groups, although there are also cases where they work for 
smaller semi-commercial producers.
Services offered. Generally speaking, individual problem-solving assistance 
and development of knowledge and skills related to commercial farm products 
fall under the category of private goods. Means of production such as seed, fer-
tiliser, credit, livestock medicine and vaccines, etc. are in general regarded as 
private goods as well.
In practice, services like training and advisory visits on the farm for the produc-
tion, processing and marketing of cash crops  may be provided by profi t-oriented 
extension, as well as services that are very concrete like the vaccination of ani-
mals, the establishment of fruit orchards, pesticide spraying, etc.
Farmers in various places have shown that credit, and assistance in obtaining it, 
are services for which they are willing to pay. Veterinary services and supply of 
means of production has in most countries become mainly provided on a private 
commercial basis.
Clients served. In Pakistan and the US studies compared the clients of public 
and private extension organisations that provide similar services, and the com-
mon sense notion that private extension tends to serve larger and rather better-
off clients proved to be true in both cases, for pest management services in the 
cotton sector in Pakistan, as well as for nutrient management and IPM in Mary-
land (US). 
Case 23 – Organic products 
for export, Uganda
Case 26 – Comparison of 
pri vate and public service pro-
viders, Pakistan, USA
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3.2.2 What market forces do not provide 
In the following the limitations of market forces with respect to making extension 
services available are illustrated.
Learning from input markets
Since the early 1980s public extension services have increasingly withdrawn 
from supplying inputs themselves, as it was assumed that market forces could do 
this better, and because these usually subsidised inputs sometimes led to levels 
of input use that are economically ineffi cient and ecologically damaging.
Functioning input markets actually established themselves in many places. 
However, in many remote areas chemical fertiliser and good quality seed are not 
commonly available in the market. In some areas of Tanzania market prices for 
inputs have become so high, and availability so unreliable, that poor people per-
ceive the non-accessibility of inputs as a cause for decreasing farm productivity, 
and thus for their increasing poverty (Narayan 1997). Moreover, quality is fre-
quently a problem in private input markets. In many countries, mixtures contai-
ning seed of good and questionable quality, and adulteration of fertiliser and 
ag rochemicals are widespread. 
Although product markets and service markets are comparable only to a certain 
extent, it can be assumed that extension service markets have limitations similar 
to those of input markets, and that thus conclusions as to the functioning of ex-
tension service markets can be drawn.
Extension services for small subsistence farmers and in remote rural areas or 
areas with low population density are less profi table than services for larger com-
mercial farms and in more dynamic areas. They may not be profi table enough 
to let market forces make them available at an adequate level and quality. Thus 
extension based purely on market forces is unlikely to serve poorer farmers and 
remote, low potential areas well.
Even where service markets appear to be functioning, competition between dif-
ferent service providers does not automatically guarantee quality and effective-
ness of services. 
Public goods
There is little motivation for users to pay for services whose benefi ts are not li-
mited to those who pay, because it is not possible to exclude non-payers from 
benefi tting. Consequently, there is no motivation for private sector actors to pro-
vide such services on a for-profi t basis. Such services are public goods in eco-
nomic terms. The market forces are unable to make public goods available. Thus 
there is a case for using public funds to make those public goods available, in 
which there is an interest of the broader society. In the following some examples 
of typical extension services with public good characteristics are given. 
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General information and advice on commonly produced crops and animals con-
stitute extension services that can be classifi ed as largely public goods. If one 
farmers applies a new practice that does not require too complex changes in the 
cropping system, other farmers can easily copy it. Farmers are usually not will-
ing to pay for such services, at least not the full costs, because others can get 
the same information for free after a short time. Many typical extension services 
offered to little specialised small farmers fall into this category. 
Experimentation to develop locally adapted innovations constitutes a public good 
to a large extent1. The innovations developed may benefi t a much wider range 
of farmers than those directly involved in the adaptation process. Consequently 
farmers would usually not pay an extensionist for support in experimentation. 
Therefore, market forces normally do not offer services to support local adapta-
tion and innovation processes, with the possible exception of certain commodity 
cash crops. However, due to the trend towards more market orientation of agri-
culture, adaptive experimentation is an increasingly important extension task. 
Particularly the development of new market and income opportunities for small 
and poor farmers requires a lot of creative thinking and exploration of ideas.
Poverty reduction
As mentioned above, extension services for small farmers and in remote or low-
potential areas may not be profi table for private service providers, although well-
designed and adapted extension services can make substantial contributions to 
improving the livelihood of marginal farmer families and communities. 
Ecological externalities
Market forces are oriented primarily to economic benefi ts and not to ecologically 
sound practices. Therefore, the practices promoted by market-driven private ex-
tension services may not be ecologically sound and have negative side effects 
(or externalities in economic terms), and practices with positive externalities may 
not be offered suffi ciently by the market forces.
Inappropriate use of pesticides on food crops, for example, has negative exter-
nalities for consumers in the form of a health hazard. Pesticide companies and 
dealers in many places do not give adequate advice to prevent pesticide resi-
dues. 
Pesticide suppliers often recommend rather more than less use of their product, 
and vendors of chemical fertiliser may not tell farmers that the continuous appli-
cation of chemical fertiliser alone ultimately leads to a decline in soil fertility, and 
that inappropriate application of fertiliser results in to water pollution. 
Services that prevent or cure contagious animal diseases have positive side ef-
fects for all people that keep animals in an area, because they reduce the risk 
that one‘s own animals contract the disease. If left to market forces these serv-
ices may not be utilised suffi ciently.
1
 Adaptive experimentation here is viewed as a participatory cooperation between service providers 
and producers.
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Long-term sustainability
Another case of public interest in extension services concerns ecologically sus-
tainable land use and natural resource management practices. Individuals are 
usually not willing to pay for advice in this respect and often are not even pre-
pared to adopt sustainable practices, which contradict their short-term economic 
interests. 
The same is true for long-term economic sustainability: Advice leading to quick 
benefi ts is likely to be sold more easily than advice which results in benefi ts only 
in the longer term, even if the longer-term benefi ts are in total higher than the 
short-term gains2. Thus market forces will favour advice resulting in quick bene-
fi ts. 
Uncertainty of beneﬁ ts
Insuffi cient information about a service constitutes a risk to the user, in so far as 
the utility of the service cannot be judged exactly. In an extension context, for 
example, users cannot judge the quality of an extension service at the time they 
receive it; its true value to the user may become apparent only later. This con-
stitutes a risk to the user that may reduce the use of extension service, that in 
fact would bring substantial benefi ts. 
3.2.3 Public interests – a case for investing public funds in 
 extension
The previous sections explained the potentials and the limitations of market for-
ces in the provision of extension services. 
Market forces ensure the provision of services with private good characteristics, 
that benefi t individuals or specifi c interest groups, or in other words pure market 
forces without any public fi nance serve private interests.
On the other hand there is a variety of extension services that market forces do 
not provide. Market forces frequently not only fail to provide services with public 
good characteristics, but also a whole range of seemingly private goods.
Moreover, market forces may provide services that have undesirable effects for 
some people. The interests of individuals and those of the public, the broader 
society, may confl ict, and leaving things to market forces may compromise the 
interests of the latter. Actions of individuals may have positive or negative side 
effects. Certain actions bring more benefi ts for the broader society or parts of it 
than direct benefi ts for the individual client. 
The public, or the institutions representing it, may have an interest in promoting 
actions with positive impact and high benefi ts for the broader society, or in re-
ducing actions with negative side effects.
2
 The concept of „discounting benefi ts expected in future“ underpins these considerations. Consult 
any environmental economics textbook for further explanations.
Case 2 – PASOLAC/Inter-
cooperation, Honduras, etc.
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Consequently, considerations about who is to pay for what type of services 
should be based on the public and private interests attached to a service, and 
not, as often suggested, on the distinction between public and private goods ac-
cording to economic theory. 
The limitations of market forces in many extension situations to produce results 
desirable from the viewpoint of the broader public, suggest that the investment of 
public funds in extension is not only justifi able but essential in many instances. 
There is a public interest in seeing certain services being offered and used, and 
if the market forces do not provide them, public funds need to do it.
3.3 Deciding who should ﬁ nance what – interests 
count
3.3.1 Determining the public interests
What is the public interest? Who defi nes it? Scientifi c rules are for various rea-
sons not helpful for determining what is in the public interest. 
Firstly, private and public interests are not a 
mat ter of black and white; distinction must be 
made along a continuum between the ex tremes 
of private and public. Perceptions of private and 
public change according to position and direction 
of view in this continuum, as the adjacent fi gure 
illustrates. From the viewpoint of a clan group 
or a farmers‘ organisation, households and in-
di viduals are private, whereas the village com-
munity is public. From a national viewpoint, 
vil lage communities appear to be more private. 
In terests can thus be located at different levels, 
ranging from individuals, families, clans and vil-
lage communities to the population of a region, a 
state, or even the international community.
Secondly, the public at each level is not a uniform 
mass, but consists of a variety of interest groups. 
Different people and groups try to promote their 
individual or particular group interests and have different perceptions about which 
services are in the public interest, and to what extent.
Consequently, societies – at local as well as international levels – need to de-
termine the public interests that represent the interest of the broader society at 
the respective level by some form of negotiation between different players. The 
resulting decisions are based on political beliefs, and the balance of power be-
tween different interest groups, rather than on economic theories3. It is clear that 
3
 What is presented as being in the broader public interest in this publication is admittedly infl uenced 
by the political beliefs of the authors, who consider environmental and economic sustainability and 
more equity a goal of development work.
International community
Country
Region/province
Village
Clan, farmer association
Household
Individual
PUBLIC
PRIVATE
The public/private continuum and the
different directions of view
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this way of determining what is in the interest of a general broader public in a 
society or at a global level is fairly idealistic. It requires that the public at different 
levels is organised, and able to articulate its interests. In reality the decisions on 
where to invest public funds are often biased towards the interests of more pow-
erful interest groups and countries.
Further, resource constraints often do not allow to foster all public interests, and 
priorities between different public interests need to be set.
Generally speaking, a high degree of general public interest is attached to serv-
ices that result in environmental benefi ts, or benefi t poor population segments 
and disadvantaged areas. 
Poverty reduction, or a certain measure of socio-economic equity, is considered 
a public concern in most societies world-wide. Consequently, most socie ties 
would fi nd it justifi able to use public funds for extension services that benefi t mar-
ginal farmes who cannot afford to pay the full cost, even if these services in theory 
appear to have the characteristics of private goods.
The degree of public interest in ecological sustainability varies a lot. Often envi-
ronmental issues are mainly a priority of the international community, and local 
communities have different priorities for the investment of their public funds. 
Building professional competence and fostering innovation development are of-
 ten seen as being to a substantial degree in the public interest.
3.3.2 Financing extension in accordance with interests
In principle, those who have an interest in a certain service should fi nance it. This 
means that the benefi tting individual, family or enterprise should pay for services 
in their private interest, while the benefi tting group should pay for services in 
the interest of a community or any other group of people. Local governments 
should fi nance services in the interest of their locality and central governments 
for services in the national public interest. Finally, international (donor) sources 
should pay for services of global public interest. 
In practice, services that are purely in the private or the general public interest are 
relatively rare. There is a mix of public and private interests in a substantial part of 
extension services. Farm families, players in the market place, urban consumers, 
the general public of a country, and the global community can well have a stake 
in the same extension service. Also private companies involved in processing or 
marketing or the provision of inputs have a stake in certain services.
Consequently, most services should be fi nanced by a mix of public and private 
funds, with the cost shared in much the same ratio as the attached interests. 
Often it is impractical to divide the cost of services in detail between all parties 
with an interest, and distinctions are simply made between the different private 
interests and a general public interest. 
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For many services a fi nancial contribution by farmer clients – even if it is small 
– can be envisaged. 
Another implication of this principle is that resources of private sector enterprises 
that benefi t in some way from extension services, may be captured to comple-
ment public funds. 
For services resulting in direct benefi ts which can be fully appropriated by the 
client, in general clients are willing to pay, and the private commercial sector is 
likely to provide such services if the frame conditions ensure suffi cient profi tabil-
ity. Public funding of such services whose supply and demand are regulated well 
by market forces should be avoided.
The fi rst step for determining how particular services offered by an extension or-
ganisation should be fi nanced, or to decide practically how the cost of a particu-
lar extension organisation should be divided, is to clearly defi ne the services 
of fered by the organisation. Then the various interests attached to each of them, 
and in particular the degree of general public interest, can be determined or ne-
gotiated. 
Key questions to be answered are: 
• What will happen if there is no public funding of the service in question? Will 
it be offered? Who will use it, and who not?
• What are the social and ecological consequences if it is not offered, or not 
used? 
• What level of public funding is necessary to ensure it is offered and used?
Such a process of analysis can be conducted in public extension organisations 
as well as for NGOs or private sector enterprises funded to some extent by pub-
lic (donor or national government) resources.
Chapter 4 – Financial par ti-
cipation
Case 11 – Service manda-
tes between public bodies, 
Switzerland
Case 31 – Public/private part-
nership for IPM extension, 
Kenya
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3.4 Eight key lessons on who should ﬁ nance what 
in extension
■  Market forces provide a range of extension services that have the characte-
ristics of private goods and are purely privately fi nanced without any public 
funding. These services tend to be for better-off farmers.
■  Market forces do not work in the public interest in many extension situations. 
Services may have public good characteristics, be insuffi ciently profi table 
to be provided by market forces, have unwanted externalities when provided 
in accordance with market forces, etc. 
■  Market forces usually do not make extension services available in remote 
areas, for poor farmers, and for the environment!
■  The decision on who should fi nance what in extension should be guided by 
the public interest attached to services and actions rather than by theories 
about private and public goods.
■  Perceptions of what is in the public interest are determined by beliefs. 
Therefore, the public interests recognised by a society are the result of 
political negotiation processes rather than scientifi c considerations.
■  Without public funds for extension, substantial public interests are com-
promised (in the view of the authors), especially those concerned with 
ecological sustainability and fi ghting poverty.
■  In principle, people with an interest in a service should contribute to fi nan cing 
it. This may be individual farm families, private enterprises, communities, 
districts, count ries or the global public.
■  Extension services that are purely in the private or purely in the public 
interest are rare. Most services should therefore be fi nanced by a mix of 
public and private funding.
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4.1 Introduction
Participation of client farmers in the fi nancing of extension services is rapidly be-
coming a paradigm in discussions of rural development policy, and consequently a 
variety of attempts to put this concept into practice are underway. In recent years, 
considerable experience with (partially) client-funded services has been gained. 
Financial participation by clients may range from a very small percentage of cost-
sharing in services of public extension organisations or NGOs, up to 100% in 
extension services that are entirely privately funded and delivered. 
This chapter focuses on the fi nancial participation of clients in extension services 
and organisations that are co-fi nanced by a mix of public and private funding. 
It describes different mechanisms of fi nancial participation. Different motives 
for introducing fi nancial participation are analysed and conclusions are drawn 
whether the respective expectations are justifi ed. Further, issues to be taken into 
consideration when introducing fi nancial participation, are discussed.
4.2 Financial participation in practice
Financial participation of extension clients can be put into practice in various 
ways: 
• Publicly fi nanced extension organisations (public extension organisations, 
NGOs) may ask for a user fee from individual users or groups for specifi c 
services of mainly private interest. Examples of such services include soil 
analysis, training or advisory support in specialised vegetable cultivation, or 
assistance in preparing a business plan for a loan application.
• Extension systems with public funding and private delivery may include a fi -
nancial contribution by the clients.
• Extension set-ups in farmer organisations or commodity organisations may 
be partially or fully fi nanced by farmers‘ contributions, indirectly through 
mem bership fees, levies, earmarked taxes or directly through user fees for 
services.
• Farmers and extensionists conclude an agreement according to which the 
extensionist gets a share of the incremental profi t resulting from the service 
or bears part of the loss. The extensionist‘s share in the profi t would usually 
supplement his/her basic salary. The extensionist in such a system may be 
from the public as well as the private sector. 
In a number of countries it is reported that public extensionists charge clients for 
their services unoffi cially, sometimes in the form of direct payments, but also in 
the form of sharing the profi ts.
4
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In industrialised countries mixed fi nancing of extension services has become the 
rule. In many developing countries fi nancial participation is common in community 
infrastructure projects like water supply, land improvement, irrigation schemes 
etc., whereas fi nancial participation by farmers in extension services provided by 
public extension organisations or NGOs is still something of an exception. Yet there 
is a considerable body of experience, from which insights can be gained. 
The following examples contributed to the insights about fi nancial participation 
by users. Among them there is one case where the introduction of payment was 
attempted, but failed. There are several cases of failed attempts to introduce 
payment, that have not been included here, because the reasons for failure have 
not been analysed suffi ciently.
4.3 Why ﬁ nancial participation?
4.3.1 Motives for introducing ﬁ nancial participation
Financial participation is advocated by different people for very different reasons. 
We have come across the following motives or reasons (in literature as well as in 
discussion with concerned persons):
• Reducing public expenditures for extension, 
• ensuring effective, demand-oriented, high quality services, better adoption 
rates of new practices, and accountability of service providers to clients,
Case number Title Where to fi nd description 
and more information
1 INTA (National Institute for Agricultural Technology), Nicaragua P. 96; box 2 (p. 35), 6 (p. 38), 13 (p. 42)
2 PASOLAC/Intercooperation, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua P. 98;  box 1 (p. 34), 8 (p. 39)
3 ICAFE, Costa Rica P. 102; box 3 (p. 35)
4 Veterinary services, Vietnam P. 102; box 4 (p. 37)
5 KSAPDA (Kyrgyz-Swiss Agricultural Project Jalalabad), Kyrgyzstan P. 102 box 7 (p. 38)
6 TES (Training and Extension Services) Centre, Kyrgyzstan P. 103; box 11 (p. 41)
7 Willingness to pay for extension, India P. 104; box 12 (p. 41)
8 INDAP (National Institute for Agricultural Development), Chile P. 105; box 14 (p. 43), 17 (p. 52), 19 (p. 55), 23 (p. 61)
9 INIAP, Ecuador P. 108; box 15 (p. 44) 
13 Service mandates with private extension enterprises, Thuringia P. 112; box 5 (p. 37)
19 PAIP, Mali P. 116; box 10 (p. 40), 24 (p. 70)
20 Farmers‘ Federation of Fouta-Djallon, Guinea P. 116; box 25 (p. 75)
22 AKRSP (Aga Khan Rural Support Programme), Pakistan P. 117; box 27 (p. 76)
25 Cotton management enterprise, Peru P. 122; box 28 (p. 77)
30 Public extensionists, Tanzania, Nigeria and other countries P. 126; box 9 (p. 40)
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• fostering empowerment and farmers‘ ownership of services,
• improving the chance of fi nancial sustainability of services.
Insights provided by the cases allow certain conclusions on whether fi nancial 
participation can fulfi ll the expectations that are behind the different motives. 
Does ﬁ nancial participation reduce public expenses for extension 
services?
There are no studies that defi nitely support or contradict the view that fi nancial 
participation reduces public expenses for extension. However, certain conside-
rations and experiences suggest that it is unlikely that by introducing fi nancial 
participation, public expenditures can be reduced, while maintaining coverage and 
service level, at least not in the case of extension organisations working mainly 
with small, semi-commercial farmers. 
A pre-condition for even nominal fi nancial participation is well-trained extension-
ists who can provide services that result in clear and obvious benefi ts for the 
clients. However, many existing extensionists have so far focused on production 
related services, and have no experience with services that focus on increasing 
profi tability. This means that often, either prior to or parallel to the introduction of 
fi nancial participation, extensionists have to undergo substantial capacity building 
and training. This requires in many cases investments that exceed the amount 
recovered through fi nancial participation.
A farmer who pays a substantial amount for a service would want very useful 
services, requiring the extensionist to give him/her a great deal of attention and 
time. In consequence the number of users that can be served by one extensionist 
may be reduced. Thus the effect of fi nancial participation in this case would be 
reduced coverage (in addition to the increase in effectiveness). The investment 
required to get the same coverage as before, may again exceed the cost saved 
through fi nancial participation.
Thus, considering the investments that are often necessary before reasonable 
fi nancial participation is possible, fi nancial participation seems unlikely to be an 
effective means to reduce public expenditures for extension, at least in the short 
and medium term. 
However, fi nancial participation certainly can help to avoid untargeted subsidising 
of private interests, provided that users can be charged for the private interest part 
of a service, and public funds are used only for the public interest part. 
Does ﬁ nancial participation result in more effective services and 
accountability?
Under the usual set-up in which extension service providers get their rewards 
from the state or donors, they are not accountable to the users but to the source 
of funds. The users have only limited leverage to ensure that extension services 
are truly useful for them. And if services are not useful, it is not their own money 
Chapter 3 – Who should 
fi nance what in extension? 
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that is wasted. The left diagram below illustrates the usual situation with public 
funding only, and shows how the eye of the extension organisation looks towards 
the source of funds.
With fi nancial participation (right diagram), the eye of the service provider has to 
look also towards the users. This should result in service providers being to some 
extent accountable to users, and it can be assumed that this accountability results 
in more effective, demand-oriented, better quality services.
Many experiences clearly show that fi nancial participation actually does result in 
accountability and more effective services.
Box 1 shows how the introduction of fi nancial participation forced service provid-
ers to adapt their offer to the interests of the customers in Honduras. However, 
it is advisable to have a closer look at the effects of fi nancial participation on the 
link between accountability and services offered, as experience from Nicaragua 
indicates (see box 2).
Box 1. Financial participation, demand orientation and service effectivity in Central America
In PASOLAC fi nancial participation of around 10% for services provided by private organisations was introduced. 
This led to substantial changes in service offer and demand, resulting in more effective services:
• The services offered rapidly shifted from staple crops to commercial crops and from a production focus to 
processing and marketing issues.
• The clients clearly perceive the benefi ts of the services, and the adoption rate of the suggested practices has 
reached between 65 and 85%. 
• Training courses have become more practical and include documentation.
• The service providers do not offer the same or very similar training services to the same clients year after year 
any more. 
Case 2 – Pasolac/Intercooperation, Honduras and other countries in Central America
Users/clients/ li
SERVICESI
$
ACCOUNTABILITY
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Users/clients/ li
SERVICESI
$
$
ACCOUNTABILITY
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Financial participation and accountability
a) Public funded services (free for users) b) Financial participation by users
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6 We assume that most readers do not feel like owners but customers in the general store where they 
buy their daily supplies.
Much discussion has been devoted to the question of the percentage of fi nancial 
participation required to achieve true accountability, i.e. to make the eyes of the 
service providers look mainly in the direction of the users. Some say at least 50% 
is needed, while others take the view that small percentages have big effects, 
as long as they represent more than a nominal expense for the users. The case 
examples indicate that rather small amounts (of 5 to 10%) are fairly effective.
However, accountability can only lead to better user orientation if users are able 
to check on the quality and appropriateness of services and can articulate their 
needs. The service providers must be able to deliver services that respond to the 
users‘ needs, and really feel the negative effects of users‘ dissatisfaction. 
Does ﬁ nancial participation foster empo wer ment and ownership?
Many of the experiences with fi nancial participation show that it really does pro-
mote empowerment and a sense of ownership. The transformation from a bene-
fi ciary to a client is certainly empowering. 
Financial participation in services of a business-like 
extension organisation in which farmers do not par-
ticipate in either steering or management leads more 
to a client relationship than to ownership6.
Linking fi nancial participation of farmers with their 
in vol vement in strategic management and steering 
of the extension organisation, promotes real sense 
ownership. This can be achieved through true farmer 
representation in supervisory or steering committees, 
or through producer organisations having their own 
extension set-up.
As illustrated in box 3, farmers who pay for extension 
services may develop an extent of ownership claims 
that brings them in a position to demand, and fi ght 
for, greater infl uence vis-a-vis more powerful other 
pla yers.
Box 2. For what services farmers pay actually – an observation from Nicaragua
In Nicaragua farmer groups can hire public extensionists of INTA (National Institute of Agricultural Technology) for 
specifi c services for payment.
Some of the farmer groups buying extension services said that they do pay for the advisory services because this 
allows them to build a personal relationship with the extensionists, and not primarily because they considered the 
services useful, although the services often resulted in increased profi t. As a result of the personal relationships 
they get access to credit and other resources of international cooperation. Thus it appears that the farmers did not 
really pay for the advisory services but rather for the tangible benefi t of access to resources.
Case 1 – INTA (National Institute for Agriculture Technology), Nicaragua
Box 3. An example from Costa Rica about chan-
ging ownership perceptions due to fi nancial 
par ticipation
ICAFE is a Costa Rican coffee sub-sector or ga-
nisation whose main task is adaptive research. 
It is fi nan ced fully by levies on exported produce 
de ducted from the price paid to the producers. 
Be si des the producers, processors and exporters 
are also members of the organisation. Only two 
of the seven persons on the board of ICAFE are 
producers. Recently the producers have become 
aware that it is in fact them who fi nance ICAFE. The 
producers are now demanding more representation 
on the board, and asking that each partner be re-
presented in accordance with its share in the fi  nan-
cing of the organisation. The outcome of the dispute 
is not yet known. 
Case 3 – ICAFE, Costa Rica
Case 2 – Pasolac/Inter coo pe-
ra tion, Honduras etc.
Box 8 – Changing relations 
between farmer and exten-
sionists (p. 39)
Case 2 – Pasolac/Intercoope-
ration, Honduras etc.
Case 9 – INDAP, Chile
Case 15 – SAHA, Madagas-
car
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Does ﬁ nancial participation by users improve the ﬁ nancial sus-
tainability of services?
If there is a small percentage of user fi nancing and the bulk of fi nancing comes 
from a single public source, the contribution of the users does not much change 
the dependence of sustainability on that source. Financial participation only in-
creases the chances of fi nancial sustainability if it covers a substantial part of the 
cost, and the contribution from the public source is not indispensable. 
The chances of fi nancial sustainability are thus not so much infl uenced by fi nan-
cial participation as by the fact that an extension organisation has diverse sources 
of funds, which make it less dependent on each individual source.
However, for some extension organisations the introduction of fi nancial partici-
pation has triggered the recognition that they can earn money themselves. This 
new awareness can be a fi rst step towards relying less on funds from outside.
There are cases of extension organisations that are fi nanced by producers fully 
or at least to a large extent, and still serve small farmers, although mostly not the 
very poor ones. The best potential for this lies in producers‘ own extension set-ups 
or services linked to product chains. 
If full fi nancial sustainability based on local resources is a requirement of an ini-
tiative, service cost must be fully adapted to the producers‘ ability to pay. This 
requirement may limit the service quality that can be achieved. Farmer exten-
sionists and local specialists are practical options.
4.3.2 Strengths and weaknesses of ﬁ nancial participation
Does fi nancial participation by users fulfi l the expectations behind the motives? 
The previous sections indicate that the answer is ‚yes‘ for some and and ‚no‘ for 
others. Is the new paradigm then justifi ed?
In our view, some degree of fi nancial par-
ticipation is desirable for virtually every ex-
tension organisation (but not necessarily for 
every service offered), because 
(a) it empowers producers, who turn from 
be nefi ciaries to customers or owners,
(b) it is the most helpful lever for ensuring 
ef fective ser vices and accountability of 
ex tensionists to users, 
(c) there is some measure of private interest in most services. 
Experience shows that farmers in general – also poor ones in many cases – are 
willing to pay for extension services if they are sure to get an added value that ex-
ceeds the cost in a reasonable period of time, and if the expenses do not compete 
Three good reasons for fi nancial participation
■ It empowers producers.
■ It is the most effective lever for ensuring 
accoun tability.
■ There is some measure of private interest in 
most services. 
Cases 22 – AKRSP, Pakistan
Case 20 – Farmer‘s Federation 
Fouta-Djallon, Guinea
Case 25 – Cotton manage-
ment enterprise, Peru
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with other immediate needs. Of course it is the farmer‘s 
perception of value and cost that is relevant, and not the 
monetary values that are more obvious to outsiders.
Extension services for payment always aim at enter-
prising farmers – be they rich or poor. The challenge is 
to design services whose benefi ts enterprising farmers 
can see and for which they are willing to pay.
On the other hand, the effects of fi nancial participation 
are never neutral. It favours those who have a certain 
level of resources and access to monetary markets. 
Some people are likely to be excluded, because not 
all farmers are able to pay, even though the services in 
question would contribute to improve their livelihoods. 
Another aspect to consider is, that the introduction of 
fi nancial participation often constitutes a fundamental 
change in a well-established system. Anyone attem-
p ting to introduce fi nancial participation must be 
pre pared to face all the resistance and resilience for 
which systems undergoing change are notorious. There is a series of obstacles 
that may get in the way – on the side of the users as well as on the side of the 
service providers. Therefore, the ground needs to be well prepared prior to the 
introduction of fi nancial participation.
4.4 Critical issues in ﬁ nancial participation
4.4.1 Equity
Financial participation is very likely to exclude potential users of the services. The 
poorest segments of the population are often simply not able to pay for extension 
services, because there are always more pressing needs for their scarce resources. 
Even in industrialized countries the introduction of fi nancial participation leads to 
changes in the structure of the clientele.
The ability to pay for extension services (in the private 
interest) is sometimes advocated as a useful se lection 
mechanism to reduce the provision of ineffective 
services, with the justifi cation that no amount of 
extension will improve the situation of extremely 
marginal farmers because they are not constrained by 
a lack of extension support, but by a lack of the most 
basic resources and that the fi nancial means for such 
ineffective extension services would be better spent on 
interventions that really help the very poor to improve 
their livelihoods.
Box 4. A fi nancial participation agreement for 
veterinary services in Northern Vietnam
A remote village in northern Vietnam: Villagers 
ra rely have money in their hands, but they are not 
destitute either. The local economy is still very much 
a barter economy. Village women were advised to 
vac cinate pigs against swine pest by a woman ve-
terinarian. The women asked the vet to visit them 
and do the vaccinations. But the vet said it was not 
possible for her to travel regularly to such a far-
away place. The village women and the vet then 
negotiated an agreement: The women agreed to 
pay for the motorbike fuel and the vaccine, but no 
fee or salary. Ho wever, of every six piglets that they 
raise to a marketable age, the women agreed to give 
one piglet to the vet as remuneration. Hence the vet 
had a vested interest in making sure that as many 
piglets as possible survived in as many households 
as possible. 
Case 4 – Veterinary services, Vietnam
Box 5. Impact of fi nancial participation in Thu-
ringia (Germany)
In the German state of Thuringia in 1998 substantial 
fi nancial participation was introduced. Before, ser vi-
ces were free. The result was a dramatic drop in de-
mand, from around 80% of farms seeking advice at 
least once per year, to 13% of farms. Moreover half 
of these were very large farms. Nearly 90% of the 
very large farms utilised the services for payment, 
whereas less than 10% of the remaining small and 
medium farms did so.
Case 13 – Service mandates with private extension 
enterprises, Thuringia (Germany)
Cases 1, 2, 13, 17
Box 5 and 6
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However, there certainly are extension services that 
contribute to improve the livelihoods of people who 
are unable to pay for these services. These benefi ts 
may not be monetary, but concern food security and 
quality.
Apart from the poor, particularly women who are less 
involved in the cash economy in many societies, may 
cease to utilise extension services if they have to pay 
for them.
Therefore, before ability to pay is taken as a criterion 
for selection of extension clients, the consequences 
should be assessed. 
4.4.2 Demand for services
Financial participation provokes changes in the types of services that are de-
manded. It works only with services that have substantial private good charac-
teristics. 
Financial participation has a better chance for success when the services con-
cerned result in direct short-term economic benefi ts. Services that deal with cash 
crops and different aspects of market integration rather than staple food crops 
are favoured. In some places a shift from production related services to services 
for processing and marketing took place after the introduction of fi nancial partici-
pation.
In general farmers have shown to be more willing 
to pay for tangible services (e.g. vaccination of ani-
mals, pruning of fruit trees) than for knowledge and 
information or process facilitation, probably because 
the added value from tangible services is direct 
and more obvious. But farmers are also paying for 
training events and advisory visits on their farm. In 
some places producer groups even paid for training 
in organisational development. Furthermore, services 
that result in ac cess to credit are often considered 
worth paying.
Services with little potential for immediate impact on 
income, but a high degree of public interest (e.g. soil 
con servation practices, gender) are not much deman-
ded, if the clients have to pay for them. 
The benefi ts of development of innovations (e.g. adap tive research, participatory 
technology development) are in general not obvious enough and do not come 
quickly enough for individual farmers to be willing to pay for them. 
Box 6. Searching for paying clients
In Nicaragua farmer groups can hire public exten-
sionists for specifi c services against payment.
The extensionists were advised to search actively 
for farmers willing to utilise the services they offer 
for payment. They fi nd such farmers mostly in higher 
potential areas and among those who are relatively 
better off. Very poor farmers are rarely among their 
clients. 
Case 1 – INTA, Nicaragua
Ch. 3.2.1 – Services offered 
by market forces
Cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 22
Boxes 2 (p. 35), 7 (this page)
Box 7. Informal payment for business plan as-
sistance in Kyrgyzstan
KSAPDA was an extension programme with an 
at ta ched credit scheme in Jalalabad Oblast in Kyr-
gyzstan. 
In this programme farmers paid extensionists for 
their assistance in making business plans in case 
they succeeded in securing a loan. This happened 
unoffi cially. The farmers and the extensionists had 
ac tually understood what would be appropriate 
fi nancing arrangements for this type of extension 
ser vice and acted accordingly, whereas the pro-
gramme was designed in the conventional way 
with all free services.  
Case 5 – KSAPDA, Kyrgyzstan
Ch. 3.2.2 – What market 
forces do not provide 
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The services for which fi nancial participation is considered must be of private 
good nature in the view of the farmers, not according to economic theory. Even 
if economic theory considers a service to be a private good, local societies may 
perceive this differently. And people will be willing to pay only for services that they 
view as private goods without regard to economic theory. 
Users will also be willing to pay for private good type extension only if the services 
are of high quality, and they are fairly certain to benefi t. Unwillingness to pay for 
services may be a sign that the services concerned do not bring about suffi cient 
(economic) benefi ts. But it may also be that the users are not certain about or are 
unaware of the benefi ts to be gained from a service, and thus may not be willing 
to invest in it. 
The consequences of such changes in the demand for services in either social, 
economic or ecological terms need to be given consideration.
4.4.3 Relations between extension users and extensio- 
 nists
Clearly, fi nancial participation has impacts on the relation between users and 
extensionists. On the one hand, as mentioned above, the position of farmers can 
change from that of benefi ciary to client or owner.  Extensionists become aware 
that farmers are clients, and the paternalistic attitude of extensionists towards 
farmers often observed in settings where service is free, becomes diffi cult. 
On the other hand, current thinking about participatory 
ap proaches to extension includes the notion that 
the knowledge and skills of rural people are just 
as important for effective extension as the external 
knowledge and skills of extensionists. What happens 
to this notion if farmers pay extensionists for their know-
ledge and skills? Financial participation may make far-
mers more protective about their own knowledge and 
skills, and thus make those aspects of extension work 
that depend greatly on pooling of knowledge – e.g. 
innovation development – more diffi cult, resulting in a 
focus on innovations from outside. 
The introduction of fi nancial participation can also af-
fect the trust relation between users and extensionists.
4.4.4 Value of knowledge
Financial participation may infl uence the values of a society, in the sense that it 
leads to attaching monetary values to knowledge, which in many places so far is 
considered a public good shared freely within a community. 
Box 8. Changing relation between farmers and 
extensionists in Central America
In PASOLAC the percentage of fi nancial participa-
tion is mostly between 5 and 10%. This relatively 
small amount radically changed the relation bet-
ween extensionists and farmers. The farmers 
rea lly turned from poor benefi ciaries to respected 
clients. This is illustrated by the fact that service 
providers have become punctual and reliable, and 
offer services also on weekends and other times 
that are convenient for the farmers.
Case 2 – PASOLAC / Intercooperation, Honduras etc.
Cases 1, 2, 30
Boxes 8 and 9
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No extension service can reach all potential clients 
and the scale of the impact of extension depends a 
lot on the free diffusion of new knowledge from farmer 
to farmer. However people who have paid for an ext-
ension service will often be unwilling to share their 
learning with others.
Thus the question emerges what the effects of fi nancial 
participation on the value of knowledge and its diffu-
sion among people may be? 
4.4.5 Framework conditions
The framework conditions determine the ease or diffi culty with which fi nancial 
participation can be introduced. Unfavourable framework conditions do not mean 
that fi nancial participation is not possible, but rather that diffi culties may be en-
countered that need to be overcome, and that it may be necessary to accompany 
the introduction of fi nancial participation by interventions towards changing the 
framework conditions. 
Factors and conditions unfavourable for ﬁ nancial participation
„Everything free“ environment. In an environment where all kinds of free 
services have been offered for many years, it is diffi cult to convince people to pay 
for services. 
Unfavourable rules and regulations. In some coun-
tries rules and regulations, e.g. about the operation of 
government institutions, or tax regulations for private 
enterprises, do not allow fi nancial participation or are 
unfavourable for its introduction.
Satisfaction of farmers with existing sources of 
services. In places where available free services are 
of suffi cient quality, users will be much less interes-
ted in services for payment than in situations where 
farmers are highly dissatisfi ed with what is available. 
Services within the own community not con si de red 
payable. In many societies, local extensionists, private 
and public, fi nd it diffi cult to demand payment from their 
fellow villagers. In many places it is unthinkable to ask 
for payment, or pay, for information and advice from 
fellow farmers, whereas it may be easier to demand 
payment for tangible services. Often it is particularly 
diffi cult to ask the rich and infl uential to pay. 
Box. 9. Decrease in farmer‘s trust in public ex-
tensionists in Tanzania
Trust between people is an important component of 
social capital. In a participatory poverty assessment 
in Tanzania, villagers reported that their trust in 
public extension workers had declined during the 
last few years. They said this was largely because 
the extension workers had started to charge fees 
for their services. 
Case 30 – Public extensionists, Tanzania, 
Nigeria and other countries
Box 10. Obstacles to fi nancial participation in 
Mali
PAIP supports the establishment of private exten-
sion providers, and attempts to introduce fi nancial 
par ti ci pation. However, there are some factors 
which make this diffi cult, although a culture of fi  nan-
cial participation exists in the programme area as a 
result of earlier in frastructure projects that applied 
this principle stri ctly.
The following factors were named as important 
ob stacles: 
•  uncertain profi tability of crops due to unfavoura-
ble climate, 
• weak farmer organisations,
• weak savings and investment culture,
• competition from NGOs and public organisations 
that offer free services,
• service providers used to being paid by donors 
and not to addressing the clients for payment.
Case 19 – PAIP, Mali
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Factors and conditions favourable for ﬁ nancial participation
An environment open to new ideas. It is easier to 
introduce fi nancial participation at times when general 
changes in policies and values are taking place, 
e.g. towards liberalisation, decentralisation and less 
government control. 
Awareness about the problems of free services and the 
benefi ts of fi nancial participation among policy makers, 
government bodies and other concerned institutions 
(e.g. NGOs, producer organisations) also fa cilitate the 
introduction of fi nancial participation.
Pressure on farmers. In situations where there is  gre at 
pressure on farmers to improve their farming as well 
as potential for signifi cant improvements, extension 
services for payment have a better chance.
Competent and self-confi dent extensionists. One 
of the most important pre-conditions for introducing 
fi nancial participation is related to the service provider 
and not, as one might expect, the users. Only compe-
tent, well-trained and self-confi dent extensionists can 
offer ser vices that are of suffi cient quality to be sold to 
users. 
Some degree of commercialisation. Because it 
is ultimately the markets that fi nance the farmers‘ 
share of the cost, fi nancial participation makes sense 
only in farming systems with at least some degree 
of commercialisation. Nowadays virtually all farming 
systems fulfi ll this condition.
Farmer groups as users. Financial participation is 
more feasible when services can be provided to groups 
of farmers, because in this case the cost per individual 
user is less. 
Confi dence of users in the extension organisation. The confi dence of users 
in the service providers and the usefulness of services is also an important 
favourable factor. 
Private enterprise as a service provider. People are used to paying for serv-
ices provided by private enterprises but not by donor-funded projects, NGOs, or, 
in many places, government institutions. Therefore, fi nancial participation is in 
general easier to introduce if the service providers are private enterprises. 
Box 11. Diffi culties in asking for payment in Sou-
thern Kyrgyzstan
The TES (Training and Extension Services) Centre 
in Osh in Kyrgyzstan supports private extensionists 
in establishing contracts with farmer groups for 
ser vices. 
When the fi rst payments were due, it turned out that 
the extensionists often felt they could not ask the us-
ers for payment despite the contract that had been 
signed, as the users were mostly from their own or 
a nearby village. And the users themselves did not 
feel obliged to pay.
Case 6 – TES Centre, Kyrgyzstan
Box 12. Willingness to pay in India
A study on willingness to pay for extension services 
conducted in India revealed that willingness to pay 
is greater:
• where satisfaction with the available sources of 
advice is low,
• with commercially oriented farmers,
• with better-educated farmers,
• where there are pressures such as small land-
holdings, or scarcity of irrigated land,
• where the percentage of income from agriculture 
is high, and the level of non-farm employment is 
also high (i.e. off-farm work does not pay well 
compared to farming).
The factors infl uencing willingness to pay varied 
from place to place. Thus the above factors merely 
give indications; other factors may be at work in 
other places.
Case 7 – Willingness to pay, India
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4.5 Good practice in introducing ﬁ nancial par-
ticipation
4.5.1 Assessing feasibility and desirability
Before taking a decision to embark on introducing fi nancial participation, one has 
to be clear about the motives for doing so. Then all the above issues – i.e. the 
likely effects of introducing fi nancial participation, type and quality of services, 
and framework conditions – must be analysed carefully, and an assessment 
must be made whether fi nancial participation is feasible and makes sense under 
the prevailing circumstances, and for what services. If not, consideration must 
be given to what needs to be done to change the circumstances, the size of 
necessary investments, and whether these investments are worth the effort. Once 
the decision has been taken, the „how“ has to be considered. Indications of good 
practice for the introduction of fi nancial participation can be derived from existing 
experience and theoretical considerations.
4.5.2 Preparation of the ground
Careful preparation of the ground is needed to lay a foundation for the introduc-
tion of fi nancial participation. Transparency, open information, discussion of the 
underlying concepts with all concerned stakeholders, and taking fears seriously 
are crucial. 
Box 13. Successful change management in Nicaragua
In Nicaragua farmer groups can hire public extensionists of INTA (National Institute of Agricultural Technology) for 
specifi c services against payment. 
The idea of fi nancial participation in the public extension system initially met with outright rejection. The promoters 
of the idea then embarked on a careful change management process which led to the acceptance and successful 
introduction of fi nancial participation. Consultations and discussions were held at all levels over several months 
before a fi eld test with four groups of voluntary farmers, and then a pilot programme were implemented.
The discussions with players of the ministry and national level institutions, and the leadership of the major producer 
associations, focused on the rationale for fi nancial participation (accountability, user orientation, and increased 
income for farmers as a result of extension).
Discussion with fi eld extensionists focused on raising awareness on the impact of services, and the capacity of the 
extensionists to offer services for which farmers may be willing to pay. The fact that the payments were to supplement 
directly the income of the extensionists was pivotal in overcoming the resistance of the extensionists.
Discussions with farmers all over the country centred around the value of extension services and their willingness 
to pay for services that allows them to increase their income. Further it sent a signal that services for payment are 
being considered.
This persuasion process was critical in getting acceptance for the idea. It was essential to understand the causes 
of opposition and the fears of the various players, and to ease them. Moreover, it was helpful to make actors at all 
levels participate in developing the practical aspects and tools. Many ideas were integrated into the concept. Another 
important factor was allowing suffi cient time for this process.
Case 1 – INTA (National Institute for Agricultural Technology), Nicaragua
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Conﬁ dence building
The confi dence of farmers in the usefulness of the services for which they pay, 
and confi dence in extensionists and extension organisations, needs to be devel-
oped. One way to do this is to ask for payment only once the benefi ts of a service 
are apparent. A fair assessment of benefi ts requires careful recording of data, 
particularly economic data, before and after, and with and without the service.
Confi dence of extensionists in the quality and value of the services they offer 
needs to be built. An analysis of all the functions, activities and services of the 
extensionists could be a start in this direction, followed by a discussion of the 
impact of the services. Consequently, it can be determined which activities directly 
benefi t users, and for which ones it would be possible to ask for payment. In such 
a process also gaps in the potential offer of services can be identifi ed. If it is found 
that very little activities benefi t users, this can be taken as a starting point for fi nding 
ways to offer more useful services.
Start with small-scale pilot activities
Convincing people about the appropriateness of something new and unknown 
is frequently much easier if the effects can be shown by a practical example. 
Therefore, fi nancial participation may be introduced 
fi rst on a pilot scale, in a limited area. In such a case 
care has to be taken to handle problems that may arise 
from unequal treatment of adjacent areas in a sensitive 
way.
Introduce ﬁ nancial participation for new 
things, not old hats
Financial participation should be introduced for ser vi ces 
which have new aspects or improvements compared 
to previous free services. It is discouraging if fi nancial 
participation is introduced for the same services that 
were free before, or for services that are less useful 
than those which are free.
4.5.3 Designing useful services that result in added value
A major challenge for fi nancial participation is to design services that clearly and 
obviously result in benefi ts for the clients, and address their main problems and 
constraints.
Sometimes it may be suffi cient to gather existing information and knowledge and 
arrange it in a suitable form. Often, however, it may be necessary to identify or 
develop new profi table opportunities, before useful services for a wider range of 
clients can be offered. 
Box 14. Resistance against fi nancial parti ci pa-
tion in Chile
The Chilean extension system has been based 
on publicly fi nanced service mandates to private 
ex tension enterprises for many years. Gradually 
in creasing fi nancial participation was envisaged. 
Ho wever, major problems were encountered in con-
 vincing farmers to pay their share. A key reason for 
this was that during the fi rst year of the programme 
intensive individual services were pro vi ded free of 
cost, whereas in subsequent years payment was 
de manded for less intensive group services.
Case 8 – INDAP (National Institute for Agricultural 
Development), Chile
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Generally speaking, the chances that the 
services offered are useful for the clients, 
are better if the latter are involved in defi n-
ing the service contents, the selection of 
the extensionsists and in monitoring and 
evaluation of services.
4.5.4 Capacity building for ex-
tensionists and users
To have the desired effects, fi nancial par-
ticipation requires different capabilities 
than the usual free public services, on 
the part of the extensionists as well as the 
clients. Extensionists may need additional 
training to be able to provide services of 
the required high degree of usefulness, or 
additional extensionists may have to be trained. The clients‘ ability to precisely 
identify their needs and articulate their demands may need to be developed. 
The required investments in training and coaching may be high, but they are often 
a justifi able investment for the future. Such capacity building is a measure that 
accompanies fi nancial participation, and not a pre-condition for its introduction.
4.5.5 Taking care of the public interests 
Financial participation favours services in the private interest, and this may have 
consequences for matters of public interest. Therefore the bodies representing the 
wider public interest have to be watchful for undesired consequences and ensure 
that corrective measures are taken if necessary.
Excluded potential users
As mentioned above, some former or potential users will not use services for 
which they have to pay (any more) for a variety of reasons. Where social justice is 
considered to be a public concern, it is necessary to watch for potentially ex-cluded 
users and decide whether measures should be taken that allow them access 
to services anyway. Inability to pay may be overcome by measures that target 
specifi cally those potential users who would benefi t from using the services, but 
are unable to pay. This may be done by transferring purchasing power through 
some demand-side fi nancing arrangement, credit for services, or by deferring 
payment until the time when benefi ts accrue (e.g. harvesting or marketing time). 
Box 15. Failed attempt to introduce fi nancial participation in 
Ecuador
The fruit programme of INIAP, a national public research institu-
tion in Ecuador, attempted to introduce fi nancial participation 
for extension services related to fruit production. It however was 
unable to do so. The following likely reasons were identifi ed:
• Participation of farmers in defi ning the contents of the services 
was insuffi cient.
• The services offered were not suffi ciently valuable for the far-
mers, because they were largely production-related and did 
not respond to the main problems that related to marketing 
alternatives, small margins, irrigation, and access to credit.
• Transparency and preparation for the introduction of payment 
was insuffi cient.
• The extension methodology was sometimes not adequate for 
the farmers.
Case 9 – INIAP, Ecuador
Cases 2, 8, 15, 18
Chapter 5.3 –  Demand-side 
fi nancing mechanisms
Box 4 (p. 37)
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Adverse impacts on ecological and economic sustainability
With the services that have short-term economic benefi ts favoured by fi nancial 
participation, there is obviously a risk of adverse impacts due to the promotion of 
unsustainable practices, particularly in ecological terms, but also with regard to 
longer-term economic viability. It is neither in the immediate interest of the users, 
nor of the extensionist to take a more long-term view. When fi nancial participa-
tion is introduced, the consequences for the ecological soundness of land use 
practices and the economic viability need to be observed. Services that promote 
sustainable practices or mitigate negative impacts may have to be made available, 
using public funds. 
Insufﬁ cient innovation development
The demand-orientation promoted by fi nancial participation mostly leads to de-
mand for services with proven impact. This can affect the development of inno-
vations, because the benefi ts of innovation development (e.g. adaptive research, 
participatory technology development) are in general not obvious enough and do 
not come quickly enough for clients to be willing to pay for them. Therefore pub-
lic funding is often necessary to ensure adequate development of useful innova-
tions. An alternative to public funding of innovation development are groupings 
of producers with a common interest in specifi c issues who jointly pay for ex-
perimentation on these issues. Or an entire farming community (e.g. a village, 
a district association) could jointly fi nance innovation development activities. In 
practice, however, often the organisational arrangements required for this are not 
in place. 
4.5.6 Negotiation of ﬁ nancial participation
Determining the users‘ cost share is a tricky matter, as it can make the difference 
between success and failure in introducing fi nancial participation. The users‘ share 
must be negotiated between the extension organisation and the users, and not 
be decided by outsiders. 
The following factors are the basis for negotiations on the cost of a service:
• the actual cost of a service,
• the degree of public interest in a service, 
• the value that users attach to a service.
The mode and timing of payment must be feasible for the users. Sometimes 
payment in kind or a delay in payment until harvesting time may be more appro-
priate than immediate cash payment.
Experience shows that it is helpful to determine the amount of payment for a 
service only when its benefi ts can be assessed by users and extensionists (i.e. 
after harvesting and marketing the crop), at least until some confi dence in the 
cost-sharing system has developed on both sides. 
Case 15 – SAHA, Mada gas car
Case 1 – INTA, Nicaragua
Case 4 –Veterinary services, 
Vietnam
Case 22 – AKRSP, Pakistan
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This may require that data on production cost, yield and market revenue are 
collected and analysed, maybe in a kind of comparative trial between the farm-
ers‘ usual practices and those promoted by the extensionists. However, there is a 
risk of secret harvesting to make the benefi ts appear to be lower than actual.
4.5.7 Direct or indirect payment?
Different arrangements for fi nancial participation are possible: e.g. direct payment 
by individual clients or payment from collective funds of a producer organisation. 
It appears that in principle both ways of payment can have the desired effects. 
However, in several cases of payment from collective funds, farmers did not realize 
that they in fact had paid for services, and consequently did not put their demands 
forward. 
Consequently, in case of indirect payment for services, fi nancial participation can 
only be effective if the system is transparent.
4.5.8 Incentives for extensionists
There are two options for allocating additional income from payments for serv-
ices: 
(a) the money paid by farmers goes directly into the pocket of the extensionist,
(b) the payment goes to the extension organisation and adds to the income of all 
extensionists.
There are arguments in favour of both options, and discussions about the better 
option are guided by beliefs rather than objective criteria. The following table lists 
some likely effects of each option, that can help in the selection.
Effects of options for allocating additional income from fi nancial par ti-
cipation. 
Note that some effects only concern extension organisations that provide free public services along 
with user-paid services.
Additional monetary benefi ts ...
... individual extensionist  ... the whole organisation
• Strong incentives for extensionists to 
offer good services
• Development of competitive spirit 
between the extensionists
• Risk that extensionists are less 
motivated to provide services, and serve 
clients, for which they get no additional 
income
• Promotion of corporate identity
• Facilitation of horizontal learning 
between extensionists through sharing 
of knowledge and experience 
• Allows services in the public and the 
private interest to be provided by the 
same organisation
Case 2 – Pasolac/Intercoo-
peration, Honduras etc.
Box 3 (p. 35) 
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4.5.9 Ensuring implementation of ﬁ nancial participation
Financial participation only brings the desired effects if it is actually implemented, 
and the arrangements must be designed accordingly. The payment of the public 
fi nance share should be made conditional on that the service provider actually 
collects a contribution from the clients. 
Without this conditionality the motivation to collect the clients‘ share will usually be 
small, because it is often easier and more profi table (because cost participation 
may reduce the number of clients) to offer services free of cost.
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4.6 Ten key lessons on ﬁ nancial participation by 
extension clients
■ Some degree of fi nancial participation is desirable for virtually every ex-
tension organisation (but not for every type of service), because it is a useful 
means to foster empowerment and promote effective services, and because 
there is a substantial degree of private interest in many services.
■ Enterprising farmers, including poor ones, are in general willing to pay for 
useful services. The challenge is to design services in such a way that they 
are suffi ciently and obviously useful.
■ Financial participation is feasible only for services that result in clear and 
obvious added value for the users.
■ Financial participation is not a means of reducing public expenses for 
extension because it requires highly competent service providers offering 
useful services. Achieving this, frequently demands substantial investment 
in capacity building.
■ Financial participation leads to effective, user-oriented services only if a) 
users are able to articulate their needs, b) service providers are capable of 
responding to them, and c) both are able to judge quality and impact of the 
services. 
■ Financial participation promotes ownership if it is linked to representation 
of producers in the steering of the extension organisation.
■ Financial participation is not helpful for services with a high de gree of public 
interest, because it reduces the number of people using these services.
■ Financial participation may exclude certain clients. Therefore it must be 
assessed whether this may have effects that contradict the objectives of an 
intervention. This may be the case if there are objectives related to poverty 
reduction or income increases for poor farmers. A public fi nancing scheme 
specifi cally for those who are unable to pay for extension services may 
accompany the introduction of fi nancial participation.
■ In principle the level of fi nancial participation should depend on the ratio 
of public and private interests. In practice negotiations between users and 
suppliers are crucial in determining the level, because they are likely to 
perceive this ratio differently. 
■ The introduction of fi nancial participation often meets resistance from 
the established systems of producers and service providers. Thus careful 
groundwork is a critical factor in successful introduction of fi nancial par-
ticipation. The feasibility and de sirability of fi nancial participation under the 
prevailing circumstances must be assessed at the outset.
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5.1 Introduction 
Public funds – from government or donor sources – can be channelled to an 
extension organisation (public or private) directly as supply-side fi nance or via the 
users as demand-side fi nance (see fi gure below).
With suppy-side fi nancing the eyes of the service providing extension organisa-
tion mainly look towards the source of funds, i.e. the service provider is account-
able to the latter. In the case of demand-side fi nancing the service provider is 
much more accountable to the clients i.e. its eyes must look much more towards 
the clients, in particular if some fi nancial contribution of the clients is included.
Supply-side fi nancing is currently much more common than demand-side fi -
nancing. Most public extension services, as well as the common donor-funded, 
NGO-delivered services, are supply-side fi nanced. However, various organisa-
tions and programmes in different places are gaining experience with different 
types of demand-side fi nancing mechanisms, as well as with new kinds of sup-
ply-side fi nancing systems. 
This chapter fi rst discusses unconventional approaches for supply-side fi nancing 
(consciously leaving out the usual supply-side fi nancing mechanisms) followed by 
various demand-side fi nancing models. Finally, consideration is given to deciding 
when to opt for demand-side or supply-side fi nancing.
Users/clients/ li
SERVICESI
$
ACCOUNTABILITY
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Users/clients/ li
SERVICESI
$
$
ACCOUNTABILITY
Supply-side and demand-side financing and their effects on accountablility
a) Supply-side financing b) Demand-side financing
5
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5.2 Unconventional supply-side ﬁ nancing – 
service mandates
This section deals with a rather unconventional form of supply-side fi nancing: 
service mandates. Service mandates can be concluded between governments 
and private (commercial or non-profi t) extension organisations. Such service 
mandates are often referred to as contracting-out or outsourcing. Service man-
dates can also be concluded between government administrative bodies and in-
dependently functioning public extension organisations. This latter option so far 
rarely appeared in the discussions on fi nancing of extension.
5.2.1 Service mandates in practice
Contracting-out to private extension organisations
A government body contracts extension organisations 
and mandates them to offer particular extension ser-
vices to a specifi ed clientele. Such service mandates 
are usually concluded with private organisations like 
for-profi t enterprises, NGOs, producer associations, 
or community organisations. 
A service mandate may be for the provision of services 
defi ned by the public sector or by the users. The 
con tracts often specify the clientele, e.g. a specifi c 
geographical area, agro-ecological zone or farming 
sy stem, specifi c population segments or types of far-
mers (e.g. farmers with less than a certain amount 
of land, women farmers, commercial vegetable pro-
ducers, etc.).
The best-described example of a service mandate 
system by a government is the one in Chile that is 
already more than 20 years old. It has been adapted 
and improved continuously in response to emerging 
problems, and thus a lot can be learnt from this ex-
perience. 
There are other cases of service mandates between 
government and private organisations that are inten-
ded to complement the public extension system with tasks and in areas it cannot 
cover. In several countries the government contracts extension service delivery 
for specifi c areas, or particular types of services (e.g. formation of producer 
organisations) out to NGOs.
Extension organisation
(private or public)
i i i
( i t li )
Government
Users/clients/ li
SERVICESI
$
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Service mandate system
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Service mandates between public bodies
Service mandates for extension can also be concluded between government 
administrative bodies and independently functioning public extension organisa-
tions. 
Service mandates between government bodies are based on the concept of New 
Public Management (NPM). NPM is an approach to make public institutions more 
effective and effi cient, largely based on shifting the focus of management from 
means and resources to products and impact. NPM approaches and tools are 
applied for public administrations in many industrialised countries, namely New 
Zealand, Australia, the US, and some European countries.
There appears to be hardly any experience with service mandates for extension 
involving different public bodies in developing countries, apart from a case in 
Kyrgyzstan where a service mandate system has been initiated on a pilot basis. 
The following cases show how service mandates may look in practice and allow 
fi rst insights.
5.2.2 Reasons for service mandates
Service mandates, in particular in the form of contracting-out from the government 
to the private sector, are advocated for a number of reasons. Some of these are 
justifi ed, for others experience indicates that they may not be correct. 
Reducing public expenditures for extension
It is often claimed that contracting-out to private organisations, and in fact man-
dating between government bodies, is more cost-effective than the usual public 
systems, and consequently results in reduced public expenditure. However, ex-
perience indicates that this is not an automatic consequence of service mandates 
but depends heavily on how contracts are formulated, i.e. that the contracting 
conditions encourage cost-effective services (desired results at minimum cost). 
Case number Title Where to fi nd description 
and more information
8 INDAP (National Institute for Agricultural Development), Chile P. 105; box 14 (p. 43), 17 (p. 52), 19 (p. 55), 23 (p. 61)
10 RAS (Rural Advisory Services), Kyrgyzstan P. 108; box 16 (p. 52), 18 (p. 54),  box 35 (p. 92)
11 Service mandates between public bodies, Switzerland P. 109
12 Service mandates with private advisers, Estonia P. 112
13 Service mandates with private extension enterprises, Thuringia, Germany P. 112; box 5 (p. 37)
2 PASOLAC/Intercooperation, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua P. 98;  box 1 (p. 34), 8 (p. 39) 
18 Mvula Trust, South Africa P. 115; box 21 (p. 60)
Case 10 – RAS, Kyrgyzstan
Boxes 16 and 18
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Service mandates with private service providers allow governments to ensure 
provision of services in the public interest without maintaining public extension 
organisations. This certainly reduces government expenditure for salaries and 
establishment cost, and leaves the public sector more fl exible, as it is usually 
easier to halt contracting than to lay off government employees when there is no 
longer a need for public funding of extension.
On the other hand, the cautioning about the expectation of reduced public ex-
penditures through fi nancial participation holds also for service mandates. 
Better quality of services
It is often said that competition for contracts leads to better service quality and thus 
more effectiveness. Experience shows that this is not automatically so.
Service quality in service mandate systems is just as 
dependent on good management as in common public 
extension systems. A transparent bidding process, 
adequate formulation and handling of contracts, ef-
fective accountability and supervision mechanisms, 
the avai lability of competent extensionists, and fi -
nancial participation by clients are key determinants of 
ef fectiveness and quality. 
Development of service markets 
Service mandate systems between government and 
private service providers are expected to contribute 
to the development of markets for extension ser-
vi ces. Well-managed mandate systems facilitate 
the establishment of a diverse range of extension 
organisations competing for government contracts. 
However, service mandates (since they are supply-side fi nancing systems), are 
not an optimal tool for developing independently functioning service markets with 
Box 16. Expectations from the service mandate system in Kyrgyzstan
In the RAS (Rural Advisory Services) in Kyrgyzstan a pilot service mandate between the central RAS secretariate 
and a decentral advisory centre has been initiated. 
There are expectations about the effects on cost-effectiveness of such a new setting. In common supply-side 
fi nancing systems, the budget allocated to an extension organisation usually depends heavily on the budget used in 
the previous year. The organisation is thus not motivated to use the funds as effi ciently as possible, because effi ciency 
would reduce the fi nancial resources available in future. If the extension organisation is mandated to provide specifi ed 
services at pre-determined cost, and is allowed to  keep unused funds, it will be much more motivated to use the 
funds effi ciently. This setting must be accompanied by very good, result-oriented of the quality monitoring, because 
there is also a motivation to save funds at the cost of quality of services.
Case 10 – RAS (Rural Advisory Services), Kyrgyzstan
Box 17. Problems with service quality in Chile
The Chilean extension system has been based on 
service mandates to private extension companies 
for many years. 
In the early years it was observed that there was 
little interest in the quality of services or whether 
they were addressing any real need. Because 
the extension fi rms had to enlist farmers to whom 
they would provide services, as a pre-condition 
for bid ding, they tended to take anybody who was 
ready to participate without considering whether 
the services offered could be of any use to these 
persons. Financial participation and explicit invol-
vement of users in determining the contents of the 
services improved the situation.
Case 8 – INDAP (National Institute for Development of 
Agriculture), Chile
Case 18 – Mvula Trust, South 
Africa
Ch. 4.3.1 – Motives for intro-
ducing fi nancial participation
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farmers as direct clients of the extension organisation. Demand-side fi nancing 
mechanisms are better suited for this purpose, although the private extension 
or ganisations that establish themselves in a service mandate system can on a 
longer term form a basis for an independent service market. 
Overcoming weak government institutions
Mandating the provision of extension services to private organisations is 
sometimes seen as a means of overcoming weak governmental institutions, or 
as a way for governments to dispose of their apprehensions about extension. 
However, service mandate systems require strong management competences 
on the part of the mandating governmental institutions, because they have to fulfi l 
important functions. 
5.2.3 Critical issues and good practice in service man-
 dates
Accountability to whom? 
In a service mandate system the accountability of the contractors will likely be di-
rected towards the source of funds, even more than if the extensionists are directly 
employed by the government, because contract renewal depends on satisfying the 
funding source. Thus service mandate systems have a high risk of being top-down 
if operational rules do not counteract this risk. 
In the case of services with a high degree of public interest, substantial account-
ability to the source of public funds is fi tting, but for services that are mainly in 
the interest of the users, the operational rules need to be formulated in a way that 
promotes accountability to users (fi nancial participation, involvement of users in 
defi ning extension contents and evaluation of activities, the possibility of sanctions 
if users are not satisfi ed).
Role and competence of government
Key roles of the government in service mandate systems are:
• Setting an adequate policy framework,
• formulating suitable tenders and contracts,
• supervision, monitoring and evaluation (i.e. quality control),
• ensuring that adequate training opportunities for extension providers are avai-
lable – be it in public or private institutions,
• ensuring that the public interest are taken care of.
Where the government does not have the capacity to take on these roles, either 
service mandates are not a good option or an investment in capacity building must 
accompany the introduction of the new system.
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Contract formulation
The key to success or failure in mandate systems (more than in other set-ups) lies 
in the design and formulation of the contracts.
Contract conditions that are crucial in stimulating quality and cost-effectiveness 
include:
• Financial participation of users in the case of services with a private goods 
component, 
• true participation of users in decision-making about extension content and in 
planning activities,
• focus on specifi cation of results and outcomes, and not mere listing of activities 
to be implemented,
• involvement of users in the selection of the service providers,
• an evaluation system which takes client satisfaction seriously,
• inclusion of the „soft“ aspects of extension in the contract (e.g. participatory 
and facilitative work by extensionists).
Financing conditions
To reward good quality service, it is advisable to link 
payment partially to the results achieved. 
An extension organisation will be most motivated 
to work in a cost-effective way when there is some 
reward for it. Therefore, a contract should fi x the 
amount to be paid for stipulated services and quality, 
and the extension organisation should be allowed to 
allocate funds it does not use because its services are 
cost effective, for other purposes (e.g. staff training). 
However, beware of mixing up savings due to lower 
quality and cost effectiveness.
If fi nancial participation by clients is foreseen, payment 
of the public share must be dependent on the collection 
of the clients‘ contribution. Otherwise the extension 
organisation may prefer not to collect it, in order to get 
more clients and thus ultimately more income.
Result-orientated monitoring and evaluation 
Activity-based monitoring does not encourage attention to quality of service. 
Therefore monitoring should be result-oriented (e.g. the number of farmers who 
adopted a new way of doing things instead of the number of people who attended 
training, or as an intermediate indicator of quality, the percentage of participants 
who can explain something new and useful they learnt in a training). Clients are 
in the best position to judge the usefulness of services; thus their opinion must 
have suffi cient weight in the evaluation.
Box 18. Funding arrangements for a service 
mandate in Kyrgyzstan
In the RAS in Kyrgyzstan the service mandate 
between the central secretariate and an advisory 
cen tre at province level includes partly perfor man-
 ce-based fun ding arrangements. Funds are paid on 
three dif ferent grounds: 50% of the planned budget 
is core funding based on annual work plans. 30% of 
the budget is output funding, based on achievable 
and measurable outputs such as training conduc ted, 
de monstrations arranged, publications produced, 
etc. 20% is paid for measurable results in the fi eld 
(e.g. income from a specifi c product produced by 
farmers participating in training compared to non-
participating farmers). The challenge is to fi nd in-
dicators for which the advisory service is actually 
responsible with no other factors involved. 
Case 10 – RAS (Rural Advisory Services), Kyrgyzstan
Case 18 –  Mvula Trust, South 
Africa
Box 21 (p. 60)
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Competence and capacity of the extension organisation
The mandated extension organisation needs well-developed operational com-
petence and management skills. 
The capacity of organisations bidding for contracts to fulfi ll the quality require-
ments stipulated in contracts should be assessed carefully in advance. This in-
cludes technical knowledge as well as methodological skills and management 
abilities. It is also necessary to make sure that they 
precisely understand the con-tracting conditions. 
Availability of training opportunities 
Competition for contracts between private service pro-
viders can only lead to better services if there are ade-
quate opportunities for professional development and 
training of extension personnel. It is a responsibility 
of the pu blic sector to ensure that such training op-
portunities are available. This does not imply that the 
public sector should offer the training itself. Service 
mandates or demand-side fi nancing mechanisms 
ba sed on similar principles than for extension ser vi-
ces involving diverse non-government training or ga-
nisations are often more appropriate options. 
Technology transfer vs. facilitation
Result-oriented contracts for „hard“ services (e.g. production technology) are 
rather easy and straightforward. Result-oriented contract formulation is much 
trickier where it concerns „soft“ services such as process facilitation, motivation, 
and organisational development. Thus service mandates are easier for „hard“ 
than for „soft“ services. Consequently, unless special attention is paid to this is-
sue, service mandates may result in neglect of the soft aspects of extension and 
a focus on production technology.
Short-term contracts result in short-term achievements
Service mandate are often used for contract periods of approximately one year. 
They may be renewable, but extension organisations can never be sure that a 
contract will be renewed. On the one hand this provides motivation for quick and 
tangible achievements, but it is also likely to discourage activities with a longer 
time perspective. Thus, for services with a longer term perspective contracts for 
several years are advisable.
Box 19. Importance of training opportunities
In the Chilean service mandate system initially no 
attention was given to training op por tunities for 
the private enterprises to which ex tension service 
provision was contracted out. Af ter some time it 
became clear that there were not enough well-
qualifi ed extensionists to ensure the desired quality 
of services and cover the de mand. Consequently, 
INDAP (National Institute for Agricultural Deve lop-
ment), the public institution responsible for ma-
naging the service mandate sys tem, took on the 
responsibility of offering training to the extension 
organisations.
Case 8 – INDAP (National Institute for Development 
of Agriculture), Chile
Case 18 – Mvula Trust, South 
Africa
Chapter 8 for options of trai-
 ning systems in de cent ra lised 
settings 
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Risk of corruption 
Government tenders and contracts in both industrialised and developing coun-
tries have a reputation of being linked to favouritism and nepotism. This may give 
rise to all kinds of accusations of corruption – justifi ed or not – in the context of a 
service mandate system. And it cannot be denied that there is a real risk in many 
places that such mandates are allotted according to political rather than objective 
criteria. Financial participation by users and monitoring by independent bodies 
can contribute to reduce the corruption risk and suspicions.
5.3 Demand-side ﬁ nancing
5.3.1 What shape can demand-side ﬁ nancing take?
There are different forms of demand-side 
fi nancing sys tems. 
The adjacent fi gure shows the basic form of 
a demand-side  fi nancing system: funds are 
channelled from the source to the clients. The 
clients then buy services from an extension 
organisation. Of course, this requires some 
form of contractual arrangement to ensure 
correct use of the funds. Usually contracts are 
made between clients and funding source, and 
often between clients and service providers 
(as opposed to service mandate systems in 
which contracts are between funding source 
and service providers (see p. 50)). 
To facilitate quality control, extension 
organisations have to be accredited in some 
way (e.g. licensing, certifi cation, shortlisting) 
to be accepted as service providers. Any 
com petent organisation may be admissible as a service provider, from private 
consulting fi rms, extensionists of pro ducer associations, and NGOs to parastatal 
and govern ment institutions.
Often the money allocated to demand-side fi nancing pro grammes is put into a 
grant fund. Clients, mostly in some organised form, can apply for fi nancing from 
this fund. The fi nance for the grant fund may be from one or several fun ding 
sources. Such funds are encountered under dif ferent names like basket funds, 
co-fi nancing funds, com petitive grant funds, extension funds, agricultural deve-
lop ment funds, etc. 
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Users/clients/ li
SERVICESI
$
$
CONTRACT
CONTRACT
SHORTLIST, LICENSEI , I
Demand-side financing
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There are various possibilities for fund governance and 
administration of grant funds: boards with representatives 
from a variety of stakeholders, independent private organi-
sations, government bodies etc. 
Vouchers and refunding systems are other ways of putting the 
concept of demand-side fi nancing into practice. 
The adjacent diagram depicts a voucher system: The users 
obtain vouchers from the funding source which entitle them to 
specifi ed services from an extension organisation. They pay 
for the services received with the voucher. After delivery of 
services, the extensionist submits the voucher to the system 
administrator and is paid. Often the approved extension or-
ganisations are shortlisted or licensed. 
Refunding (part of) the expenses for extension service is an 
approach very similar to vouchers for environments in which 
farmers have suffi cient cash at hand. Service providers also 
in this case are usually registered in some way.
5.3.2 Demand-side ﬁ nancing in practice
Programmes for local or community infrastructures (e.g. 
water supply and irrigation schemes) have relatively long 
experience with demand-side fi nancing. Communi ty 
organisations or other user groups obtain funds, usually 
to be complemented by their own funds, to buy technical 
advice, material and labour for the construction of the 
infrastructure. 
Competitive grant funds are used in various countries to 
direct public funds to-wards the most promising (agricultural) 
research activities (Gill and Carney 1999, Dufaut 1998). 
Experience with demand-side fi nancing for extension services is still relatively 
rare, and existing experience is rather recent, although agricultural development 
and extension grant funds are advancing in different places because some major 
donors increasingly support this type of approach.
Voucher systems are often mentioned as a promising approach. However, there 
is little practical experience with vouchers for extension services. Voucher sys-
tems have been used fairly often in small enterprise development programmes 
for vocational training and business development services. This experience is 
relatively well analysed. A refunding system is in use in the German state of 
Sachsen-Anhalt.
The insights about demand-side fi nancing systems presented in the following 
section are based on experience gained in the cases below.
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Users/clients/ li
REPORT/
PROOF
/
SERVICESI
$
$
SHORTLIST, LICENSEI , I
A refunding system
Extension organisationi i i
Sources of financei
Users/clients/ li
$
VOUCHER
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$
SERVICESI
A voucher system
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Case number Title Where to fi nd description 
and more information
8 INDAP, Chile (early years) P. 105; box 14 (p. 43), 17 (p. 52), 19 (p. 55), 23 (p. 61)
14 CABI-IPPM Programme, Tanzania, Kenya P. 113; box 20 (p. 59)
15 SAHA, Madagascar P. 113
16 Voucher systems in Small Enterprise Development, various 
countries P. 114; box 22 (p. 61)
17 Refunding system, Sachsen-Anhalt (Germany) P. 114; box 23 (p. 61)
18 Mvula-Trust, South Africa P. 115; box 21 (p. 60)
2 PASOLAC/Intercooperation, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua P. 98;  box 1 (p. 34), 8 (p. 39)
5.3.3 Reasons for demand-side ﬁ nancing
Demand-side fi nancing systems have their strengths for specifi c purposes and in 
specifi c situations. Some of these purposes are mutually not exclusive and can 
be combined; others do not go well together. 
Developing service markets 
Demand-side fi nancing may be chosen as part of a strategy to promote and fa-
cilitate the development of markets for extension services. If implemented ap-
propriately, it has little distorting effects on markets, allows business-like fi nancial 
relations between clients and extension service providers, and does not crowd out 
any potential service providers.
Particularly, voucher and refunding systems are mechanisms used with the ex-
plicit objective of market development. They allow users to convince themselves 
of the usefulness of services by trying them without too much fi nancial risk. Public 
funding in this case is temporary, as a kind of special offer for a limited time. It is 
expected that after some time the service markets will continue to function without 
any public funding. 
However, experience with vouchers to develop markets for business development 
services in the small enterprise sector, raises questions about the potential of 
limited-time demand-side fi nancing to result in functioning markets. Supply and 
demand for services have often declined substantially once public subsidies are 
phased out (Gibson 2000).
Demand-orientation and accountability
Demand-side fi nancing is used as a means to promote demand-oriented serv-
ices and to direct public fi nance for extension to those service providers who 
best respond to users‘ requirements. It facilitates a relationship of accountability 
between extensionists and clients, as was explained earlier in the diagram on p. 
49). 
Case 13 – Service mandates, 
Thuringia (Germany)
Chapter 6.2 – Developing mar-
kets for extension ser vi ces
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Empowerment of clients 
Demand-side fi nancing in the form of grant funds 
and similar settings can be employed as a means 
of developing local manage ment ca pa cities, and the 
ability to analyse one‘s own situation and to articulate 
need and de mand for services. Moreover, demand-
side fi nancing makes a paternalistic attitude on the 
part of service providers towards far mers unlikely. 
Accordingly, demand-side fi  n ancing is a mechanism 
to empower them selves that allows rural people.
Competition between types of ser vices
Demand-side fi nancing systems do not only encoura ge 
competition between different service providers, but, 
particularly in case of competitive grant funding, also 
between different project proposals or types of servi-
ces. Under the condition that an adequate selection 
me chanism exists the public funds are directed to the 
most promising initiatives and services. 
Transfer of purchasing power 
Demand-side fi nancing can be used as a means of allowing access to services 
in market-based systems for those who otherwise cannot afford the services. In 
other words, demand-side fi nancing can be used to transfer purchasing power to 
people who do not have it. 
5.3.4 What demand-side ﬁ nancing system for which si tu a -
 tion?
The following table compares the suitability of different demand-side fi nancing 
mechanisms for different purposes and situations.
Basic demand-side fi nancing and grant funds Voucher system Refunding system
Requires a functioning local banking system Works without banking 
sys tem and in areas where 
people have very little cash
Requires that clients have 
cash in hand
Suitable for strengthening local management, fund handling 
capacities, and articulation of demand
Suitable where payment for services by the clients is the 
normal way and some clients need to be subsidised
Suitable when the clients are organised in some way Can be used for individual users as well as for groups
Suitable when direct contacts to clients already exist, but it is 
of course possible to establish contacts as a fi rst step
Suitable when the target group for the subsidies is defi ned, 
but no direct contacts exist
Suitable to fund longer-term services and projects; for very 
short one-off advisory services too complicated 
Suitable for short duration and one-off services
Box 20. Demand-side fi nancing for Farmer Field 
Schools in Tansania and Kenya
In an IPPM (Integrated Pest and Production Ma na ge-
ment) pro g ram me operating in Kenya and Tansania 
farmer groups get funds to pay ex tensionsist as 
trainers for Farmer Field Schools.
The following positive effects have been ob ser-
ved:
• Farmers learn to decide which extension ser vices 
are more or less important to them,
• they understand the cost of extension,
• they learn how to manage community funds,
• bad extensionists are not paid,
• reduction of workload for the fi eld school groups 
and the pro gramme staff because of shorter 
decision pro cesses and less travelling time.
Case 14 – CABI-IPPM Programme, Tanzania, Kenya
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5.3.5 Critical issues and good practice for demand-side 
ﬁ nancing
Demand-side ﬁ nancing for private interests
Demand-side fi nancing is appropriate mainly for services characterised by a 
substantial degree of private interest. This private interest is not limited to indi-
viduals or families; it may also be the interest of a particular group of people, e.g. 
an interest group, a producer organisation or a community. The public funds should 
be directed to the people who have the main interest in the respective service.
Competence of users and service providers
Financing of services themselves is very often not enough. Potential users 
must learn to identify and articulate their demand, negotiate with the service 
providers, as well as judge and control service quality. Service providers must 
be able to offer the services that are demanded; they need the right knowledge, 
experience and skills. Thus demand-side fi nancing of services very often needs 
to be complemented by support of capacity building on both, the client and and 
the service provider side. 
The funds for capacity building may be provided as supply-side fi nance, but can 
as well be channelled as demand-side fi nance, i.e. given to the persons and or-
ganisations that need training and coaching, who then purchase the necessary 
support services. 
Innovative initiatives
It is a challenge to identify extension services that truly have a positive impact 
on the livelihoods of rural people. Demands formulated by farmers or rural com-
munities are based on their own immediate experience and on what they have 
seen in their surroundings. New opportunities offered by innovative products, in 
more distant markets, by new forms of organisational cooperation etc. are easily 
overlooked in pure demand-fi nancing systems. Thus demand-side fi nancing 
pro grammes ought to encourage and fund the conscious search for innovative 
Case 15 – SAHA, Madagas-
car
Case 2 – Pasolac/Intercoo-
peration, Honduras, etc.
Case 15 – SAHA, Mada gas-
car
Case 18 – Mvula Trust, South 
Africa
Box 21. Result-oriented contracts to foster better quality services 
The Mvula Trust supports rural communities in South Africa in setting up water supply schemes using a demand-
side fi nancing approach.
Although there is a market for development consulting services in South Africa and certainly some competition 
between them, the Mvula Trust fi nds it diffi cult to identify consultants who are able and willing to work in the desired 
participatory manner. Most consultants – be they engineers, social workers or trainers – try to fulfi l their contracts 
with as little effort as possible. They do not take uneducated villagers seriously. Moreover, village organisations 
fi nd it diffi cult to demand quality services from the service providers they contract. They simply do not know what 
”quality” could mean. Thus, Mvula staff has to undertake a great deal of controlling. As a response, Mvula Trust 
is now developing result-oriented contracts, in which the capacities that the village water committees should have 
acquired as a result of the consultant’s work are specifi ed.
Case 18 – Mvula Trust, South Africa
61
Directing public funds: supply-side and demand-side fi nancing
ideas and gathering of helpful information from various sources, as well as joint 
(by farmers and service providers) investigation and experimentation on potential 
opportunities. 
Complex administration 
As in demand-side fi nancing systems funds must be 
distributed to many more different places than with 
supply-side fi nancing, administration and control are 
considerably more complex. It generally is much easier 
to channel donor funds to one or two rural development 
NGOs and control their use, than to several dozen 
local organisations. Consequently, the administration 
of demand-side fi  nan cing systems is relatively costly. 
However, the cost of administering demand-side 
fi nancing systems remains to be compared with the 
administrative costs of conventional supply-side fi nanced 
extension organisations. Moreover, the empowering capacity buil ding effects of 
demand-side fi nancing may often justify higher administrative cost.
On the other hand it has been observed that demand-
side fi nancing can also reduce the administration efforts 
required. Competent clients and confi dence in their 
capacity on the part of the programme management 
certainly favours lower administrative efforts.
Financial participation of clients
In demand-side fi nancing systems fi nancial par ti ci-
pation of clients – even if small – is a must. Without 
it, the motivation to use available funds ef fectively and 
effi ciently is limited. Moreover, fi nancial participation 
grea tly enhances the effect of demand-side fi nancing 
on userorientation and accountability of service pro-
viders to clients.
The payment of the public fi nance component to 
the service provider should be made conditional on 
payment of the users‘ contributions; otherwise there is 
no motivation to insist on it. 
Control
Effective control and monitoring mechanisms that 
com plement the effect of fi nancial participation, are 
particularly important success factors in demand-side 
fi nancing. Such mechanisms include some form of 
ac cre ditation of eligible extension organisations, mo-
Box 22. Cost of administration of voucher sys-
tems
The Swiss development organisation Swisscontact 
has used voucher systems with the objective of de-
veloping training and BDS (Business Development 
Services) markets for small enterprises in a number 
of countries.
They found that the administration of the voucher 
schemes is relatively costly, i.e. the cost for admini-
stration of the schemes can be upto twice the value 
of the allotted vouchers. 
Case 16 – Voucher systems in Small Enterprise 
Development, various countries
Box 23. The three important C in demand-side 
fi nancing systems
In 1978 Chile began to provide vouchers to farmers 
which they could use to purchase technical as sis-
tan ce from private extension enterprises. Su-
per vision was supposed to be done by farmers 
themselves, and there was no fi nancial participation. 
Fur ther there were only a few service providers, 
and farmers had no real choice. The result was that 
many vouchers were submitted to the government 
with little or no extension at all having taken place. 
Consequently, better supervision mechanisms 
in cluding outside control, support and training op-
portunities for service providers and, later, fi nan cial 
participation, were introduced.
In contrast, the refunding system in Sachsen-An-
halt, included a fi nancial contribution, support to 
service providers to ensure that there are suffi cient 
service providers available, and adequate control 
mechanisms, from the very beginning. Thus it did 
not encounter the problems observed in Chile and 
is functioning well. 
From the experience in Chile and Sachsen-Anhalt 
three C, that are crucial for proper functioning of de-
mand-side fi nancing can be derived: a) a fi nancial 
contribution by the clients, b) effective control, c) 
competition between service providers.
Case 8 – INDAP, Chile
Case 17 – Refunding system, Sachsen Anhalt (Germany)
 Box 20 (p. 59)
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nitoring of activities, and unbiased evaluation of results and impact – from the 
viewpoint of the users and the public interest.
Competition between service providers
Demand-side fi nancing makes sense only where the users who obtain fi nancing 
really have a choice among different service providers, i.e. if there are enough 
service providers in an area to ensure a measure of competition. 
If this is not the case, investment in the establishment of more service providers 
may be required. This implies complementing the demand-side fi nan cing setup 
with support to the supply side, e.g. through partial funding of the cost of setting 
up basic infrastructure, but also in the form of capacity building. 
In countries where public extension organisations are dismantled, there is of-
 ten a good potential for a diversity of service providers to emerge, if former 
public employees are supported in establishing themselves as private service 
providers.
Development of proposals
The articulation of demand and the formulation of proposals for initiatives and 
projects by clients often needs outside support, at least initially. Users and ser-
vice providers may cooperate in this, although there is a certain risk that the 
service providers push their own ideas too much in order to get an assignment. 
Alternatively the support for project elaboration may be provided by representa-
tives of the funding source. 
Selection of initiatives to be funded
What criteria should be used for the selection? Who should be involved in the 
selection decisions? Answers to these questions are very situation-specifi c, and 
thus here only a couple of thoughts are given.
As common sense tells, transparency is very important. Nevertheless it is often 
not practised, resulting in distrust and confl icts. 
The bodies that decides which initiatives are to be funded need to be selected with 
care. Service providers should usually be represented in selection bodies only in 
an advisory capacity without voting rights. Representation of public and private 
interests in the selection decisions needs to be balanced in accordance with the 
attached interests.
Demands from clients can be very diverse and thus demand-side fi nancing fa-
vours sort of piecemeal initiatives rather than of coherent programmes. If desired, 
programme coherence can be achieved through appropriate selection criteria and 
the targeted allocation of funds to initiatives in specifi c fi elds. 
See also chapter 6 – Fos tering 
private extension services
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Information
Often the information about the existence of a demand-side fi nancing system 
and the conditions for obtaining funds does not reach the majority of the people. 
Hence a communication strategy to make the availability of funds and the rules of 
the game known to potential users may be necessary. 
In voucher systems the question of information and distribution of vouchers has 
been addressed in a number of ways: In some voucher systems the service 
providers themselves got the tasks to inform people and distribute vouchers. 
This resulted in confl icts of interest between unbiased information provision and 
voucher distribution, and the wish to attract as many clients as possible, and led 
to a tendency to distribute vouchers to people for whom the concerned service is 
not really useful. This can be avoided with a compulsory fi nancial contribution. In 
another case vouchers were distributed through telephone kiosks because they 
exist everywhere, including in remote areas, and are easily accessible. Here the 
problem arose that the kiosk operators were not in a position to provide adequate 
in-depth information and advice.
Duration of demand-side ﬁ nancing interventions
It is often said that vouchers and other demand-side fi nancing interventions 
should only be temporary to stimulate demand and supply, and must gradually be 
reduced. However, this rule can only apply where service markets really develop 
and this seems rare apart from certain profi table spheres. Experience indicates 
that the effectiveness of kick-off subsidies as a tool to foster the development of 
independently functioning service markets is doubtful. 
Moreover if the purpose of a demand-side fi nancing intervention is related to a 
persisting public interest as in the case of poverty reduction or ecological meas-
ures, long-term public funding is necessary and justifi ed. For instance, if marginal 
farmers are intended to have access to useful extension services continually, 
(partial) public funding has to be continual too, unless the services are so effective 
that the poor escape poverty to the extent that they can afford services purely with 
their own means. 
Thus the duration of demand-side fi nancing interventions does not necessarily 
need to be only temporary, but should be in accordance with the duration of the 
public interest in the concerned services.
Changes in power relations
The introduction of demand-side fi nancing in general requires substantial changes 
in established systems, and it is clear that these systems often resist change 
fervently. 
Along with the transfer of purchasing power, other powers are also transferred, 
and many donors as well as governments and NGOs feel uncomfortable with the 
loss of power and control associated with demand-side fi nancing, and thus resist 
See p. 58 and 70 for more 
details
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such changes in power relations. Moreover, the clients, too, may resist because 
they are unwilling to take on more responsibility. 
Careful and transparent change management also here helps to overcome re-
sistance and create support for the changes. 
5.4 Demand- or supply-side ﬁ nancing?
The following table provides a comparison between demand- and supply-side fi -
nancing systems, summarising the key points made in the previous sections.
Situations in which demand-side fi nancing 
systems are likely to be more adequate
Situations in which supply-side fi nancing 
systems are likely to be more adequate
When accountability should be mainly towards the users, 
i.e. when the service is mainly of private interest
When a high degree of accountability to the public is 
desired
When the development of service markets that function 
independently is a goal
When the government wants to keep some control over 
the system
For services that are meant to be paid fully by users at a 
later stage
For services which are planned to be mainly publicly 
fi nanced for a long time
When there is a service market where clients normally 
pay for services and the aim is to publicly subsidise 
specifi c client groups or areas of service
For ensuring services in which higher-level public interest 
is dominant 
When empowerment and development of local 
management and capacity to articulate demand are goals
When users do not have the capacity to articulate their 
needs well
When there are service providers but they do not yet offer 
services responding to the demands of the clients and 
must fi rst become aware of their needs
When there are only few potential service providers
Case 1 – INTA, Nicaragua
Box 13 (p. 42)
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■ Public funds for extension can be channelled to an extension organisation 
directly as supply-side fi nancing or via clients as demand-side fi nancing.
■ Service mandates are not only an option for contracting out extension 
services to private service providers, but can also be concluded between 
government bodies at different levels.
■ With service mandates, accountability is heavily oriented towards the 
sour ce of funds.
■ Service mandates provide motivation for good-quality and cost-effective 
services if the contract is result-oriented and the funding system is such 
that service providers are rewarded for cost-effectiveness.
■ Over-attention to cost-effectiveness may result in a loss of quality. 
■ Competition for contracts does not automatically promote service quality 
and innovation. Opportunities for capacity development must be in place. 
■ Demand-side fi nancing is particularly recommended when independently 
functioning service markets are a goal, when the private interest component 
of  services is high, and when empowerment of clients and local manage-
ment ca pacity are goals.
■ Demand-side fi nancing often needs to be complemented by supply-side 
fi nancing to develop the capacity of extension service providers, and by 
efforts to develop the capacity of users to articulate their needs.
■ Demand-side fi nancing combined with fi nancial participation strongly pro-
motes accountability towards users.
■ Demand-side fi nancing changes power relations. This is one of the reasons 
why it meets with resistance from donors and service providers, who are 
likely to loose some control.
■ Success for demand-side fi nancing systems is based on factors such as 
fi nancial participation, competition between service providers, and a good 
controlling system.
5.5 Key lessons on mechanisms to direct public 
funds for extension
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6.1 Introduction
In most countries a large proportion of public and donor funding is allocated 
for public extension organisations and non-profi t NGOs. This is true for well-
established programmes as well as for many recent initiatives.
An alternative to channelling public and donor funds directly into public extension 
organisations and NGOs that offer free services, is to use these funds to build up 
extension organisations in the private sector. Such extension organisations may 
be private commercial enterprises, or extension services of producer, community 
and sub-sector organisations. 
These extension providers offer services to their clients for payment. Farmers are 
not the only possible clients of private extension organisations. Private extension 
organisations can also be contracted by public bodies at various levels (national 
government, local government, community) to provide services in the interest of 
the respective constituencies, e.g. through service mandates. Through demand-
side fi nancing mechanisms private service providers can be made accessible to 
a clientele that would normally not make use of such services. 
Of course, private extension service provision is nothing uncommon, for instance 
linked to producer organisations, subsector production, processing and marketing 
chains, or linked to input supply. This chapter does not look at such arrangements 
in general, but highlights issues to take into consideration when investing public 
funds in the building of extension organisations in the private sector.
Thus, the chapter deals fi rst with support for the establishment of extension service 
providers in the private commercial sector with the purpose of developing markets 
for extension services. Some issues related specifi cally to extension services of 
producer organisations are discussed in the second part of the chapter. Finally 
two examples of services based on marketing margins are presented: The fi rst is 
a case of advisory services based on price differences for organic produce, and 
the second a special example of advisory services provided by suppliers of inputs 
and fi nanced by a margin on input sales.
6.2 Developing markets for extension services
Initiatives that support the establishment of private commercial extension enter-
prises in most cases have the more or less explicit goal of developing markets 
for extension services. Such efforts come in various forms. Many initiatives that 
aim at developing service markets typically support building of service providers‘ 
capacities. This may include training and coaching in technical know-how, meth-
ods and management, as well as assistance for product development and shar-
Chapter 5 – Directing public 
funds: supply-side and de-
mand-side fi nancing
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ing the risk of investing in establishing an enterprise (e.g. by partially fi nancing 
infrastructure).
Sometimes this is complemented by capacity building on the client side (needs 
analysis and articulation of demands, organisational development, etc.).
Most initiatives that want to develop markets for services also subsidise the actual 
service provision. Mostly it is foreseen that these subsidies are phased out after 
some time. In other cases the services are planned to be permanently publicly 
funded (at least partially). 
When the services are intended to be only initially subsidised, demand-side 
fi nancing mechanisms are used to stimulate the demand for services and to 
encourage service providers to offer services that respond to demands (mainly 
voucher and refunding systems). If permanent public contributions are foreseen 
(i.e. when services are in the public interest), both supply-side and demand-side 
fi nancing mechanisms are used (e.g. service mandates, demand-side grant 
funds).
To be truly pluralistic, markets for services must allow anybody who has marke ta-
ble skills and knowledge to be a provider of services. Private enterprises, producer 
and community organisations, agricultural specialists, NGOs, as well as public 
servants and public organisations may offer services in the market. The client side 
includes a similar diversity of individuals and organisations. Nevertheless, many 
initiatives with the aim of developing markets focus support on a limited number 
of service providers and do not really promote true pluralistic markets.
The idea of promoting service markets in developing countries came up fi rst in 
the domain of enterprise development; consequently, it is in this fi eld that broader 
experience has been gained in developing service markets, namely with support 
services for small enterprises (Business Development Services). 
In the fi eld of extension, experience with developing markets for services is still 
scarce, but approaches that aim at market development are becoming increas-
ingly popular. Large World Bank funded programmes in a range of countries 
(e.g. Nicaragua and Uganda) plan to employ various demand- and supply-side 
fi nancing mechanisms to facilitate the development of markets for services. There 
are a few established examples where promoting markets for services is a more 
or less explicit major goal.
The following cases illustrate different strategies to support private commercial 
extension providers and market development.
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Case number Title Where to fi nd description 
and more information
6 TES Centre, Kyrgyzstan P. 103; box 11 (p. 41)
8 INDAP, Chile P. 105; box 14 (p. 43), 17 (p. 52), 19 (p. 55), 23 (p. 61)
13 Service mandates with private extension enterprises, Thuringia (Germany) P. 112; box 5 (p. 37)
17 Refunding system, Sachsen-Anhalt (Germany) P. 114; box 23 (p. 61)
16 Voucher systems in small enterprise development, various countries P. 114; box 22 (p. 61)
19 PAIP, Mali P. 116; box 10 (p. 40), 24 (p. 70)
6.2.1 Why develop markets for extension services?
Reasons and expectations
The idea of interventions to develop markets for extension services is based on 
two major assumptions. The fi rst assumption is: a) there is a demand for services 
with the characteristics of private goods, b) some, but not enough in number, or not 
adequately qualifi ed, private extension providers exist, and c) supply and demand 
are not aware of each other or do not match suffi ciently. A second underlying 
assumption is that markets for services will continue to function effectively and 
independently after an initial kick-off intervention. 
Market development is advocated by its proponents for various reasons:
• Markets for services with a diversity of suppliers are more likely to offer the 
different kinds of services that the rural population requires.
• Competition in a market for services acts as a driving force for the develop-
ment of innovations, and innovations adapted to local conditions are the key 
to improvement of rural livelihoods.
• Public fi nance support for individual extension organisations distorts market 
signals and crowds out potential private commercial extension organisations.
• Farms are enterprises, and extension organisations that are also enterprises 
and not public servants or NGOs, are more likely to offer services that are truly 
useful for the clients.
• Donor and government programmes can only reach a limited number of po-
tential clients. They should accept this limitation, and therefore concentrate on 
promoting markets for services, that can serve a much larger clientele. 
Publicly funded interventions to develop a market for services can directly target 
those parts of the market that are weak. The development of markets for serv-
ices may require major investments and a great deal of patience and time, but the 
expectation is that once a functioning service market exists, services that truly 
have the nature of private goods will be offered by private providers. The public 
funds dedicated to extension can be channelled precisely towards those parts of 
the system where the private markets do not function in the public interest, i.e. 
Chapter 3 – Who should fi -
nan ce what in extension
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to ensure access to services in remote areas and for poor people, and to fund 
services that promote ecologically sound practices.
Do market development efforts fulﬁ ll the expectations?
Initiatives to develop markets have often succeeded in considerably increasing the 
quantity and quality of service providers, as well as services offered and used. But 
the key question is what happens once the intervention with public funds ends. 
Does past experience indicate that market development interventions actually 
result in sustainable and independently functioning service markets? Experience 
is mixed: markets for services develop, although they may not look and function 
in the envisaged way.
In some of the cases a considerable number of competent private extension or-
ganisations established themselves. However, reductions in the level of public 
funding have usually been accompanied by a reduction in demand, and by a shift 
in clientele towards larger and better-off farmers.
Therefore, temporary kick-off initiatives such as vouchers or refunding arrange-
ments do not appear as practical tools for developing sustainable service mar-
kets that serve a broad range of clients. This is confi rmed by experience with the 
development of markets for Business Development Services: there is no evidence 
from developing countries that markets for services continue to function in the 
same way after the subsidies are cut off (Gibson 2000).
On the other hand, the existence of capacity in the private, commercial sector 
enhances the chances that opportunities for profi table services are seized, when 
they emerge.
Cases 8, 12, 13, 17
Box 24. Private service providers‘ perception of their potential for success in Mali
The Support Programme for Producer Initiatives (PAIP) supports the establishment of private extension providers. 
Some of them have been asked about perceived advantages and disadvantages of having become private extension-
ists. 
The following were mentioned as advantages: • development of local extension capacity, • creation of jobs, • inde-
pendent decision-making regarding strategies, and • possibility of developing relationships with new partners. The 
following disadvantages were listed: • diffi culty of fi nding new institutional clients/partners, • competition from public 
servants offering similar services at uneconomically low prices, • low purchasing power of farmer clients (they are 
willing to pay only if there is an immediate and obvious economic benefi t), and • huge responsibility to employees 
(failure not allowed).
Overall, they expect to be fi nancially self-sustaining within fi ve years. By then, their competence and usefulness will 
have become evident and they will have established relations with local development organisations. Development 
organisations are likely to be more important customers than farmers because only a few farm products are profi table 
enough to allow producers to pay directly for support services.
Case 19 – PAIP (Support Programme for Producer Initiatives), Mali
See also chapter 5.3.3
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Critical issues and good 
prac tice in service mandates 
(ch. 5.2.3) and demand-side 
fi  nancing (ch. 5.3.5)
6.2.2 Issues and good practice in the development of 
 mar kets for extension services
In the following, emerging issues and good practice that are specifi c to initiatives 
with the aim of developing service markets are presented. Further issues and 
good practice are discussed in the chapters on demand-side and supply-side 
fi nancing. 
Preconditions for market development
The market development approach requires that several preconditions be ful-
fi lled:
• The policy and legal framework must allow private enterprise to thrive.
• Some service providers should already be available.
• A market for farm produce must exist to back up the market for services, i.e. 
the farming systems concerned must be commercialised to some degree, or 
have at least some potential for commercial production.
• There should not be too powerful competition from public extension organi-
sations and NGOs offering services for free. The presence of such competition 
obstructs the establishment of private service providers, in particular if the free 
services are useful and of good quality.
The fi rst precondition is absolutely crucial. If it is not fulfi lled, attempts to develop 
markets will fail; therefore, initiatives must begin with the creation of an enabling 
environment.
Where the second and third condition are not in place, market development is 
likely to require much time and resources. Careful consideration must be given to 
whether it is worth the effort. 
If the fourth condition is not in place the private service providers must focus on 
high quality services, market niches, and generally on services not offered for 
free.
Understanding the limitations and potentials for service markets 
There are always some reasons if there are no functioning markets for extension 
services. Before attempting to develop of markets for services, these reasons 
should be understood, and one should get to know what service providers, ser-
vices and clients exist already. Moreover, an understanding of what markets 
offer elsewhere under similar conditions (i.e. what service providers offer which 
services to what kinds of clients) needs to be developed. 
Cases of uncommon extension arrangements in the private commercial sector 
benefi tting small farmers that came into existence without the involvement of public 
funds, like for example the cotton management enterprise in Peru, can be used to 
gain ideas on what kind of settings could be fostered. 
Case 25 – Cotton mana ge-
ment entreprise, Peru
Framework conditions for 
fi  nan cial participation 
(ch. 4.5.5)
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One may fi nd that other strategies to foster extension services are more suitable 
than market development, or that an initiative to develop a market for services must 
be designed in such a way that the causes of market failure are overcome.
In places where public extension organisations have been dismantled, part of 
the former government extensionists are good potential private service providers. 
In many of the former planned economies, Kolkhoz agricultural specialists with 
various levels of specialisation have become useful extensionists.
Using public funds in ways which least distort market signals
In general it appears that public funding of development costs of service providers 
(including e.g. training, offi ce infrastructure) causes less distortion than reducing 
the price of services by directly subsidising service transactions.
Moreover, it is often stated that demand-side fi nancing of service transactions 
is less distorting than supply-side fi nancing. However, some cases of demand-
side fi nancing have shown that this mode may result in economically non-viable 
ser vi ces being offered. Thus it must be assumed that demand-side fi nancing 
also distorts price signals to a varying extent unless an initiative is designed 
carefully.
Public interest
Markets, and private extension organisations in general, that rely purely on private 
funds, are well suited to serve the private interests of users. 
Extension services for very poor farmers and in remote areas may not be profi t-
able enough to motivate private extension enterprises to offer services of suffi -
cient quality, if any services at all. Market development efforts are unlikely to 
change this.
Services in the public interest will only be provided by market forces if the public 
demands these services and is willing to pay for them. 
Markets do not guarantee high quality services
An important effect expected in market development approaches is that they will 
result in user-oriented, high quality services. However, various experiences show 
that markets for services do not automatically result in good quality, user-oriented 
services.
Therefore initiatives to develop service markets must consider how to ensure 
certain quality standards.
Roles of government in service markets
Also in well-functioning service markets there is an important role for govern-
ments. Essential are:
More on taking care of the pu-
blic interest in chapter 4.5.5
Case 18 – Mvula Trust, South 
Africa
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• Providing a favourable policy and legal frame, including measures to ensure 
quality control.
• Mandating the delivery of services in the public interest to suitable service 
providers and paying for it. Ideally such service mandates are given by the level 
of government that has the main interest in the concerned services.
Training opportunities and linkages
In markets for extension services, like in other decentralised, pluralistic systems, 
special attention and arrangements are required to ensure continual access of 
service providers to opportunities for methodological and technical training, in-
stitutional learning, horizontal exchange of experience, and linkages between 
ex tension and research. 
Resistance from donors and governments
Although a market development approach seems attractive and in tune with cur-
rent thinking on the power of markets, most donor and government initiatives fo-
cus on supporting individual extension organisations. 
Among the reasons for this may be:
• If just a few or individual extension organisations are supported, close contact 
and partnership between the source of funds and the supported organisation 
is possible. Initiatives to develop markets require that those who provide the 
funds are willing to relinquish some control.
• Every initiative to develop markets implies some degree of public funding of 
private entrepreneurs‘ interests, and many donors and governments hesitate to 
do this (although they do not seem to hesitate as much to publicly fund private 
interests with free-for-all public extension). 
6.3 Extension services provided by producer or-
ganisations
6.3.1 Producer organisations‘ own extension in practice
Producer organisations may maintain their own extension set-up. This can take 
various forms – from large farmers‘ associations maintaining a whole extension 
organisation, or groupings of farmers involved in the production of a specifi c cash 
crop running extension services for that crop, to small village-level organisations 
that pay one of their members for specifi c services. 
Extension set-ups of producer organisations may be fi nanced through member-
ship fees, direct payment for services, or, in cases where the organisation is 
Chapter 8 – Some cross-cut-
ting insights
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involved in product marketing, through levies. There may also be fi nancial contri-
butions from public sources for the provision of services in the public interest.
Extension services owned or managed by producer associations are quite com-
mon in industrialised countries. In Denmark and France for example, the main 
extension set-ups are operated by producer organisations. These services usu-
ally have a mixture of private and public funding, whereby the public/private ratio 
varies widely.
Extension set-ups of producer organisations are relatively common also in de-
veloping countries, mostly with commodity producer associations. Support to 
broad-based farmer organisations including the establishment of their own ex-
tension services is becoming an increasingly common development intervention. 
The following case examples illustrate some issues and emerging good practice 
for extension by producer organisations.
Case number Title Where to fi nd description 
and more information
20 Farmers’ Federation Fouta Djallon, Guinea P. 116; box 25 (p. 75)
21 UNFA, Uganda P. 117; box 26 (p. 75)
22 AKRSP, Pakistan P. 117; box 27 (p. 76)
2 PASOLAC/Intercooperation, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua P.  98;  box 1 (p. 34), 8 (p. 39)
3 ICAFE, Costa Rica P. 102; box 3 (p. 35)
6.3.2 Issues and good practice in extension services pro-
 vided by producer organisations 
Real ownership
Support for extension services provided by farmers‘ organisations is based on the 
view that accountability of service providers is best achieved if farmers are the 
owners of the extension services instead of their customers. However, farmers are 
likely to be the real owners only, if they fi nance the extension services provided by 
their producer associations, at least partially. And even fi nancing by producers may 
not be enough to ensure ownership if not transparency ensures that the producers 
are aware that they fi nance the services and thus can claim ownership.
The box below shows some further success factors for the emergence of real 
ownership.
Case 3 – ICAFE, Costa Rica
Case 2 – PASOLAC/Inter coo-
peration, Honduras etc.
75
Fostering private extension services
Inclusiveness
In some cases only a small fraction of the farming families in an area are members 
of a producer association, and those who are members are better off than non-
members. In other cases coverage is high, and also poor families are members. 
But even if poor farmers are members, they may not be able to access services 
that are useful to them, as infl uential and well-off farmers may have greater 
decision power in the association. This risk seems to exist mainly with larger 
farmer organisations, whereas small, local associations have a better reputation 
in this respect. 
Financial sustainability
Extension services provided by producer organisations 
are expected to be fi nancially more sustainable. 
Ho w ever this is the case only under certain condi-
tions, notably if the organisation succeeds in raising 
substantial own resources. Although some degree of 
a monetary economy is probably required for this to 
be possible, the different experiences indicate that this 
is not the main condition. More important is a well-
functioning, transparent and cohesive association that 
is of use to its members.
Donor funding, in particular for functions which are to 
be fi nanced later from local resources, can become a 
risk to fi nancial sustainability. 
Box 26. Questions about fi nancial sustainabili ty 
in Uganda
In Uganda, district farmer associations are emplo-
ying extensionists with the support of DANIDA. 
It was foreseen that DANIDA pays 65% of the 
sa la ries of these extensionists initially, and that 
the donor contributions would decrease by some 
percentage each year. In practice most farmer or ga-
nisations do not pay their share in the salary, and 
the extensionists appear to be satisfi ed with the 
amount of the donor contribution. Also the foreseen 
payment for services could not be implemented so 
far. Consequently, the beginning of the decrease in 
the donor contribution had to be postponed.
Case 21 – UNFA, Uganda 
Box 25. Factors resulting in real ownership – experience from the Fouta-Djallon Farmers’ Federation
The Farmers‘ Federation of Fouta-Djallon in Guinea is an umbrella federation of many local farmer as sociations built 
with the support of a donor funded project. The following factors are regarded as the ones crucial for success: 
• Members contribute a substantial part of the funds, 
• farmers assumed major responsibilities from the very beginning of the project,
• decision making is decentralised, 
• the federation is successful in accessing services useful to its members, 
• farm revenues increased as a result of the work of the federation, 
• the federation succeeded in getting access to donor funds, 
• exchange between member groups on issues related to organisational development resulted in relatively quick 
increase in number of successful member groups.
Case 20 – Farmers‘ Federation Fouta-Djallon, Guinea
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Well-functioning organisations
Only well-functioning farmer organisations can 
ha ve an extension set-up that functions well. Thus, 
ex ten sion systems should only be set up where 
far mers‘ organisations are mature and locally an-
cho red. Wherever farmers are not (well) organised, 
organisational development must constitute the fi rst 
step, before actually developing an extension set-up. 
Organisational development for farmers associations 
usually requires long-term and intensive efforts. 
Financing of farmer or community exten sio-
nists
Farmer-to-farmer extension, village specialists, farmer extensionists and si mi-
lar approaches are employed for purposes such as expanding the scope of 
professional extension organisations, utilising the potential of particularly skilled 
farmers and making specialist advice available locally. Often these extensionists 
are representatives of local farmers‘ associations or community organisations.
There is much debate on how farmer extensionists in farmer-to-farmer systems 
should be remunerated for their efforts. The following considerations are based 
on experience gained in different places, among them Pakistan, Nepal and Kyr-
gyzstan.
Should farmer extensionists be paid? Some development organisations ex-
pect farmer extensionists to work without compensation. In fact, many farmer 
extensionists are willing to do a fair amount of work for their community without 
getting paid. The social recognition they receive and the benefi ts of special training 
they get for their own farming is suffi cient compensation. However, the amount 
of working time that they are willing to devote to voluntary work is limited (and 
rightly so). Thus, if extension work beyond this limit is desired, they must be paid 
or offered some other form of compensation. 
How should they be paid? Payment should be determined in accordance with 
their goals and tasks:
• If the tasks are in the interest of the community, extensionists should obtain a 
regular salary or one-off payment from the community. 
• For individual services the individuals who benefi t should pay.
• If an external development organisation needs farmer extensionists to achieve 
certain objectives, and if no local ownership is required, and the extensionists 
are not supposed to function later without external support, they should be paid 
by this organisation (one-off or regular salary).
If payment or compensation is supposed to be provided by the community or in-
dividual farmers, negotiations on the form and amount of payment should be left 
to them, and not be imposed by outsiders.
Box 27. Farmer extensionists‘ success in Paki-
stan
Farmers selected by their village organsation 
ob tain training as village specialists and provide 
services to their fellow villagers.
A study on success factors for these farmer exten-
sionists revealed that success or failure depend 
a lot on the quality of the village organisation to 
which the spe cialists belong. Well-functioning or-
ganisations had a substantially higher percentage 
of suc cessful farmer extensionists than organi sa-
tions with problems.
Case 22 – AKRSP, Pakistan
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A further concern is whether the services that the farmer extensionists provide are 
considered to be remunerable within the local socio-cultural context. In general, 
people are more willing to pay for tangible services than for advice or facilitation, 
and they will only be willing to pay if they feel that the farmer extensionists are 
suffi ciently qualifi ed to be of substantial use to them. In many societies it is not 
possible for a farmer extensionist to ask fellow villagers for payment, particularly 
for advice, but often also for more tangible services.
6.4 Other forms of private, commercial exten-
sion
There are various other mechanisms through which extension services are pro-
vided by the private, commercial sector: Input suppliers are maybe the currently 
most common private commercial extensionists. The problems that this can cause 
have been mentioned earlier. Non-producer players with a stake in production 
and marketing chains often provide extension services. Such players may be 
processing enterprises, market actors, exporters, or 
or ganisations encompassing various players around a 
specifi c crop (sub-sector organisations). These set-ups 
often serve mainly larger produceers.
On the other hand there are examples of set-ups linked 
to input supply or production/marketing chains that 
serve small farmers well. An unconventional example 
is shown in the adjacent box.
Fostering the building of such set-ups that allow to 
capture commercial interests for the provision of ex-
tension services with some degree of public interest, 
can be an interesting option for interventions with pu-
 blic funds, as is illustrated by the two mechanisms pre-
sented in the following. 
6.4.1 Price premium for quality
Services fi nanced by a price premium for particular product quality are a rather 
uncommon, not universally applicable approach to private commercial extension. 
Sometimes, there is the potential to capture the price premium paid in the market 
for products of special quality to motivate private for-profi t players to provide 
specifi c extension services to small farmers. 
In many markets a premium is paid for a special quality of products or production 
processes, e.g. for organically grown products, for socially equitable conditions of 
farm employees, or simply for a better-than-average quality. The approach relies 
on the consumers‘ willingness to pay higher prices for products for which there is 
a guarantee that they are produced in specifi ed ways. In case the better quality is 
not obvious for the buyer, the guarantee is ensured by a trade-mark or label.
Box 28. An special private sector service ar-
rangement for small farmers
A large cotton producer established a cotton man-
agement enterprise in a dynamic coastal region in 
Peru. The enterprise makes contracts with farmer 
companies (formed by groups of small cotton farm-
ers) for the provision of services for payment. The 
services cover production practices, facilitating ac-
cess to credit of formal banks and links to ginners 
and textile companies (but not marketing itself). The 
service package costs approx. 25% of the profi t of 
the cotton farmers. Apparently the arrangement is 
very profi table for the farmers despite the relatively 
high cost, since every year the number of farmers 
involved increases dramatically.
Case 25 – Cotton management enterprise, Peru
Chapter 3.2.2 – What market 
forces do not provide
Case 6 – TES Centre, Kyr gyz-
 stan
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The label approach is common in industrialised countries. Examples from devel-
oping countries are mostly related to crops that are exported to industrialised 
countries. Various fair trade organisations in Europe maintain labels for a range 
of products from developing countries that are produced in socially just and/or 
ecologically sound ways (e.g. bananas, coffee, cocoa, honey, tea, citrus fruit, and 
fl owers). 
Such a label may be owned by a producer organisation, an exporter or a dis-
tributor/retailer. A certifying agency oversees the correct use of the label. The 
producers, traders or retailers of the labelled product pay the organisation that 
owns the trademark for the label. This income fi nances the management of the 
label – including advisory services, monitoring, quality control and often promo-
tion of the label.
The example of extension services linked to a price premium on certifi ed organic 
production in Uganda provides some lessons regarding this approach.
Emerging issues
Financing. The costs of premium-fi nanced extension 
are shared by those who have an interest it, i.e. pro-
ducers, market players, exporters, importers, and 
con sumers. 
In principle this is a market-based approach, whose 
fi  nancing should ultimately be independent of public 
funds. However often public funding is required to es-
tablish the system, in particular for setting up links to 
markets in developed countries and certifi cation. 
In the example from Uganda in the adjacent box virtually 
no technical assistance for the conversion to organic 
production was required. It remains unclear how far 
the premium for the certifi ed produce can actually pay 
for more intensive extension services in cases where 
producers need stronger support in converting their 
production system to satisfy certifying conditions. Also 
for this transition public funds may be needed.
Once they are established, such systems seem to have the potential to become 
economically viable.
Certifi cation costs and benefi ts for producers. In the case of certifi ed organic 
produce, the costs of certifi cation are relatively high, in particular if the certifying 
agencies are located in the richer countries (in Uganda so far, they are all Euro-
pean). National certifying agencies would reduce certifi cation costs and thus in-
crease the premium that can be distributed.
Certifi cation of small farms is only feasible if practically all farms in a specifi c lo-
cation can be included, and be certifi ed as a group. Administering certifi cation 
Box 29. Sesame turning into high-value organic 
export crops in a remote area of Uganda
A private exporter interested in developing exports 
of certifi ed organic sesame and other crops from a 
remote area in Uganda to Europe was supported 
by SIDA (Swedish Agency for International De ve lop-
ment) to set up operations and obtain certi fi cation. 
The exporter negotiated contracts with producers 
to ensure that they do not use any forbidden inputs. 
Not much change in production systems, and thus 
not much technical advice was necessary, because 
the farmers hardly used any external inputs any-
way. The economic benefi ts for the farmers are 
sub stantial, although certifi cation by European or-
ga nisations is expensive.
Case 23 – Organic products for export, Uganda
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Box 30. Vegetable seed and nursery entrepre-
neurs as advisers on the use of their products
In Bangladesh two Swiss-funded programmes 
trained local small farmers as nursery plant and 
ve getable seed producers. The majority of these 
enterpreneurs succeeded in earning a better living 
for themselves, and at the same time make saplings 
and seed of a reasonable quality available at the 
village level. Based on initial observations, it was 
expected that these enterpreneurs would also 
be come a type of local extensionists. However, it 
turned out that the enterpreneurs give good basic 
advice on how to plant trees and vegetables, but 
do not provide more complex information related to 
ve getable growing like soil fertility, pest and di sease 
management, tree care, etc. 
Case 24 – VFFP and CARE-Bangladesh, Bangladesh
of dispersed small farms would be too costly for the price premium to remain 
attractive.
Potential for poor areas and families. In the presented case from Uganda, 
premium fi nanced extension resulted in economic benefi ts for poor families living 
in a very remote and poor area. This shows that there is a potential to improve 
the situation of such people by enhancing productive resource use rather than by 
providing free services through charity initiatives. But the challenge is to identify 
the potential and the opportunities available in an area and among specifi c groups 
of people.
Risks. Producing for export is very often a risky venture for small farmers, due 
to the volatility of international markets, the dependence on exporters and other 
out-side actors etc. In the Uganda sesame export case the certifi cation rules of 
the European Union are a major risk to the sustainability of this business. The 
EU is currently considering to disallow group certifi cation. Without this possibility 
the certifi cation of the very small farmers involved would probably become far too 
costly to be viable. 
6.4.2 Small-scale enterpreneurs providing extension lin -
 ked to sales of means of production
Input suppliers – be they large agro-chemical companies or vendors in a bazaar 
– are sources of advice and information for many farmers. The sellers have a 
business interest in providing advice to their customers on the use of their prod-
ucts. The costs of this advice are factored into the price of the inputs. This common 
approach can be applied also in a relatively uncommon way to promote the spread 
of products, in the use of which there is public and private interest. 
Suitable small-scale entrepreneurs are trained in the 
production and marketing of a specifi c product. They 
also learn what advice their customers need to use 
the product successfully. The enterpreneurs have a 
business interest in motivating people to use their pro-
ducts and in advising how to use them best, in order 
to gain more and satisfi ed cus tomers. Public funds 
may be required for large-scale promotion to make the 
product widely known and demanded. This approach 
has been used successfully to pro mo te tree planting 
in Bangladesh, and to promote the dissemination of 
metal grain silos in Central Ame rica. In this way market 
forces (in the shape of business interests of private 
entrepreneurs) have been harnes sed to promote a 
public interest (more trees in Bangladesh, less post-
harvest losses in Central America).
The experiences indicate that this approach is sui ta ble only for simple information 
closely linked to the sold product and has li mitations when it comes to more 
complex advisory services.
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6.5 10 key lessons on building private extension 
service
■ Interventions to develop extension services in the private sector 
may focus either explicitely on developing markets for services, or 
on supporting individual organisations (e.g. extension by producer 
organisations).
■ When the goal of interventions is market development, subsidising the 
establishment and further development of private service providers 
distorts the market less than subsidising actual services.
■ It is often assumed that initial demand-side fi nancing of services has 
a less distorting effect on markets than supply-side fi nancing. But 
experience indicates that demand-side fi nancing may also distort price 
signals substantially. 
■ Initial public fi nancing of services may compromise later fi nancing by 
users.
■  Key preconditions for successful development of markets for services 
are an enabling policy framework for private enterprises and the exis-
tence of markets for farm produce.
■  Competition in markets for services does not guarantee good quality 
service. 
■  Well-functioning producer organisations are a precondition for suc-
cessful producer-owned extension set-ups.
■  Community or farmer extensionists should be paid if they are expected 
to devote substantial time and efforts to extension work.
■  In pluralistic extension settings with a variety of service providers, spe-
cial arrangements for research/extension links and learning systems 
need to be made. 
■ Public interests need particular attention in systems with private ex-
tension service providers. 
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7.1 Introduction
In many countries large public extension organisations, mostly organised in line 
departments, are or have been at the centre of the extension landscape. They have 
been (and in many cases still are) fully publicly funded. A lot of donor assistance 
is channelled through them.
There is currently support for the establishment and operation of country-wide, 
decentralised mostly public extension organisations in several former centrally 
planned economies (e.g. Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Laos). On the other hand, more or 
less radical interventions in national public extension organisations (various forms 
of privatisation and decentralisation) have been undertaken in many countries 
(e.g. in many Latin American countries). Other countries, particularly in Africa, are 
currently considering what to do with national public extension systems that they 
fi nd more and more diffi cult to fi nance. 
What can countries and programmes involved in building new public extension 
organisations or in reforming existing ones learn from experience with change and 
reform in large public extension organisations made in other places? 
This chapter fi rst discusses the key question preceding most reform plans – whe-
ther delivery should be private or public – and then gives an overview of options 
that contain innovative fi nancing mechanisms. These options that are mutually not 
exclusive but can be to some extent combined, include:
• privatisation of public extension services systems, 
• decentralisation to local levels,
• service mandates between different government levels,
• cost-sharing arrangements with the private sector.
Many practical aspects of these options have been discussed in detail in earlier 
sections of this document, and thus are here presented only briefl y. Links to the 
sections that provide more relevant information are given.
7.2 Private or public delivery?
A key question – when planning new extension systems as well as when con-
sidering what to do with existing public extension organisations – is whether the 
delivery of extension services should be by private or public organisations. Deci-
sions in this regard are often infl uenced by political beliefs.
There is a belief among some major development experts and donors that the 
private sector is more effective and effi cient than public institutions. Others take 
7
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the view that only government organisations can provide the right public services 
and ensure that the public interest is accounted for. 
However, there is little evidence that either of these beliefs is correct in principle. 
There are clearly many examples of ineffective and ineffi cient public extension 
organisations all over the world. But there are also many examples of equally in-
effi cient and ineffective NGOs. Private for-profi t sector advisers do not necessarily 
fulfi l expectations of quality and effectiveness either. Furthermore, there are public 
extension organisations that have undergone successful reforms, in terms of way 
of working, quality and type of services offered, and fi nancing mechanisms.
We believe that, in principle, it does not matter whether services are provided 
by pri vate or public sector organisations. Quality, effectiveness and effi ciency 
are determined much more by accountability mechanisms and organisational 
management than by the public or private nature of institutions. The fi nancing 
and delivery system must ensure that service providers are accountable to clients 
(be they farmers or public bodies), personnel must be competent, innovative 
and motivated (this includes satisfactory remuneration), and the management 
and working approaches of the organisation must facilitate effectiveness and 
effi ciency. 
Transaction costs for reforming a public extension organisation are high and the 
process takes time, but the same is true for privatisation of institutions and building 
up capacity in the private sector. So the transaction costs for the change must 
be compared and considered in relation to the expected costs of the system after 
the change. 
A national public extension organisation is an asset even if it does not yet function 
optimally, and there need to be very good reasons for giving up such an asset. 
Astonishingly, the establishment of public extension systems in some of the for-
mer centrally planned economies is taking place with the support of the same 
donors that advise dismantling public extension organisations in other places. 
In developing countries where governments have rid themselves of the respon-
sibility for extension (and research), donors have taken over this responsibility to 
a substantial extent. 
Reforms in public extension organisations such as decentralisation, transforma-
tion to independently functioning units, or the introduction of payment for services 
in the private interest and other cost-sharing arrangements, coupled with capacity 
building for personnel, appear in general just as promising as privatisation. The 
continuation of public extension organisations does not mean that there is no 
scope for private extension organisations. Pluralistic extension landscapes with a 
broad range of extension providers serving different client groups offer the most 
desirable perspective. 
Case 25 shows an example of 
a private service provider that 
is more effective. 
Case 26 shows an examp le 
where small and large pro du-
cers have diffe rent perceptions 
about effectiveness of servi-
ces.
Case 18  shows an example of 
low quality services by private 
providers.
Case 27 – Withdrawal of the 
state, Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, 
Guatemala
Box 31 (p. 84)
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7.3 Privatisation
7.3.1 Privatisation in practice
Privatisation or the withdrawal of the state from extension and other functions in 
the agricultural sector can take place in various ways:
Dismantling. „Dismantling“ is just what the word indicates: staff are released and 
structures are abandoned. It is expected that replacement structures in the private 
sector will develop within a reasonable time. In many Latin American countries 
public extension as well as research organisations have been dismantled to a 
large extent. 
Controlled privatisation. Controlled privatisation is the conscious and man-
aged transformation of public organisations into, or their targetted replacement 
by, private entities. Such entities are mostly commercial enterprises, but could 
also be producer associations, NGOs, trust funds or foundations. A large public 
organisation may be transformed into one large private entity, or into a number of 
smaller entities. 
Privatisation of extension services in developing countries is much talked about 
these days. Most of the privatisation experiences mentioned turn out to be a more 
or less managed retreat of the state from service fi nancing and provision including 
dismantling of the respective public organisations. 
Privatisation of public services in the agricultural sector in developing countries 
often starts with input provision and veterinary services, functions that have 
been performed by extension organisations in many countries until fairly re-
cently. In some countries commodity extension services have been privatised 
hand in hand with the concerned, previously para-statal, commodity boards. In 
some industrialised countries public advisory services underwent controlled in-
stitutional privatisation (e.g. in UK). 
Some highlights from experiences with privatisation made in Peru, Honduras, 
Bolivia and Guatemala indicate possible consequences and provide some ideas 
on good practice.
7.3.2 Issues and good practice in privatisation
Possible consequences of privatisation
The retreat of public institutions is usually based on a neo-liberal policy envi-
ronment and on the assumption that the private sector will take on service 
pro vi sion. However, experience shows that the dismantling of public extension 
organisations does not automatically lead to the emergence of an extension 
service market with diverse private enterprises offering services to a broad clien-
tele.
Case 27 – Withdrawal of the 
state, Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, 
Guatemala
Box 31
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Private providers of advisory services emerge in profi table niches and offer ser-
vices to commercial and often specialised producers. Services that link advice 
with the provision of means of production and credit, as well as integrated support 
services around subsector product chains become more widespread. 
Private arrangements may offer benefi ts for small farmers, but overall they favour 
better-off clients.
Extension services for small and poor producers and services in remote areas 
are taken up gradually by NGOs, largely with donor money. As these NGOs are 
dependent on donor funding, long-term services are not ensured. Further, NGOs 
operating on donor money face the drawback of not having local political legiti-
macy, and may undermine the development of local governance. 
In some places public extension was not missed much after dismantling; in other 
countries the government and further stakeholders realised relatively quickly that 
there is a need for some structure to replace the public extension organisations. 
Sometimes this happened on the initiative of donors who lost their local imple-
mentation partners. 
Managed privatisation, not just withdrawal
Privatisation by simply dismantling public extension and research organisations 
without carefully assessing the possible consequences and designing practical 
alternatives is in most cases not a sensible option. In practice this may amount 
to the government disposing of its responsibility for certain public interests and 
handing it over to the international community, instead of handing over the res-
ponsibility for private interests to the (local) private sector as intended. 
Box 31. Withdrawal of the government from extension – consequences observed in Latin America
Peru. In Peru the public sector largely retreated from agricultural services in the early 1990ies. Public extension 
became limited to specifi c areas and programmes. The gap left was partly fi lled by donor-funded NGOs. Integrated 
service packages around commodity crops offered by agri-enterprises and sometimes producer organisations 
became more widespread, as well as services linked to credit and input sales. Better-off producers fi nd their service 
needs largely satisfi ed, whereas small and medium producers only sometimes can get what they need.
Honduras. In Honduras the public extension organisation and the research system were dismantled in 1997. Many 
former government employees have been engaged by NGOs or have even founded their own NGOs, and are now 
implementing donor-fi nanced research and extension activities.
Bolivia. In Bolivia public research and extension organisations were dismantled in 1998. After a couple of years it 
was realised that something is missing. Currently a new national research and extension system (Sistema Boliviano 
de Tecnologias Agropecuarias, SIBTA) is being established, based on a grant fund scheme (alimented by various 
donors) through which public funds for agricultural innovation will be channelled. 
Guatemala. In Guatemala public extension was dismantled in the second half of the nineties. In a remote valley 
of the country, many farmers said that with the disappearance of public extensionists they lost their only source of 
outside information. Sometimes the dismissed local extensionists continued to act as informal sources of information 
for their own community. In some places NGOs have taken up the extension role.
Case 27 – Withdrawal of the public sector from extension services, Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, Venezuela
Case 25 – Cotton manage-
ment enterprise, Peru
Case 26 – Comparison of 
public and privat extension, 
Pakistan, USA
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This publication shows a variety of practical alternatives to both the extremes 
– complete withdrawal of the public sector and the conventional way of public 
extension organisations – that combine public and private fi nance and service 
provision. 
Preparation of actors for new roles
Experience in other sectors and places indicate that privatisation yields better 
outcomes if change processes are meticulously managed and the various actors 
are well prepared for their new roles. 
Depending on the privatisation process chosen, various actors may have to be 
prepared for new roles
• Extensionists may have to be prepared for working as private service provid-
ers, i.e. they must be technically and methodologically competent, and the 
staff expected to manage an enterprise – even if it is a small consulting bureau 
– need to be trained in management and entrepreneurial skills, and possibly 
be coached during their establishment as entrepreneurs.
• The staff who will undertake governmental tasks that are still necessary must 
be prepared for new role too. This includes the following main tasks:
+ facilitate the determination of public interests,
+ funding services in the public interest,
+ ensuring that all services and inputs in which there is a public interest 
are on offer,
+ ensuring that training opportunities for private extension organisations 
are available, 
+ ensure that private extension organisations have access to sources of 
information and innovation,
+ setting rules and regulations and ensuring that they are followed,
+ designing adequate policies.
7.4 Decentralisation of public extension
7.4.1 Decentralisation in practice
Decentralisation means shifting the responsibility for extension from a central 
governmental level to some regional or local administrative level. Different de-
grees of shift in responsibility are possible, from operational and administrative 
decision-making to political control and fi scal management. Usually some struc-
tures at the central level remain. 
Decentralised operational decision-making has become relatively common, 
whe reas administrative, political and fi scal decentralisation have come into the 
Chapter 5 – Mechanisms for 
directing pub lic funds 
Chapter 6 – Fostering private 
extension services
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discussion only in the 1990s. Decentralised operational decision-making is in-
evitable for meaningful functioning of extension and will not be taken up here. Our 
concern is with further-reaching decentralisation. 
Finance in decentralised extension systems may come mainly from the level of 
the central government, or it may be fi nanced from local resources where revenue 
generation at intermediate or local levels is possible. 
Decentralisation may begin with a legal obligation for districts, municipalities or 
other local-level administrative units to ensure that extension services are avail-
able. It is then up to the local units to decide how to fulfi ll this obligation. 
The establishment of decentralised extension structures may be carried out si-
multaneously and in a co-ordinated way with the dismantling of central institutional 
structures. Alternatively, central structures may be dismantled fi rst; then it will be 
left to the decentralised levels to build up their own extension systems.
Usually decentralisation of extension takes place within the frame of a general 
decentralisation process.
Apart from decentralising previously centralised extension systems, there are 
examples of systems that have been organised in decentralised structures from 
the very beginning.
There are a few well-documented examples that provide lessons on the implica-
tions of decentralisation. The case of Colombia offers most insights whereas the 
other cases highlight specifi c issues.
7.4.2 Issues and good practice in decentralisation
Local control and accountability
Control of extension services by the local farming community would appear to be 
easier to establish in decentralised structures, but so is interference by infl uential 
local people, which is notoriously diffi cult to control in most societies. Thus a 
decentralised extension system does not guarantee control by farmers. Local 
authorities may take decisions that are just as contrary to the interests of the small 
farmers as decisions taken at a far-off extension directorate. The same is true for 
local farmer committees and similar bodies. Those with few resources are likely to 
fi nd it diffi cult to make their voices heard, also in a decentralised system.
Case number Title Where to fi nd description 
and more information
29 UMATA (municipal extension units), Colombia P. 125; box 32 (p. 87), 33 and 34 (p. 88)
10 RAS (Rural Advisory Services), Kyrgyzstan P. 107; box 16 (p. 52), 18 (p. 54),  35 (p. 92)
28 Decentralisation to districts, Uganda P. 124
11 Service mandates between public bodies, Switzerland P. 109
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As long as the services are free for users, the accountability of the extension 
service providers to the clients is likely to be weak, although there may be some 
social accountability in case the extensionists are local people. 
Financial participation, and demand-side fi nancing for services with a high level 
of private interest, are helpful mechanisms to enhance local control and ac-
countability also for decentralised systems. 
Support and links
It could be expected that decentralisation of extension 
services results in higher quality and effectiveness of 
service, because of better local control and user ori-
entation due to the greater proximity of extensionists 
and farmers.
However, decentralisation can bring about particular 
decentralisation-related problems with the quality 
of services. Back-up support from subject matter 
specialists and training opportunities (pre-service 
and in-service) may no longer be available. Links 
and cooperation with research are more diffi cult to 
maintain. 
Technical and methodological support and back-
stopping, training for extensionists, and links to re search and other sources 
of innovation need to be spe cially designed for decentralised systems. The 
training and backstopping function can be assigned to any suitable, competent 
institution(s). 
Management capacity
A decentralised extension system requires different management capacities 
than a centralised system, at both the local and central levels. Substantial efforts 
may need to be invested in the development of the necessary capacities and an 
adequate understanding of the new roles of the different actors. 
At the local level all kinds of management skills need to be available – from fi -
nancial management to planning, monitoring and evaluation – to allow effective 
services. 
The staff remaining at the central level need to understand a new role and learn 
how to perform new functions. The transformation from a top-down command 
system to a bottom-up system where the top managers should have more of a 
support and resource function than a command function, may be diffi cult to make. 
Often problems in this respect are blamed on the lack of a change in attitude; 
however, even a manager with the right attitude may fi nd the transition diffi cult 
because the new role requires very different skills.
Box 32. Service quality after decentralisation 
in Colombia
In Colombia public extension services have been 
decentralised to municipal level nearly a decade 
ago.
The quality of services is reported to have rather 
deteriorated with decentralisation. Links to re-
search have weakened and political interference 
by municipal authorities affects service quality. On 
the other hand the extensionists are much closer to 
the farmers and therefore are more aware of their 
needs and constraints, and can respond to their 
real demands. This is an aspect of quality which 
apparently has improved. 
Case 29 – UMATAs (Municipal Extension Units), 
Colombia
Cases 10 and 11 as well as 
box 35 on p. 92 offer examples 
on how to ensure support and 
links in decentralised systems 
(see also chapter 8) 
Chapter 4 – Financial parti ci-
pation 
Chapter 5.3 – Demand-side 
fi  nan cing 
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Cost and coverage 
Decentralisation, like other major system changes, 
is a complex process that involves transaction costs. 
Thus the cost of a decentralised system will certainly 
be higher in the short run. In the longer run, public 
cost at the central level may be shifted to local levels. 
However, decentralisation, like other reforms in fi  nan-
cing mechanisms, does not necessarily reduce pu blic 
expenditures for extension. 
Decentralisation has the potential for increased co-
verage in comparison with centralised systems, when 
local authorities have an enforceable obligation to es-
tablish extension services. If the local authorities are 
free to decide how to use their budget, they may set priorities on concerns other 
than extension, because better-off farmers can obtain advisory services on their 
own while poor farmers and natural resources tend to have rather little voice.  
Policy environment favourable for decentralisation
Extension has been successfully decentralised within the framework of wider 
decentralisation processes, and a policy environment that fosters decentralisa-
tion and devolution of power appears to be a precondition for true decentralisation 
of extension organisations. Where there is no such framework, fi scal and political 
decentralisation of extension is likely to be an uphill task. Operational planning 
and management decision-making can be decentralised also where fullscale 
decentralisation is not (yet) feasible.
Pluralistic system
Decentralisation of the responsibility for extension, 
coupled with dismantling of central structures, would 
offer the possibility for local-level contracts with private 
commercial enterprises, NGOs or farmer organisations 
to provide services. This would result in a pluralistic 
system catering to diverse needs. In practice, however, 
so far the decentralised levels tend to maintain public 
delivery systems with employed extensionists. The rea-
son for this is obvious, where staff is transferred from 
central to decentralised administrative levels. Where 
the local authorities can decide themselves whether 
to contract or to employ extensionists, there may be 
various reasons.
Box 33. Cost and coverage in the decentralised 
system in Colombia
The annual cost of extension in the decentralised 
system increased more or less simultaneously 
with increase in coverage. The cost per user was 
reduced by about 10%. 
The number of municipalities and small farmers 
rea ched by extension services has increased dra-
matically with the municipality-based system. The 
number of extensionists is much higher; the number 
of users per extensionist is slightly lower. 
Case 29 – UMATAs (Municipal Extension Units), 
Colombia
Case 10 indicates diffi culties 
that can arise with decent rali-
sed arrangements in a rather 
centralised environment
Box 34. Employ extensionists or contract pri-
vate service providers?
When conceptualising the decentrali sa tion in Co-
lom bia, it was as su med that municipalities would 
make use of private sector enterprises to fulfi l 
the legal ob li gation to establish extension units. 
However, most municipalities preferred to employ 
extension staff. It is not clear whether this was due 
to the lack of suitable players in the private sector or 
because of political reasons (e.g. better control over 
the ex tensionists), or because the people involved 
were more used to employing than contracting.
Case 29 – UMATAs (Municipal Extension Units), 
Colombia
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7.5 Service mandates between different govern-
ment levels
Service mandates between a public administration body and independent public 
extension organisations, appear to be an alternative to privatisation and subse-
quent contracting-out of service provision to private extension providers. Service 
mandates may be concluded between the public administration at any level from 
central to local, and public extension organisations at any level, but they look 
particularly interesting for decentralised extension systems. 
7.6 Cost-sharing arrangements with the private 
sector
Various forms of cost-sharing arrangements with the private sector can be a way 
out of the most severe budgetary constraints for public extension organisations. 
In addition to formal and informal ways of fi nancial participation of clients that 
have been mentioned earlier in this document, there are – formal and informal – 
examples where public extension organisations provide services that are fi nanced 
to some extent from private sources. 
A common case is NGOs that contract public extensionists as technical special-
ists, on a task-basis or on deputation from their usual position. Also producer and 
sub-sector associations, as well as agri-businesses contract public extensionists 
to provide services to members or contract producers.
Such arrangements of course run counter to the intentions of public extension: 
Services are supposed to be free and extension organisations are supposed to 
have operational funds ... Alternatively such arrangements can be looked at in a 
more positive way: It is a practical survival strategy for public extensionists that 
allows them to do useful work under decent conditions. The problem of such 
arrangements is certainly that they lead to neglect of public interests, in particular 
if they are informal. On the other hand, one can well imagine a public extension 
organisation working for the private sector in formal cost-sharing arrangements 
to earn income that can be used as operational funds for services in the public 
interest, or to motivate private sources to pay for the operational cost of certain 
services in which there is a common interest.
Chapter 5.2 – Service man-
dates
Case 10 – RAS, Kyrgyzstan
Case 11 – Service mandates, 
Swit zerland
Case 31 – Public/private par-
t nership for IPM extension in 
Kenya
Chapter 4 – Financial partici-
pation
Case 1 – INTA, Nicaragua
Case 4 – Veterinary services, 
Vietnam
Case 30 – Public extensionists 
in various countries
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7.7 Eight key lessons on options for public exten-
sion organisations
■ Private extension organisations are not necessarily more effective or 
more effi cient than public ones; good management and appropriate 
ways of working do more to determine the quality of extension or-
ganisations.
■ Options for change in fi nancing of public extension organisations 
in clude privatisation, decentralisation to local administrative levels, 
service mandates between different levels of government, and cost-
sharing arrangements with the private sector.
■ Where public extension and research systems have been dismantled, 
donor-funded NGOs often fi ll the gap, and private enterprises provide 
only a very small portion of the services.
■ Privatisation is not accomplished by simply dismantling the public ex-
tension organisation, but requires careful transformation processes or 
support to the development of service providers in the private sector.
■ Decentralisation and service mandates between different levels of 
go vernment are noteworthy alternatives to privatisation of public ex-
tension organisations. 
■ A policy environment favouring devolution of power and decentralisa-
tion is a precondition for successful decentralisation of extension.
■ A decentralised extension system requires particular management 
ca pacities at decentralised levels as well as at the central level. These 
may need to be developed fi rst.
■ Decentralised extension systems require specially designed support, 
training and backstopping arrangements – for technical issues as well 
as for methodology and management.
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In chapter 1 causes for dissatisfaction with conventional approaches to fi nancing 
ex tension that are based on services funded fully with public resources of go-
vernments and donors, and delivered by public extension organisations or NGOs, 
have been outlined. Here we want to recapitulate to what extent the innovative 
approaches to fi nancing extension can contribute to resolving these problems.
A case for public funds in extension
Full withdrawal of the state and the international community from fi nancing ex-
tension is not desirable. The public interests related to extension, and the gaps 
that open up when leaving extension to the market forces, show that there is a 
case for public investment in extension. On the other hand there is also evidently 
a case for reforms in fi nancing arrangements, in order to utilise the public funds 
for extension more effectively and in line with the interests of the broader public. 
Often a mix of private and public funding is appropriate.
For service delivery, solutions do not lie in the question whether private or public 
service providers are better, but in allowing pluralism, designing useful services, 
and in good management practices and effective accountability mechanisms. 
In pluralistic extension landscapes with a diversity of privately and publicly funded 
service providers, the public interests require special attention. How fi nancing 
mechanisms can be designed to take into account public interests, has been 
outlined in various places of this publication. 
Ownership, accountability and effectiveness of services
Clearly, innovative approaches to fi nancing extension offer ample ways to address 
the concerns with unsatisfactory effectiveness of extension services. They  have 
shown the potential to promote accountability of service providers to clients, to 
improve the effectiveness of services and the adoption of new benefi cial practices, 
to foster ownership and empowerment of producers, and also to motivate for more 
effi cient use of funds.
However, reforms in fi nancing mechanisms alone are not enough. Financing 
mechanisms are only one key to more effective extension. A change in the 
perception of extension from technology transfer for production increases towards 
supporting commercialisation and marketing, as well as all kinds of processes 
to promote organisational development and land management, is probably even 
more crucial. In addition to a move towards modern understanding of extension, 
the skills and self-perception of extensionists also need to be developed. Modern 
extensionists need good interpersonal skills. They should be able to coach en-
terprise development processes, facilitate the joint identifi cation of solutions for all 
8
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kinds of community level problems, mediate between public and private interests, 
pro-actively link different players who can be useful to each other, and in general 
be responsive to changing conditions for their clients.
The dilemma of ﬁ nancial constraints and the need for pu blic funds 
for extension
Experience indicates that there is no straight way out of the dilemma of funding 
constraints and the dire need for public funds for extension. Certainly the available 
funds can be used more effectively and effi ciently. 
On the other hand, increased fi nancial participation by clients requires more 
effective and better-quality services. Achieving this quality implies higher costs. A 
simple reduction in the level of public funding (government and donors) will usually 
be followed by a reduced level of services. Only when the publicly funded ex-
tension services are of really poor quality, will their reduction or disappearance not 
be felt at all. Moreover, any reform of the fi nancing mechanisms implies transaction 
costs, which may by far exceed a possible reduction in the operational cost. 
Therefore, expectations from new fi nancing approa ches with respect to reduced 
cost should not be too high.
Learning systems
Pluralistic and decentralised extension landscapes 
need functioning systems to ensure that learning can 
 ta ke place. Such learning systems include training 
oppor tu nities, links between diverse extension pro-
 vi ders and research orga nisations, as well as oppor-
 tunities for mu tual learning and exchange of experience 
between peers at different levels. Learning must be 
possible for (technical) know ledge as well as for me-
thodological skills.
There are different ways to arrange learning systems. 
It is possible to establish resource and training ins-
titutions, in the public or private sector, or assign 
the provision of learning opportunities to research or 
educational institutions. In the latter case, special attention is needed to ensure 
that learning is not limited to theoretical scientifi c knowledge. The adjacent box 
gives an example of a creative solution for a learning system in a decentralised 
setting.
Financing mechanisms coherent with situation and goals
There is no approach to fi nancing extension that is suitable in every situation. 
But choices that people make are often governed neither by the situation nor by 
Box 35. Local competence centres
The RAS (Rural Advisory Ser vices) in Kyrgyzstan 
explores a particular ap proach to technical back-
stopping. 
Each of the decentralised extension centres builds 
knowledge and experience on particular topics that 
are of importance in its area, to become a centre 
of competence in that specifi c fi eld. For instance, 
one centre in a mountainous area has become the 
centre of competence for sheep production, another 
in the south has become the one for issues related to 
marketing of fruits and vegetables. The competence 
centres offer training and backstopping to staff of 
other centres in their fi elds of specialisation.
Case 10 – RAS (Rural Advisory Services), Kyrgyzstan)
The cases 6 (TES Centre, Kyr-
 gyzstan) and 11 (Swit zerland) 
show further op tions
The last section of this chapter 
pre sents some more thoughts 
on fi nancial sustainability
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realistic goals, but by funding constraints and beliefs. Admittedly some of the views 
expressed in this document are infl uenced by political beliefs too. Nonetheless, 
readers of this publication should be equipped with broader information and 
insights from practical experience in different places, which will allow them to 
design fi nancing arrangements that fi t the situation and are in tune with the goals 
of an intervention. 
Demand-side fi nancing appears as the fi nancing mechanism of the future. It allows 
demand-oriented services for clients at different levels, from individuals and local 
interest groups to the public at regional and national levels in a pluralistic extension 
landscape. However, there is still a lot to be learnt about the critical issues and 
possible solutions in demand-side fi nancing systems. 
Careful management of change is crucial
Even new fi nancing approaches that fi t the situation very neatly, run the risk of 
failure due to resistance from actors in the system that is supposed to change. 
Good change management is absolutely crucial. Changes in systems must be 
carefully planned, involve all stakeholders, take fears seriously, and work out 
potentials and obstacles.
New pilot systems in limited areas help on the one hand to recognise problems. 
On the other hand, they make it possible to demonstrate the feasibility of intended 
reforms and create more acceptance for reform plans.
Some considerations of ﬁ nancial sustainability
Financial sustainability is claimed as an important factor in the success of in-
terventions. Often, however, there are completely unrealistic expectations in this 
regard.
Financial resources in developing countries are of course far less than desirable, 
and many functions developed with donor funds have no chance of ever being 
fi nanced by local public resources. The new approaches to fi nancing extension 
do not offer easy solutions for this issue. Donor-funded interventions must take 
this into account.
Donors need to be very careful when fi nancing functions and services that are to be 
funded from local sources – be it public or private – at a later stage. It is extremely 
diffi cult to replace such external funding.
Thus donor-fi nancing of functions and services that are to be funded later by local 
sources, should be started only under certain conditions:
• if the availability of longer-term local funding is certain, or
• if external funding can be committed for the long term, or
• in the form of pilot programmes with the purpose of showing that the functions 
and services concerned are useful. In this case, however it needs to be 
acceptable that local decision-makers may decide not to take them over.
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If none of these conditions apply, it is better not to start funding the concerned 
functions and services at all.
Alternative strategies to investing in setting up services and functions that imply 
costs too high to be born by local resources, are
• to seek for services that are affordable in a longer perspective – even though 
they may be of a less sophisticated quality,
• focus on using donor and public funds to effect changes and improvements that 
can be maintained by the people on a longer-term without access to support 
services.
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Case 1. INTA – Nicaragua
Approach and insights in detail
Context
INTA (Instituto Nicaraguense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria) is a public organisation responsible for research 
and extension in Nicaragua. In 1996 fi nancial participation of farmers for extension services provided by public 
extensionists were initiated on an exploratory basis. Later this pilot programme was expanded and became one 
of three main INTA extension programmes: 
• A publicly fi nanced and delivered extension programme focussing on staple foods and large scale 
dis semination of basic production technologies,
• a programme in which services are delivered by public extensionists with fi nancial participation of 
clients, focussing on groups of small and medium producers with some commercial potential,
• a programme in which services are delivered by private extension enterprises, co-fi nanced with public 
funds, focussing on small and medium farmers with good commercial potential. 
This case example deals with the second one of the programmes only. It refl ects the situation in 2000.
Financing and service delivery arrangements
The extensionists make contracts with farmer groups. In the contracts the type of services (so far mostly support 
concerning a specifi c crop during one growing season), including frequency of farm visits and payment modes, 
Concepts illustrated • Financial participation
• Options for public extension organisations 
Approach and insights
(for details see below)
In INTA fi nancial participation of farmer groups was introduced with the aim of making 
extension services more effective. Farmer groups can hire public extensionists for specifi c 
services, so far mainly training and advice on commonly grown commercial crops against 
cash payment. The payments complement the extensionists’ salary. The price of the services 
is negotiated between the farmers and the service providers. 
Key insights
• A careful and extensive change management process was crucial to overcome the strong 
resistance against fi nancial participation that was faced initially.
• Financial participation can be practical also for public extension organisations, and in an 
environment where free public services are are seen as a basic right.
• The clients of the services for payment are rather better-off farmers in dynamic areas.
• Sometimes it appears that the farmers do not pay for the technical aspects of the services, 
but for the links and connections that arise from the close contact with extensionists.
• The competence of the extensionists to offer a wide range of services that result in 
increased income is limited.
Sources of information Giancarlo De Picciotto, SDC, Switzerland; Barandun (2001); Etienne (1998); Paul Schütz, 
GTZ, Germany; Keynan, Olin (1997); Dinar, Keynan, (1998); Keynan, Olin, Dinar (1997)
Locations and relevance Boxes 2, 6, 13 (chapter 4); chapter 7
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are specifi ed. Payment is based on two aspects: one is the services provided, and the other is the effect of the 
services on crop yields/incomes (compared with usual yields). 
Prices for specifi c services are either negotiated between the extensionists and the client farmer groups, or 
may be fi xed regionally e.g. per visit. The payments made by the farmers directly increase the salary of the 
extensionists. 
Observations and insights
Practicality of the approach. The case example shows that fi nancial participation is practical, even in 
government extension organisations. Many farmers made positive comments (e.g. “the extensionists do now 
really show interest in us”). However it also clearly shows the drawbacks of fi nancial participation with respect 
to access of disadvantaged people to services.
Change management. The idea of fi nancial participation initially met with strong resistance. A lot of efforts 
were undertaken by the initiators to gain support for the idea at all levels from the farmers and fi eld extensionists 
to producer associations, the higher levels of INTA, and policy makers. Extensive consultation and discussion 
preceded the actual introduction of fi nancial participation. The consultations and discussions focused on 
different issues at each level:
• With policy makers, INTA managers and high level representatives of producer associations discussion 
centred around the rationale for fi nancial participation, e.g. that the main purpose of extension is to 
increase the income of farmers, and that fi nancial participation enhances the accountability of the 
extensionists and the effectiveness of the services.
• With fi eld extension staff the discussions focused on the services they can offer, how these services 
benefi t the farmers, and on the possiblity that they can earn additional income.
• With the farmers the ideas of fi nancial particpation was fl oated, the value and benefi ts of services were 
discussed, and their willingness to pay for services that really enhance their income was fostered.
Only after a several months process to prepare the ground, fi nancial particpation was put into action in a 
few places. Then gradually more farmers and extensionists joined in, and fi nally the programme was further 
expanded to cover the whole INTA system.
This careful and transparent change management process was certainly one of the key success factors.
The extensionists’ view. Initially the extensionists did not feel that their services were worth of being paid and 
were therefore the most sceptical about the practicality of the new approach. The prospect of earning additional 
income convinced them fi nally, and now many of them are happy with the additional income they earn.
The increased income was for some of the extensionists so much of an incentive that they neglected their other 
extension tasks which they are supposed to do within their regular salary. 
But it became also apparent that there are limitations in knowledge and skills of extensionists and that useful 
“extension contents” are scarce. 
In low-potential areas, the extensionists fi nd it diffi cult to fi nd an adequate number of paying clients and have 
lower incomes than their colleagues from more dynamic areas. 
Client selection. Extensionists have to search for clients that are willing to pay and fi nd them in relatively 
commercial, not very poor, rather privileged farmers. Most contracts are concluded in dynamic areas. This is 
explicitely acknowledged by INTA.
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It is not clear to what extent disadvantaged farmers are excluded from the programme, but there are indications 
that they may be little willing or able to pay, because in low potential areas it is obviously diffi cult for the 
extensionists to fi nd an adequate number of paying clients.
The clients’ view. The participating farmers feel that their relation to the extensionists has changed, that the 
extensionists now really show interest in them, and that they gain benefi ts from the services.
On the other hand, some clients reported that the main benefi t they gain from the services for which they pay 
is not increased profi ts, but that through the relationship established with the extensionists and their links to 
other players they gain access to credit and donor-funded activities. 
Mode of payment. Price setting turned out to be delicate. Prices should be high enough for farmers not to be 
indifferent, but not too high. The total paid by a group should be suffi cient to be an incentive for the extensionist. 
In some cases the prices negotiated were low when compared to the yield increases achieved as a result of 
the services. 
In several cases the measurement of results after the services were provided, indicated a decrease in yields 
and profi ts, while the farmers were very positive about the services. It was thought that the mode of payment 
mayhave encouraged the farmers to report too high usual yields and to measure too low actual yields. 
Case 2. PASOLAC/Intercooperation – Honduras and other coun - 
  tries in Central America
Concepts illustrated • Financial participation 
• Demand-side fi nancing
Approach and insights
(for details see below)
PASOLAC supports activities that foster sustainable land use practices in hilly areas of 
Central America so far mainly in Honduras. Financial participation in training and advisory 
services of around 10% of the total cost was introduced a couple of years back on a pilot 
basis. The service providers are private organisations. Various mechanisms of fi nancial 
participation are in use.
Key insights
• The effectiveness of services has improved. 
• The thematic focus has changed from staple crops to commercial crops and from 
production to market integration.
• The attitude of the service providers, and the role of the farmers has changed. The 
farmers are treated like clients by the service providers.
• The capacity of users to identify and articulate their service needs is a limitation for 
further improvement in effectiveness of services.
• The programme fi nds demand-side fi nancing more promising than supply-side fi nancing 
with a small fi nancial participation. 
Sources of information Fischler et al. (2001); Martin Fischler, PASOLAC/Intercooperation, El Salvador; Ueli 
Stür zinger, SDC, Switzerland; Stürzinger, Bustamante (2000); Tonino Zellweger, LBL, 
Switzerland
Locations and relevance Box 1, 8 (ch. 4), chapter 5, chapter 6
99
Annex 1 – Case examples
Approach and insights in detail
Context
PASOLAC (Programme for sustainable agriculture on sloping land), a Swiss-funded programme in Central 
America, is implemented by the Swiss development organisation INTERCOOPERATION in partnership with 
local NGOs, extension enterprises and producer associations. The programme provides training and advisory 
services related to sustainable land and natural resource management to small farmers with limited fi nancial 
resources and limited access to markets in hilly areas. Most services are provided to groups.
In the earlier stages of the programme the advisory services offered were well utilised and the training courses 
well attended. However, it was observed that adoption of training contents was low and that the same farmers 
attended courses on very similar topics often year after year. Thus the programme was searching for a new 
approach which would allow to identify the real demand for services, lead to better quality services, increase 
the adoption of extension contents, and strengthen the management capacity of farmer groups. 
From 1999 onwards a small number of the programme partners introduced fi nancial participation, and in some 
places demand-side fi nancing. The insights presented here have been gained mainly from the experiences of 
SERTEDESO (Empresa Privada de Servicios Técnicos de Desarollo Sostenible), a private extension enterprise, 
and APAS (Asociación de Productores de la Sierra), a second-level association of producer cooperatives. Both 
cases are from Honduras. More recent experience from other cases in Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua 
complements the insights.
Financing and service delivery arrangements
SERTEDESO and APAS use different arrangements. Financial participation by clients is a key feature in both 
the cases, and the organisations get the funds from the programme only under the condition that they get a 
“matching” contribution from the farmers. SERTEDESO is a case of supply-side fi nancing, whereas APAS is 
an example for demand-side fi nancing.
SERTEDESO:
The fi nancing and delivery arrangements include the following steps:
1. Sertedeso identifi es interested farmer groups. Their demand for extension services are worked out in a 
participatory process, and their willingness to pay something for the services is assured. 
2. Sertedeso submits a project proposal to the PASOLAC programme. 
3. When the project is approved, the programme transfers funds to Sertedeso which cover however only about 
90% of the costs. 
4. Sertedeso and the concerned farmer group sign a contract where the services to be delivered, the fi nancial 
contribution of the farmers and other mutual responsibilities are specifi ed. 
5. Sertedeso carries out the agreed services and the farmer group pays for them (so far about 10% of the total 
costs). 
6. The programme evaluates the services with the farmer groups as well as with Sertedeso. 
The amount of fi nancial participation is determined by the farmer groups in discussion with SERTEDESO. 
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APAS:
With APAS the steps of the fi nancing and delivery arrangements are different:
1. APAS identifi es the extension needs of its member cooperatives. 
2. APAS formulates a project proposal and submits it to the programme. 
3. After project approval APAS gets approx. 90% of the cost from the pro g ramme. 
4. APAS contracts service providers.
5. The service providers deliver the agreed services to the cooperative mem bers.
6. APAS pays the service providers with the funds obtained from the programme and from the farmers 
participating in the activities.
The amount of fi nancial participation here often depends on the crop. It is de termined by the cooperatives. In 
some cases the fi nancial participation is included in the paying back of loans.
Observations and insights
More effectiveness of services. With the new approaches service quality and effectiveness obviously has 
improved. This shows itself in various ways: 
• The clients clearly perceive the benefi ts of the practices suggested in training and advisory services, 
and the adoption rate of the suggested practices is between 65 and 85%. 
• Training courses are practical and include documentation.
• The service providers do not offer the same or very similar training services to the same clients year 
after year any more. They either have to expand their operations to new areas to fi nd other clients, or 
identify new extension contents and develop new service offers.
• Training is no longer seen as a touristic trip.
Changes in demand.  Services for commercial crops like coffee, vegetables and fruits are much more 
demanded than for staple crops, and demand for services related to processing and marketing has risen quickly. 
Services with little income increasing potential and a high degree of public interest (gender, conservation of 
natural resources) are little demanded. 
In general, farmers are more interested in services of a technician than of farmer extensionists (promotores), 
although also some of the latter are now getting paid for their services. 
The response of the service providers to the change in demand is not clear. Some broadening of the offer 
has been observed, but it appears that the capacity of service providers to meet the new demands may not 
be suffi cient. So far the appearance of new service providers as an effect of the new approach has not been 
observed.
The users of the services, in particular in the case of individual payment, are mainly farmers with a certain 
economic development potential. 
Empowerment – from benefi ciary to clients. The status of farmers has changed from a benefi ciary to a 
client. Farmers and extensionists have a more equal level relation. This empowerment is illustrated by certain 
changes, e.g. in the attitude of the service providers:
• Service providers have become punctual and reliable.
• Services are offered also on weekends and other times that are convenient to the clients.
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• When negotiating the price of services with a farmer group it was decided that the prices of training for 
women should be lower than of those for men. The women protested and said that they are of equal 
value than the men and thus they would pay the same price as the men. 
Management and demand articulation capacity. The often low capacity of farmer groups to formulate their 
demand for services is limiting real demand-orientation. Farmers lack clear criteria to prioritize their needs. The 
services demanded have mostly a short-term perspective and are not particularly innovative. Often farmers 
are not aware of the full range of available offers. The development of proposal is a lenghty process and the 
groups need to be supported.
Overall, an improvement of the management capacity of the client farmer organisations has been observed. 
However, this is not thought to have happened as a consequence of demand-side fi nancing alone, and in 
many cases capacity building support (demand articulation, fund administration, contract negotiation, quality 
control etc.) is necessary important to ensure that demand-side fi nancing can achieve the desired demand-
orientation.
Preference of demand-side fi nancing. The people involved in the programme fi nd demand-side fi nancing 
mechanisms used in APAS and with other producer organisations more appealing than the supply-side 
mechanism of the SERTEDESO case. The main reasons for this preference are: 
• Demand-side fi nancing has a stronger effect on enhanced accountability and demand-orientation than 
fi nancial participation alone.
• The positive effects of demand-side fi nancing on management and or gani sational capacity building of 
the involved producer organisations are considered important.
Direct or indirect payment? In some cases individual farmers pay directly for the services, whereas in other 
cases the payment is indirect and comes from common funds of the producer organisations. In principle, both 
modes of payment have positive effects on effectiveness and demand-orientation. But in some cases, the 
organisation members were unaware that in fact it is them who pay for the offered services, and consequently 
they did not exert their infl uence. Thus with indirect payment, transparency and awareness are key factors to 
achieve the desired effects.
Effects on dissemination of knowledge. No extension service can reach all potential clients and thus the 
impact of extension is enhanced if there is exchange of new knowledge between farmers. What are the likely 
effects of fi nancial participation on farmer-to-farmer diffusion of knowledge? In some cases it was observed that 
farmers who had obtained services, passed the gained knowledge on to others against a small fee. It appears 
that fi nancial participation can obstruct free dissemination of knowledge. Where payment for service is from 
collective funds the risk of barriers to diffusion is probably smaller. 
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Case 3. ICAFE – Costa Rica
Case 4. Veterinary services – Viet Nam
Case 5. KSAPDA (Kyrgyz-Swiss Agriculture Programme Djalal  
 Abad) – Kyrgyzstan 
Concepts illustrated • Financial participation 
• Financing of services by levies on produce
• Subsector organisations as service providers 
Approach and insights ICAFE is a coffee sub-sector organisation in Costa Rica. Its main task is adaptive research. 
It is fi nanced by levies on exports. Of seven persons on the ICAFE board only two are 
producers. When the producers realised that it is them who fi nance ICAFE they demanded 
more representation on the board. 
Key insight
Financial participation with indirect payment fosters demand-orientation and empowerment 
provided there is transparency and awareness of the producers.
Source of information Denis Pesche, Inter-Rèseaux, France (2000, pers. comm.)
Locations and relevance Box 3 (ch. 4), chapter 6
Concepts illustrated • Financial participation
• Options for public extension organisations 
Approach and insights Women in a remote village of Northern Viet Nam pay a public veterinarian for regular 
visits in their village to vaccinate piglets. They negotiated payment inkind depending on the 
effectiveness of the services. The case shows that also poor people in remote areas can, 
and are willing to, pay for useful services, provided payment is in an appropriate form.
Source of information Ueli Scheuermeier, LBL, Switzerland
Locations and relevance Box 4 (ch. 4), chapter 7
Concepts illustrated Financial participation
Approach and insights KSAPDA provided extension services and credit in the Southern Kyrgyz Oblast of Jalalabad. 
The programme focused mainly on the credit component and extension services were 
provided largely in connection with loans. In many cases farmers paid the extensionists 
for assistance in the preparation of a business plan if it resulted in the approval of their 
loan application. Such payments were not foreseen, but they show that support in getting 
access to loans is a service with clear benefi ts for which consequently many people are 
willing to pay.
Source of information KSAPDA (1999, pers. comm.)
Locations and relevance Box 6 (ch. 4)
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Case 6. TES (Training and Extension Services) Centre – Kyrgyzstan 
Approach and insights in detail
Context
In Kyrgyzstan agriculture is characterised by the transition from large collective and state farms to market-based 
farming systems with smaller farm enterprises. Advisory services are in this situation an urgent need because 
in the large farms division of responsibility and specialisation was high, and nowadays’ new small farmers have 
no experience in managing whole farms and in marketing products. 
Financing and service delivery arrangements
The Training and Extension Services Centre (TES Centre) is based at a university in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The 
centre supports agricultural specialists to become private extensionists. They are offered training in technical as 
well as methodological subjects. Scientists and teachers of the university and other specialists, e.g. from former 
kolkhozes, function as trainers and subject matter specialists. They form thematic working groups to share and 
develop knowledge and extension contents, and are involved in adaptive research to identify new opportunities. 
The TES Centre offers training not only to private extensionists but also to staff of other programmes and the 
public extension organisation RAS. The private extensionists as well as the trainers and backstoppers are 
envisaged to be only part-time engaged in this extension and training business.
The extensionists offer services for payment to farmers in their vicinity. They make extension contracts with 
clients. The payment mode includes a fi xed rate per day and a component which depends on an increased 
profi t of the clients from the concerned crop. The extensionists also have a contract with the TES Centre and 
Concepts illustrated • Financial participation
• Building private extension organisations
Approach and insights
(for details see below)
The TES (Training and Extension Services) Centre based at the University of Osh in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan supports agricultural specialists in becoming private extension service 
providers, mainly by providing technical and methodological training. 
Key insights
• To be successful (private) extensionists need attractive service offers. The availability of 
locally adapted practical innovations or their development can be a key success factor.
• Cultural customs can make it diffi cult for private extensionists to ask for payment.
• Tax systems can obstruct the functioning of private extension providers.
• Training and support centres like the TES Centre are an option to solve the key problems 
of extension systems that are decentralised or based on private service providers: those 
of skill development, links to research, technical bankstopping etc.
Sources of information Klaus Gerhardt, GTZ/AFC Project „Promotion of private agriculture in Osh“, (2000, various 
project documents, Peter Reinhard, LBL, Switzerland (2001, pers. comm.)
Locations and relevance Box 10 (ch. 4), chapter 6 and 8
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part of the earnings is paid to the Centre. Ultimately the Centre should be fi nanced from funds paid by clients 
for training and other support.
Observations and insights
• In principle the extensionists acquire their clients on their own. However, in the beginning the GTZ project 
that initiated the TES system, accompanied them to farmer meetings to explain the concept and to convince 
potential clients about the competence and seriousness of the efforts. Such backing will in many cases be a 
key factor for a successful start of private extension providers.
• For the new private extensionists it is crucial to have useful and attractive services to offer, and thus, the 
adaptive research that fi nds solutions to constraints and new opportunities appears to be a further key 
success factor. 
• Many of the extensionists fi nd it diffi cult to ask for payment, even though the conditions are clearly written 
in the contracts. The culture does not allow to ask directly for payment for services from people of their own 
community, but suggests that it is up to the person who receives a service to decide what to give in return.
• Centres like the TES Centre are an option to address one of the key problems inherent in extension systems 
that are decentralised or based on private service providers, i.e. skill development and training, links to 
research and other sources of innovation etc.
• The tax system threatens the motivation of the private extensionists.
Case 7. Willingness to pay for extension services – India
Concepts illustrated Financial participation
Approach and insights Within the framework of studies for a policy paper on privatising agricultural extension 
in India an investigation of the conditions and factors infl uencing the willingness to pay 
for extension services was conducted. It was also investigated what kind of services are 
currently offered for payment, and what kind of organisations provide them.
Key insights
• It appears that willingness to pay is greater:
❏ where satisfaction with the available sources of advice is low,
❏ with commercially oriented farmers,
❏ with better-educated farmers,
❏ where there is pressure such as small land-holdings or barely irrigated land,
❏ where off-farm work does not pay well compared to farming.
• A variety of services are offered for payment. Notable among them is that there are public 
institutions like universities and training centers that offer training courses for payment.
Source of information Sulaiman and Sadamate (2000)
Locations and relevance Box 12 (ch. 4)
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Case 8. INDAP (National Institute for Agricultural Development) –
 Chile 
Approach and insights in detail
Context
Chile pursued a development strategy with a general focus on privatisation from the late 1970s onwards. Within 
this political framework in 1978 an extension system was introduced where farmers obtained vouchers to 
purchase technical assistance from private extension enterprises. Soon major diffi culties arose with vouchers 
being submitted while hardly any extension service provision took place. 
In 1983 the system was changed into a service mandate system (contracting-out), with public funding and 
private delivery of services. Initially this programme addressed only small farmers with potential, later poor 
farmers were also included. Particularly since 1990, the system has continuously been adapted in accordance 
with experience gained and insights learnt.
Concepts illustrated • Service mandates between government and private providers (contracting-out)
• Development of markets for extension services
• Financial participation
• Voucher systems
Approach and insights
(for details see below)
In 1978 Chile introduced a voucher system that however failed. In 1983 then the system 
was transformed into a service mandate system. The public institution INDAP mandated 
private extension enterprises with the provision of extension services to a specifi ed clientele. 
Subsequently, the system was continuously adapted in accordance with new insights. 
Key insights
• Voucher systems require competition, fi nancial participation and effective con trolling.
• To achieve effectiveness, in service mandate systems ...
... fi nancial participation is a must in the case of services with a certain degree of
private good characteristics,
... contracts and monitoring should be result-oriented,
... adequate opportunities for professional development of private service providers
need to be in place
• Service mandates demand high management competencies of the mandating public 
body.
• Service mandates between public and private sector have an inherent risk of biased 
selection.
Source of information Berdegué (1997), Bebbington and Sotomayor (1998), Berdegué and Marchant (2001) 
Locations and relevance Box 14 (ch. 4), boxes 17, 19, 23 (ch. 5), chapter 6
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Since 1998 the system is further evolving towards demand-side fi nancing (contracts between clients and 
advisers) and a greater role of producer organisations, strict fi nancial participation, and more emphasis on 
market integration. 
This case serves as an example to illustrate service mandates between government and private extension 
organisations. Therefore the following analysis deals mainly with the period from 1983 to 1997, during which a 
real service mandate system was in operation. 
Financing and service delivery arrangements
INDAP (National Institute for Agricultural Development) selected and contracted private companies through a 
public bidding process, to provide extension services with government-determined contents in a certain area to 
a pre-determined number of farmers. Monitoring was done by client farmers and government-hired consultants. 
The contracts were for one year and could be renewed or not.
The system underwent continous adaptations in accordance with lessons learnt, although it continued in its 
core features until 1997. A number of important changes were introduced after 1990: e.g. • NGOs and farmers’ 
associations were also admitted to the bidding process, • three stages of extension support with different levels 
of fi nancial participation (free, 25% to be paid by clients, 100% client fi nancing) were introduced, • farmer groups 
could also get services (previously only individuals), • farmers could increasingly determine extension contents 
themselves, • INDAP provided training to staff of the private service providers, • services also addressed issues 
of marketing and farm economics. 
Observations and insights
Initial voucher system. The initial voucher system failed because there was no market for extension services in 
the rural areas of Chile. Voucher systems can only function if there is a service market with suffi cient competition 
to allow farmers to choose between a range of service providers. Additionally, to function well, voucher systems 
require fi nancial participation and independent controlling. 
Demand-orientation and effectiveness of services. Several observations and in sights concerning demand 
orientation and effectiveness of services emerged:
• As long as there was no fi nancial participation there was little interest in the quality of services or in 
whether they addressed any real need of the farmers. The extension enterprises had to enlist farmers 
to whom they would provide services as a pre-condition for bidding. Consequently, they tended to take 
anybody who was ready to participate without considering whether the services would be of use to the 
concerned participant. 
• Although the service mandate contracts suggested that farmers must be in volved in extension 
planning, participation was very variable and depended largely on the attitude and experience of the 
extensionists. To foster better participation fi nancial participation was enforced more strictly, farmers 
obtained representation in the commitees responsible for registration of admissible service pro viders, 
and client satisfaction was included in the evaluation criteria.
• In the early stages the competence of the private service providers was an obstacle to really high quality 
services. INDAP then took on the responsibility of ensuring opportunities for training and professional 
development of the private service providers.
• A variety of impact studies indicate that there has been substantial impact on the productivity, and 
mostly also on incomes.
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Accountability. Service mandate systems without fi nancial participation direct the accountability of the service 
providers strongly towards the government, probably more than if the extensionists would be directly government 
employed. Therefore fi nancial participation is a must in such systems if the concerned services are to a major 
extent private goods.
INDAP does not see fi nancial participation primarily as a way to reduce public expenditures, but as a means to 
ensure accountability and demand-orientation.
Willingness to pay. There were major problems with convincing farmers to pay their contributions. It seems 
that until 1997 no one yet has got to the 100% payment stage, but also 25% of the cost were often not paid. As 
possible reason for this has been mentioned that farmers are expected to pay for less intensive group services 
whereas earlier intensive individual support was provided free of cost.
Government functions. Service mandate systems are not a way to overcome a problem of weak government 
institutions, as such systems require strong management compentence. In Chile INDAP took on the following 
functions (apart from funding):
• defi nition of global policies and allocation of resources to areas and socio-economic strata in ac-
cordance with these policies,
• defi nition of general methodological and operational frameworks, 
• regulation and implementation of the public bidding process,
• ensuring the access of private service providers to adequate training and professional de ve lop-
ment,
• supervision, evaluation and grading of private extension enterprises.
Market development. The service mandate system had as one objective the development of a market for 
extension services. This objective has been achieved to a substantial extent. Currently there are nearly 200 
private enterprises in the system, whereas 15 year ago there were only a few that obtained a large percentage 
of the contracts. 
Political bias in awarding contracts. In the earlier years contracts were not always awarded unbiased in 
accordance with the competence of service providers and the quality of the proposals. Nepotism resulted in 
most contracts going to a very small number of enterprises. Anonymous proposals that reduced the possibility 
for biased choices were introduced as a counter-measure.
Financial sustainability. INDAP is of the view that high quality services to small farmers are only possible with 
some degree of public funding. It thus does not envisage fully private funding of the services. Consequently 
the fi nancial sustainability of service provision will continue to depend on annual budget allocations by political 
decision makers. 
Benefi ts for very poor farmers. INDAP recognised that many small and poor farmers do not benefi t from 
the existing system. Therefore INDAP now makes contracts with municipal governments in low potential areas 
and allots the municipality a certain amount per poor farmer that is earmarked for advisory services. The 
municipalities are free to employ their own extensionists or to mandate service provision to NGOs or private 
enterprises.
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Case 9.  INIAP - Ecuador
Case 10. RAS (Rural Advisory Services), Kyrgyzstan
Concepts illustrated Financial participation
Approach and insights The fruit programme of INIAP, a national public research institution in Ecuador, attempted to 
introduce cost sharing for extension services related to fruit production in the mid 1990ies. It 
however was unable to do so. The main reason for this failure appears to be that the services 
offered did not respond to the main problems that fruit growers faced.
Source of information Schlotmann 1997
Locations and relevance Box 15 (ch. 4)
Concepts illustrated • Service mandate between different levels of government
• Decentralised public extension organisation
Approach and insights
(see below for more 
information on the service 
mandate)
In Kyrgyzstan an decentral extension system (RAS, Rural Advisory Services) has been 
established in 1999, where previously there was no public extension at all. RAS Centres 
(Rural Advisory Services Centres) were established at Oblast (province) level, with branch 
offi ces in the Rayons (districts). At Oblast and Rayon level there are steering councils that 
are composed of representatives of the farming community and various local organisations 
and administrative bodies. The RAS secretariate at the central level has supervisory, 
coordinating and signifi cant controlling functions. It also has the fi nancial responsibility for 
the system.
In one Oblast a service mandate between the RAS secretariate and the RAS Centre was 
intitiated on an experimental basis. The underlying assumption is that service mandates 
result in more effi cient use of funds and more effective services than conventional activity- 
and input-based budget funding.
Apart from the pilot service mandate the fi nancing mechanisms of RAS are not very 
unconventional. However it offers a couple of insights that are useful for decentralised 
set-ups.
Key insights
• In Kyrgyzstan where people in general are used to top-down structures, it requires a lot 
of time and efforts for the different players to grasp their new roles. This is particularly 
the case for the RAS Secretariate, which has to learn to be a facilitator and coordinator 
rather than an instructor and controller. The diffi culties with this new role possibly may 
also have a connection with a perceived loss of power and control.
• RAS approaches the problems of knowledge management and horizontal exchange that 
is inherent in decentralised structures with the concept of local competence centres. This 
concept envisages that every RAS Centre becomes a resource base for certain issues 
with which it has special experience and knowledge.
As the service mandate system was initiated only recently no consolidated insights are yet 
available.
Source of information Peter Schmidt, KSAP (Kyrgyz-Swiss Agricultural Project), Helvetas Kyrgyzstan (2001, 
various internal documents), KSAP Prodoc (1998)
Locations and relevance Box 16, 18 (ch. 5), box 35 (ch. 8), chapter 7
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Difference between conventional budget funding and the service mandate 
approach
The difference between conventional budget funding and service mandates is that in the former funds are 
allocated for the inputs (salaries, offi ce expenses, acitivity cost etc.) while in the latter funds are allocated for 
the outputs (the results achieved).
The following table shows further details of the differences in functioning of the conventional budget funding of 
the RAS Centres and the service mandate system.
Case 11. Service mandates between public bodies – Switzerland
Usual functioning: Functioning of the service mandate system
RAS centres prepare an annual plan of operation (in a 
participatory process with the farmer clients) with activities 
and a budget specifying salary cost, offi ce expenses, 
trans port cost, cost of activities etc.
The RAS centre prepares a plan of operation (in a 
par ticipatory process with the farmer clients) containing 
clear, measurable, expected results, and the activities and 
expected cost required to achieve each of the results. 
The RAS secretariat approves plan of operation and 
bud get, and disburses funds according to the budget to 
the RAS centre. 
The RAS secretariat and the Oblast RAS centre con clude 
a contract for a service mandate based on the plan of 
operation. The RAS centre obtains the funds as per 
ag reement.
At the end of the fi nancial year the RAS centre gives unused 
funds back to the secretariat. 
Use of less funds than budgeted may have as a 
con se quence a reduced budget in the following year. Thus 
there is no motivation to conduct activities with as little cost 
as possible. 
The RAS centre reports about the activities conducted, 
thus there is no clear motivation to achieve results or even 
impact on the ground.
At the end of the contract period the achieved results are 
assessed jointly. 
If the results are less than foreseen, the RAS centre will 
be paid less. If the results are achieved at less cost than 
planned, the centre will obtain the full amount. It can use this 
amount in whatever way it likes – invest in something, top 
up staff salaries. In this way there is a) motivation to achieve 
real results, and b) to use funds rationally.
In addition, in the mandate system the RAS centre has 
the possibility to sell its services also to further sources of 
funds.
Concepts illustrated • Service mandates between different public bodies
• Payment for services according to public and private interests
• Backstopping and linkages in decentralised systems
Approach and insights Switzerland has a decentralised public extension system since 1958. It is funded by users, 
cantonal governments and the federal government. Nowadays, who pays for what services 
is strictly determined in accordance with the share of public and private interests in a 
service.
Since a couple of years service mandates between the federal government and the cantonal 
governments govern the fi nancial contributions from the federal level, instead of budget 
funding.
An independent resource institution is responsible for technical and methodological 
backstopping of the extension organisations. It is owned by an association and funded 
partly from federal funds and partly by other stakeholders.
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Approach and insights in detail
Context
Farming in Switzerland is characterised by small farm sizes (avg. 13.8 ha) when compared with EU countries 
or North America (US, Canada). Swiss agriculture is highly subsidised. In recent years a move from production 
subsidies to direct payments per area has taken place. These payments are conditional to observing production 
guidelines (mainly concerning ecological issues). Since 1990 agricultural incomes have declined by about 30%. 
Many farmers are giving up farming (more than 2500 in 1999 alone), and the average farm size is on the rise.
Financing and service delivery arrangements
In Switzerland the cantons (in size of small provinces) maintain agricultural extension services since 1958. 
Finance comes from different sources: federal government, cantonal government and farmer contributions. 
Cost sharing is dependent on the degree of public interest in a service. The farmers’ share thus can be anything 
between 0 and 100%.
In recent years the system of budget contributions from the federal level to the cantonal agricultural departments 
has been converted to service mandates between the federal government and the cantonal government, in the 
run of a general move to make government services more effi cient by changing from input fi nancing to output 
fi nancing. The amount of funds that the cantons obtain from the federal government to fulfi l their obligation of 
making certain kinds of extension services available now depends on the amount and type of services provided, 
and no longer on the staff positions and operational cost. 
Categories of services and topical areas have been defi ned. For each of these the ratio of public to private 
interest has been estimated, ranging from 0% to 100% public interest. The federal government is no longer 
concerned with services which are fully in the private interest, however the extension organisations can still 
offer such services to farmers, as long as they are not contradictory to the national agricultural policy. Cantons 
have also the option to decide to abolish the cantonal extension services and contract private organisations for 
the provision of services in the public interest. Furthermore, cantons can decide that additional services which 
are termed not in the general interest of the Swiss public and thus are not funded by the federal government, 
are in the public interest of the canton and provide cantonal funds for them.
Key insights
• Recording and measuring of services provision in service mandate systems is deman ding 
and complex.
• In Switzerland around 60% of the services provided have a degree of public interest of 
75% or higher.
• Extension services are overall publicly fi nanced to around 50%.
• The Swiss approach to backstopping and training functions in decentralised systems is 
an option for other countries too.
Source of information Swiss Centre for Agricultural Extension and Rural Development (2001)
Locations and relevance Chapter 5.2, chapter 7, chapter 8
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Percentage of public interest at the federal level as agreed in Switzerland
For training and support to the cantonal extension services there is an independent institution, the Swiss Centre 
for Agricultural Extension. This Centre belongs to an association, the members of which are various concerned 
organisations like the Swiss Farmers Union and several other farmer organisations, and the cantons. It is funded 
partly by the federal government, and partly by a variety of clients.
Observations and insights
The Swiss extension set-up has several features that provide insights for similar set-ups in developing coun-
tries.
Share of public interests. Approximately 60% of the services actually provided fall into a category of service 
and topical area which has been rated as 100% or 75% in the general public interest. It is likely that in developing 
countries an even larger proportion of extension services are at least partly in the general public interest. 
Service mandates. The effects of the system change from input fi nancing to a service mandate with output 
fi nancing on effectiveness and effi ciency are not yet visible. What, however, is already clear, is that it is 
demanding and complex to record and measure the services provided in a service mandate system compared 
to the the usual way of input fi nancing. 
Negotiation of public interests. The rules for the federal contributions are the result of broad-based negotiations 
involving all stakeholders, i.e. farmers and their organisations, the administration, as well as political parties 
and environmental organisations. 
Resource institution for decentralised and privatised systems. The existence of a resource institution for 
training, information and other support is a pre-condition for a functioning de-central system. An independent 
institution on the pattern of the Swiss Centre of Agricultural Extension is an option for countries where public 
extension is decentralised or privatised.
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Case 12. Service mandates with private advisers – Estonia 
Case 13. Service mandates with private extension enterprises – Thu 
 ringia Germany)
Concepts illustrated • Service mandates between public and private sector
Approach and insights In Estonia a service mandate system has been established. There are various forms of 
contracts, e.g. for individual advisory services, for group advisory services and training, and 
for longer-term projects. The public funds are channelled directly to the service providers, 
while the users participate in fi nancing to a varying degree (e.g. 20% in the case of groups 
services). 
For individual services a contract is concluded between the adviser and the client, which 
has to be approved by the county administration to get the public fi nance share.
For groups services and training advisers submit a proposal to the county administration 
which is then approved and funded.
Key insights
• The contracts are largely adviser-driven, and thus not fully demand-oriented.
• There is a high motivation for advisers to offer services and the number of farmers that 
have access to services has increased substantially.
• Training and backstopping of advisers is not yet satisfactory.
Source of information Loolaid (2001)
Locations and relevance Chapter 5
Concepts illustrated • Financial participation 
• Service mandate between public and private sector
Approach and insights In 1998 public extension provision in the German state of Thüringen was cut down. Only 
services with clear public interests continued to be provided by public extensionists. For 
services with a substantial degree of private interest publicly funded service mandates with 
private extension enterprises, and fi nancial participation of clients were introduced. The aim 
of the public funding was to foster the establishment of private extension providers. The 
government certifi es individual extensionists, and offers cost-free training. 
The price of services was not fi xed, and it appeared that the amounts charged were rather 
high. This suggests that the service providers did not use the public fund contribution to 
reduce the price of services, but for capital investments or higher salaries.
Key insights
The introduction of fi nancial participation resulted in a dramatic drop in demand. Before 
around 80% of farmers had sought advice at least once per year, and when they had to 
pay this fi gure fell to 13% of farms. Moreover half of these were very large farms. Nearly 
90% of the very large farms utilised the services for payment, whereas less than 10% of 
the remaining small and medium farms did so.
Source of information Currle, Hoffmann, Kidd (2001)
Locations and relevance Box 5, (ch. 4), chapter 5
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Case 14. CABI-IPPM Programme – Tansania and Kenya
Case 15. SAHA – Madagascar
Concepts illustrated Demand-side fi nancing
Approach and insights The CABI-IPPM (Integrated Production and Pest Management) Programme provides 
ex tension services in the form of Farmer Field Schools (FFS). The client farmer groups get 
the funds to plan and implement the Field Schools. The approach is fairly fl exible. Financial 
participation is required only in relatively better-off communities. Financial participation 
allows to include more topics or to get more intensive services. In Tansania demand-side 
fi nancing is implemented only where a bank is available. 
Key insights
• Clients learn a lot: e.g. management of funds, prioritizing service needs, understanding 
about the cost of different types of services.
• Bad service providers are not paid. This indicates some positive impact on the quality of 
services. 
• Demand-side fi nancing can reduce the workload of clients and programme staff (shorter 
decision processes and less travelling).
Source of information Godrick Khisa, CABI-IPPM Programme, Kenya; Thomas Julianus, CABI-IPPM Programme, 
Tansania
Locations and relevance Box 20 (ch. 5)
Concepts illustrated Demand-side fi nancing
Approach and insights SAHA, a rural development programme in Madagascar, employs a demand-side fi nancing 
ap proach, among others for services related to income generation and natural resource 
management. Farmers, groups and rural organisations can submit project proposals for 
funding. Although it has started operations only recently the fi rst insights emerge.
Insights
• While designing and planning the programme a lot of efforts were required to foster 
acceptance of the new approach by the various players, particularly by NGOs, who earlier 
obtained supply-side fi nance. Also the clients fi rst had to become familiar with their new 
role and the linked responsibilities.
• The principle of demand-side fi nancing is adapted to the capacity of the clients. In some 
cases they manage the funds fully themselves, in some cases fund management is done 
jointly by the programme and the clients, and in other cases funds are still managed by 
the programme, but payment to service providers is made only with formal approval by 
the clients.
• Most of the obtained proposals are relatively conventional, no innovative ideas have 
ap peared. In consequence, SAHA decided to undertake participatory innovation 
de velopment (action research).
• SAHA wants to have poverty reduction impact. However, so far they are unsure which 
proposals really offer the potential for such an impact. 
• The villagers and groups are unable to formulate adequate proposals, and thus the 
programme provides assistance to the clients in developing proposals.
• Number and quality of service providers is unsatisfactory. SAHA is devising strategies to 
improve the situation.
Source of information Harilanto Ravelomantsoa, Bruno Rakotonirina, SAHA, Madagascar, Herman Mulder, 
In tercooperation, Switzerland (2001, pers. communication and some internal documents)
Locations and relevance Chapter 5
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Case 16. Voucher systems in small enterprise de velopment – 
 various countries
Case 17. Refunding system – Sachsen-Anhalt (Germany)
Concepts illustrated • Demand-side fi nancing
• Development of service markets 
Approach and insights Voucher systems are employed with the objective of developing markets for training and 
business development services in the Small Enterprise Development sector since many 
years in many countries. The experiences made provide insights that are helpful when 
considering voucher systems for extension services.
Key insights
• Public subsidising of services with vouchers usually results in an increase in services 
offered and demanded. Often also very small and informal enterprises begin to use 
services. However, it appears that usually demand declines as soon as the public 
subsidies cease, and a shift in types of clients occurs, although the diversifi ed offer may 
persist.
• Vouchers should not be advertised and distributed by service providers, but by an 
unbiased organisation.
• Cost participation and a good controlling system are keys to success.
• Without competition between service providers, vouchers have little effect on quality 
of services. The same is the case if there are no training opportunities for service 
providers.
• Voucher programmes do not sell by themselves. Information and advertising is 
necessary.
• The management of voucher systems is complex and expensive.
Source of information Peter Lutz, Swisscontact (2000, pers. comm.), Gibson (2000), Mc Vay and Overy Miehlbradt 
(2001), Goldmark et al. (2001)
Locations and relevance Box 22 (ch. 5), chapter 6
Concepts illustrated • Demand-side fi nancing
• Development of markets for extension services
Approach and insights Sachsen-Anhalt is a state in the Eastern part of Germany that formerly belonged to the 
German Democratic Republic. After the reunion of Eastern and Western Germany, farmers 
who were previously workers on large collective farms found themselves in the situation of 
having to adapt their now private farms to a highly competitive commercial environment. 
The government wanted to subsidise, though not fully fi nance, the necessary extension 
assistance, and to foster the establishment of a market for private advisory services. 
A demand-side fi nancing mechanism was chosen: a refunding system. Farmers who use 
services of private advisers get part of the expenses refunded by the government against the 
submission of a proof. Initially the farmers had to pay 20% themselves. Later the percentage 
of fi nancial participation was gradually increased and has reached now around 80%. The 
government certifi es the extension enterprises and individuals if they fulfi l certain quality 
standards, and provides training opportunities. 
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Case 18. Mvula Trust – South Africa
Concepts illustrated Demand-side fi nancing
Approach and insights The Mvula Trust is a South African NGO that supports rural communities in establishing water 
supply schemes using a demand-side fi nancing approach. Mvula obtains funding from donor 
agencies and the South African government. Financial participation of the communities is 
compulsory.
During planning of a project Mvula staff take the lead, whereas construction and putting 
schemes into operation are managed by community water committees, including the 
con tracting of engineering, training and management support, material purchase and 
con struction work, with funds that Mvula transfers to the committee. Mvula provides 
su per vision and other assistance when necessary.
Key insights
• The deep involvement of the communities in project management results in strong 
ow nership and management skills. This shows itself in the high sustainability percentage 
of Mvula supported schemes compared to schemes constructed with other approaches.
• The implementation of their project is an opportunity for the communities and in par ticular 
the water commitees to learn a variety of new competencies, among them management 
of funds, as well as contracting and supervising consultants. 
• The communities often had diffi culties to demand good quality services from consultants. 
This concerns engineers as much as trainers and facilitators. The consultants tended to 
complete their assignments as quickly as possible and did not pay attention to processes 
and participation of the clients. This shows that private service providers are no guarantee 
for quality services, even if there is a market with competition, and that service quality 
de pends a lot on the capability of clients to recognise good quality. Mvula tries to 
improve service quality by result- instead of activity-oriented contracts, by assessing the 
competencies of the service providers more carefully, and through closer supervision of 
consultants by own staff.
• Schemes where fi nancial participation is strictly enforced are mostly successful, whereas 
many of the projects where the fi nancial participation rule was relaxed are problematic.
Source of information Mvula Trust, South Africa (Martin Rall, 1999, pers. comm. and various internal do cu ments)
Locations and relevance Box 21 (ch. 5), chapter 6, chapter 7
Key insights
• The services used are mainly related to market integration and farm management. 
Advisory services and support to farms which are in an economically insecure position 
and services about environmental issues are not taken care of by the system. In response 
to this gap in the service offer the government engaged special services for economically 
insecure farms.
• In order to function well demand-side fi nancing systems, particularly refunding and 
voucher systems, require fi nancial participation, some degree of competition, and 
adequate control and supervision mechanisms. 
• The objective of fostering market development appears to be achieved. A broad range of 
enterprises offering services has developed. Services continue to be demanded despite 
the reduction in public funding, although demand has diminished.
• Studies attest the system high effi ciency and effectiveness. Its success is such that other 
former Eastern German states have established similar systems. 
Source of information Zack (1996, 1997)
Locations and relevance Box 23 (ch. 5)
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Case 19. PAIP (Support Programme for Producer Initiatives) – Mali
Case 20. Farmers’ Federation Fouta-Djallon – Guinea
Concepts illustrated • Financial participation 
• Fostering private extension organisations
Approach and insights PAIP (Support Programme for Producer Initiatives), a programme of Helvetas Mali, supports 
the establishment of private extension providers. In many cases these service providers 
were previously programm employees. Linked to this, PAIP attempts to introduce fi nancial 
participation for training and advisory services.
Insights
• Unpredictable agro-climatic conditions resulting in uncertain profi tability of farming are 
an unfavourable environment for fi nancial participation.
• Competition from NGOs and public extension that offer services for free makes business 
for private service providers diffi cult.
• Although the private service providers face a variety of diffi culties they are confi dent 
that they will become fi nancially viable, although with development organisations and 
programmes as clients, rather than farmers directly.
Source of information Daniel Valenghi and other staff, PAIP/Helvetas Mali (2000, pers. comm.); Etienne (2001)
Locations and relevance Box 10 (ch. 4), box 24 (ch. 6) 
Concepts illustrated Producers‘ own extension services
Approach and insights The Farmers‘ Federation Fouta-Djallon is a federation consisting of more than 200 producer 
organisations with more than 10‘000 farmers. It has been successful in being helpful to its 
members by pulling down donor funds and government services, negotiating with market 
actors and traders, infl uencing policy and offering other useful services to members 
(technical and economic advice, experiementation, marketing etc.). The federation has 
achie ved substantial fi nancial autonomy by raising own funds (member contributions, 
interest on loans, margins on inputs, levies on marketed produce). 
Key insights
The following factors are regarded as the ones crucial for success: 
• Good degree of fi nancial autonomy.
• Farmers assumed major responsibilities from the very beginning of the project and 
decision making is decentralised.
• The Federation is truly useful to members. 
• Exchange between member groups on issues related to organisational de velopment 
resulted in relatively quick increase in number of successful member groups.
Source of information Etienne (1998)
Locations and relevance Box 25 (ch. 6)
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Case 21. UNFA (Ugandan National Farmers Association) – Uganda 
Case 22. AKRSP (Aga Khan Rural Support Programme) – Pakistan
Concepts illustrated • Producers’ own extension services
• Financial participation
Approach and insights UNFA is an umbrella organisation of decentralised, independent district farmer associations 
(DFA) since 1998. UNFA and the DFAs are expected to fi nance themselves from membership 
contributions and the sale of advisory and training services. Currently DANIDA contributes 
substantial fi nance.
The membership in the DFAs has been rapidly increasing over the last couple of years, but 
is still well below 10% of the farm households. UNFA is widely recognised for representing 
small farmers, but rather few really poor farmers are members.
The DFAs offer advisory services and training to their members. For this they employ own 
extensionists. Currently DANIDA pays 65% of their salaries, in theory. It is envisaged that 
DANIDA’s contribution will diminish over time. In practice, the 65% paid by DANIDA mostly 
makes up 100% of the advisers’ salary and they are satisfi ed with this. The plans to reduce 
the Danish share had to be postponed to avoid a breakdown of the whole set-up. Although 
foreseen, fi nancial participation so far happens only in a few places. 
Insight
The idea of gradually decreasing public and simultanously increasing private funding for 
the same type of services works only rarely. The infl ow of public funds sabotages the 
establishment of a local funding base and the development of local ownership. 
Source of information Danida (2000), Agricultural Sector Programme Support (2000), Kidd, Beckman (1999), 
Andrew Kidd, DfID-Nigeria (2001, pers. comm.)
Locations and relevance Box 26 (ch. 6)
Concepts illustrated • Producers‘ own extension services
• Financial participation
Approach and insights In Northern Pakistan famers selected by community organisations obtain training as village 
specialists and provide services to their fellow villagers, within the frame of broad-based 
rural development activities. Outstanding village specialists get further training to become 
master trainers as a second tier of local extensionists. The modes of payment for services 
are negotiated between the village extensionists and their community organisation. AKRSP 
pays for training and an initial service kit for the specialists.
Key insights
• In general the villagers are willing to pay for tangible services, but hardly for advisory 
services and training. 
• Successful village organisations are more likely to have successful village specialists.
• It is good if the payment for services is negotiated between village extensionists and their 
clients, and not determined from outside.
• Village extensionists need to be paid for services if they are to devote substantial time 
and efforts to extension tasks.
Source of information Katz (1999), various publications and internal documents of AKRSP
Locations and relevance Box 27 (ch. 6)
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Approach and insights in detail
Context
The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) runs an integrated rural development programme in Nor thern 
Pakistan. Villagers organise themselves in village organisations and women’s organisations for a development 
partnership with AKRSP based on three corner stones: • organisation of the communities, • mobilisation of local 
capital resources through a savings and credit scheme, and • skills development through a variety of training 
and support activities. Community-owned extension services for agriculture and natural resource management 
is part of the skills development activities. 
Financing and service delivery arrangements
The community organisations select suitable men and women to be trained as village specialists in specifi c 
fi elds, e.g. in fi eld and fruit crops, vegetables, livestock, poultry, marketing and forestry. The village specialists 
offer various services and products, e.g. livestock and poultry vaccination and medication, pesticide spraying, 
orchard tree planting, cereal and vegetable seed, fertilisers, vegetable planting, transport to markets.
As a second tier of village-based extensionists the most capable and suitable specialists of a village cluster 
are selected to become master trainers in their fi eld of specialisation. They are expected to be model farmers, 
entrepreneurs dealing with inputs, easily available resource persons for village specialists, trainers, and capable 
of linking with e.g. government extensionists and researchers, market actors or input companies. They are also 
encouraged to organise themselves in associations. 
The payment for the services provided by the village specialists is negotiated and agreed between the specialist 
and their fellow organisation members. In general the provision of tangible services like a vaccination of an 
animal or the pruning of a tree is paid for. The specialists provide also information and advice, however, this is 
in general not perceived as something payable by the people.
Training and technical support for the village specialists as well as for the master trainers is paid by AKRSP. 
During the training they get a daily allowance. Master trainers are paid by AKRSP for functioning as assistant 
trainers during training of further village specialists. 
Observations and insights
Service quality. Overall the village specialists are seen as useful by the village organisation members. Some 
villagers said that they are doing a good job considering their level of education and training, but that more 
knowledgeable, higher educated specialists would be even more useful. Some villagers expressed the view 
that they would not be willing to fi nance the training of the village specialists, as they cannot become useful 
enough to be worth such an investment. 
Motivation of village specialists. Most village specialists opt for becoming a specialist fi rstly because they want 
to improve their own farming skills and income, and only secondly because they want to serve as extensionists. 
The social recognition they get is suffi cient motivation to share their learnings and information with fellow 
villagers. They don’t expect to be paid for this. 
119
Annex 1 – Case examples
Importance of strong village organisation. Usually well-functioning and active village organisations tend 
to have good specialists too. Farmer extensionists apparently are more likely to be successful with strong 
community or producer organisations in the background.
Setting the price of services. For this type of approach it is good to let the villagers and the farmer extensionist 
negotiate and agree on payment modes. They can best fi nd modes adapted to the local perception of values 
and economic behaviour. 
Input business or advisory services? Farmer extensionists, in particular at the master trainer level, whose 
services should be mainly fi nanced via input businesses, may focus mainly on the business and neglect other 
services required. A more promising approach may be if well-trained and skilled farmer extensionists are paid 
by a number of community organisations together, either on a case to case basis (e.g. for organising a training 
on a specifi c topic, for travelling to a research station to collect information) or through regular remuneration 
(i.e. a kind of monthly salary). 
Importance of second tier local extensionists. A second tier of the community-own extension system (here 
the master trainers) is a crucial element for sus tainability in this type of approach. Only where there are other 
institutions taking up the functions of the second tier on a longer term, it may be left out. 
Case 23. Organic products for export – Uganda 
Concepts illustrated Extension fi nanced by market margins
Approach and insights A private exporter interested in developing exports of organic sesame and other crops 
from a remote area in Uganda to Europe obtained support from SIDA (Swedish Agency for 
International Development) to set up operations. 
The exporter negotiated contracts with producers to ensure that they do not use any 
forbidden inputs. Not much change in production systems was necessary, and thus not much 
technical advice required, because the farmers hardly used any external inputs anyway. 
The economic benefi ts for the farmers are substantial, although certifi cation by European 
organisations is expensive.
Source of information Kidd, Tulip, Walaga (2001) 
Locations and relevance Box 29 (ch. 6)
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Case 24. VFFP and CARE-Bangladesh – Bangladesh 
Approaches and insights in detail: Village Farm Forestry Programme
Context
Bangladesh has very little forest area (approx. 15%) of which nearly 90% are in the East and North-Eastern 
hills of the country. In the remaining areas tree cover is limited. Wood for all purposes is scarce and prices are 
high. Deforestation is progressing rapidly. In order to increase the availability of wood, tree planting on private 
land around houses and in fi elds is a must. 
The Village Farm Forestry Programme (VFFP) intends to achieve the three following main objectives
• promotion of tree planting on private crop and homestead land, 
• raising awareness about the potential of trees, 
• making the necessary inputs and technical support available. 
Financing and service delivery arrangements
In the early nineties (until 1994) partner NGOs were assisted in pursuing the above objectives. They obtained 
training, set up nurseries and tried to motivate people to plant trees. Certain core farmers were paid by the 
project to promote tree planting in the villages. 
From 1994 onwards the approach was changed: selected villagers obtain training and support in establishing 
village-based nursery enterprises. Partner NGOs select the nursery entrepreneurs, provides the training and 
support, and undertake some promotional activities. VFFP undertakes research and technology development, 
monitoring and evaluation, trains the NGO staff, and does large scale promotion. 
Concepts illustrated Extension fi nanced by market margins
Approach and insights In Bangladesh various programmes (Village Farm Forestry Programme VFFP and CARE-
Bangladesh) train local small farmers as nursery tree and vegetable seed producers. The 
majority of these enterpreneurs succeeded in earning a better living for themselves, and at 
the same time make saplings and seed of a reasonable quality available at the village level. 
The approach proved to be very effective in terms of promoting the planting of trees when 
compared to promotion of tree planting by NGOs.
Based on initial observations it was expected that the enterpreneurs would also become a 
type of local extensionists. However, it turned out that the enterpreneurs gave good basic 
advice on how to plant trees and sow vegetables, but that more complex information related 
to vegetable growing like soil fertility, pest and disease management, tree care, was not 
provided. 
Key insights
• Advisory services that coincide with business interests, e.g. linked to input sales, are 
likely to be limited in depth. 
• Advice and promotional activities linked to business interests can be put to use to foster 
public interests.
Source of information VFFP and CARE Bangladesh (1999/2000, pers. comm.)
Locations and relevance Box 30 (ch. 6)
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The nursery entrepreneurs assess the demand for seedlings in their surroundings, produce and sell the 
seedlings. In their very own business interest they also promote the idea of tree planting and provide technical 
advice on how to best manage the planted trees. 1997 there were 1500 tree entrepreneurs with 300’000 clients. 
In 1999 2500 nursery entrepreneurs (women and men) were running successful businesses, with 650’000 
villagers and many NGOs, contractors and donor programmes as clients.
The activities of the VFF Programme itself and the partner NGOs are fi nanced by donor money. The input supply 
(tree saplings) and extension activities of the nursery entrepreneurs are fi nanced by the sale of seedlings, i.e. 
paid for by the clients. 
Observations and insights
Entrepreneurs’ success in promoting tree planting. Since tree growing promotion is done by the enterpreneurs 
the numbers of trees planted has increased dramatically. 
As the above fi gures show, the approach with the nursery entrepreneurs is much more successful than the 
NGO promotion approach. 
1991 - 94 Promotion by NGOs 500‘000 trees
1994 - 97 Promotion by nursery entrepreneurs > 5 million trees
1997 - 99 Promotion by nursery entrepreneurs > 100 million trees (of which 31 million by farmers and the 
re mainder by NGOs and con -tractors for roadside plantation)
Potential of local entrepreneurs to make inputs available. Extension services can fully serve their purpose of 
existence only when the means of production required to improve farming are accessible to farmers. Where 
access to inputs and other means of production is not ensured, extension services often resort to supplying the 
inputs themselves. Instead of doing so their time and effort may be better invested in training and supporting 
local entrepreneurs to set up an input business. This is particularly feasible for inputs which can be produced 
locally, such as tree saplings, vegetable and grain seed, or chicks, but also for industrial inputs like fertilisers or 
livestock vaccines. Thus the approach used by VFFP may be a useful complementary tool for many extension 
organisations. 
Approaches and insights in detail: CARE-Bangladesh
Context and approach
Land is scarce in Bangladesh, and many families own hardly any cropping land. However most families have 
some garden area around their homestead. A number of CARE-Bangladesh programmes have the objective of 
fostering the productivity of this land by promoting vegetable gardening and local production of vegetable seed. 
Towards this objective villlagers (mainly women) are trained as extensionists for vegetable production and as 
entrepreneurs for seed and nursery production. 
Observations and insights
Many of the trained people have become successful entrepreneurs. They provide basic advice on the use of 
seed and tree seedlings. However, also in this case the services provided by the entrepreneurs are usually of 
limited depth, and do not satisfy all the need for advice required to improve vegetable productivity.
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Case 25. Cotton management enterprise – Peru
Concepts illustrated • Private extension organisations
• Financial participation
Approach and insights Chincha is a dynamic coastal region in Peru. Larger farmers move out of cotton production 
and into asparagus due to decreasing cotton prices. Small farmers move into cotton 
production but face a host of problems with it. 
A large cotton producer established a cotton management enterprise. The enterprise makes 
contracts with farmer companies (formed by groups of small cotton farmers) for the provision 
of services for payment. The services cover production practices, facilitating access to 
credit of formal banks and links to ginners and textile companies (but not marketing itself). 
The service package costs approx. 25% of the profi t of the producers. This amounts to 
approximately 50% of the additional profi t that results from the arrangement.
Apparently the arrangement is very profi table for the farmers despite the relatively high cost, 
since every year the number of farmers involved increases dramatically. 
A comparison with advisory and support services for small cotton producers provided by 
an NGO shows that cooperation with the cotton management enterprise results in 80% 
more profi t compared to no services at all, whereas cooperation with the NGO brings only 
50% more profi t.
The benefi ts of the arrangement come e.g. due to a reduction of the transaction cost due 
to economies of scale for inputs and outputs. Another point is that the farmer companies 
do not sell the cotton to the ginners anymore, but contract the ginners as service providers 
and sell ginned cotton to textile factories.
The management company works with farmer companies and not individuals because of 
reduced workload and the mutual supervision of production practices between farmers of 
an enterprise which reduces the risk of loan default.
Key insights
• This is a case where a private extension provider is more effective than a public one. And 
the cotton management is fi nancially more sustainable, because it does not depend on 
donor funds.
• The case shows that better services are demanded also by small farmers even if they 
cost.
• The cotton management enterprise emerged without outside intervention. However, it 
would be interesting to explore how development initiatives can foster and not sabotage 
the establishment of such arrangements.
Source of information Escobal et al. (2000)
Locations and relevance Box 28 (ch. 6), chapters 4 and 7
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Case 26. Comparison of public and private service providers –
 Pakistan, USA
Case 27. Withdrawal of the state – Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, Gua te- 
 mala
Concepts illustrated Private extension organisations
Approach and insights In Pakistan a study compared similar services provided by public and private extension 
organisations (pest management in the cotton sector).
Both the private (pesticide company) and the public extension organisation work more with 
larger better educated farmers. 
Overall the clients rate the private services slightly better than the public ones. There is an 
interesting exception in that advice on virus control by the public extension is considered 
better (viruses cannot be controlled with pesticides and thus the pesticide company has 
not much interest in it).
Farmers with better education rate extension quality higher than those with little education, 
in particular for public extension.
Better-off farmers fi nd the private service provider better, whereas smaller farmers rate the 
private services as rather poor.
Those farmers that are satisfi ed with public extension tend to be smaller, younger and better 
educated than those who are unhappy with it.
Those farmers who have access to neither of these extension services obtain advice on 
pest management from pesticide dealers in the bazaar.
In Maryland (USA) a comparison of private and public services for integrated pest 
management (IPM) showed that the private service providers focused on high potential 
areas and on large farmers.
Source of information Davidson et al. (2001), Hanson and Just (2001)
Locations and relevance Chapter 7, chapter 3
Concepts illustrated Options for public extension organisations – privatisation 
Approach and insights In many Latin American countries a privatisation move in the agricultural sector took place 
in the 1990s within a general neo-liberal policy framework. In Peru, Honduras, Bolivia and 
Guatemala this privatisation move led to the dismantling of public extension and research 
organisations somewhen in that decade. 
There was the expectation that the private sector would fi ll the resulting space. What 
happened actually? 
In Peru growth in the agricultural sector after privatisation was substantial, caused on the 
one hand by new products for export and by expanding the land under crop production. 
Very little research was undertaken by the private sector. Many additional NGOs that offer 
extension services with donor funding emerged. Some NGOs became intermediaries 
between producers and markets, sometimes fi nanced by levies or by the interest on 
loans. Producer organisations and agri-businesses around specifi c commodities offering 
integrated support packages came up. The large farmer unions disappeared because they 
had no partners in the government any more.
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Case 28. Decentralisation to districts – Uganda 
Better-off producers report that they can get much of the services they need for payment, 
while medium and small farmers largely state that their service needs are not fulfi lled by 
what is offered for payment.
Insights (based on Peru, Honduras, Bolivia and Guatemala experience)
• Donor-funded NGOs tend to fi ll part of the gaps left by the public extension 
organisations.
• Commercial producers, particularly better-off ones tend to be serviced satisfactorily by 
private arrangements. Many small producers in remote areas are left with little or no 
access to useful and affordable services.
• Privatisation opens up space for innovative service provision arrangements that in some 
instances also benefi t small producers. 
• Private arrangements that offer integrated service packages for commercial crops or 
advice linked to the sale of inputs or credit increase.
Source of information Heredia (1999), Martin Fischler, PASOLAC/Intercooperation, El Salvador; Monika Zurek, 
Uni Giessen, Germany; various other persons
Locations and relevance Box 31 (ch. 7)
Concepts illustrated Options for public extension organisations – public/private partnerships
Approach and insights In Uganda the directorate of extension at the ministry of agriculture was abolished in 1998 
and the major responsibility for supporting and backstopping extension was transferred 
to the national agricultural research organisation. Extension itself became a responsibility 
of the districts. The salaries of existing extension staff is paid by the central government, 
whereas new extensionists have to be paid by the local government. Districts and sub-
counties are supposed to pay the operational expenses. On a longer term it is envisaged 
that more and more of the service providers will be private, and that the local government 
will give service mandates to these. 
Currently, however, what happens in reality, is that donor-funded programmes and NGOs 
contract in public extensionists. This results in a public/private partnership, in which donors 
fund operational cost and often some forms of incentive for the public extensionists, and the 
public sector takes care of the basic salary. This may not be the foreseen way of operation, 
but in the local perception apparently the most practical one, because it overcomes the 
common constraint of public extension, i.e. the lack of operational funds and low staff 
salaries. 
With these arrangements the extensionists learn new, more participatory, ways of working, 
and new approaches, e.g participatory experimentation, marketing support. These new 
professional competencies may well form the basis for future engagement as private service 
providers, once the NAADS (National Agricultural Advisory Services) programme which is 
the basis of all the system changes becomes fully operational.
Source of information Crowder and Anderson (2001)
Locations and relevance Chapter 7
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Case 29. UMATAs (municipal extension units) – Colombia 
Concepts illustrated Options for public extension organisations – decentralisation
Approach and insights Within an overall drive for decentralisation, the municipalities in Colombia have been 
as signed the legal obligation to maintain a municipal extension unit, called UMATA (Unidad 
Municipal de Asistencia Tecnica Agropecuaria). 
Most municipalities employ extensionists for the UMATAs, who provide technical support on 
agricultural, livestock, fi shery, environmental, social and gender issues. The management 
responsibility lies fully at the municipal level. Training and technical support to UMATAs is 
provided by institutions of the Ministry of Agriculture. The users of UMATA services are small 
farmers. Who is a small farmer is defi ned according to certain criteria.
The municipalities get funds from the central government for running the UMATAs, which 
are complemented by funds from the national co-fi nancing system (= outside + municipal). 
For client farmers the services are free. There are ideas that in future the municipalities will 
have to create their own revenue to fi nance the extension services and that clients have to 
contribute to its fi nancing.
 Key insights 
• The number of municipalities and small farmers reached by extension services have 
increased dramatically with the UMATA system. The number of extensionists is much 
higher, the number of clients per extensionist is slightly lower.
• The annual cost have increased more or less synchronously with the increase in 
coverage. The cost per client appear reduced by about 10%. 
• The quality of services is a problem and appears to have deteriorated with decentralisation. 
Links to research have weakened and political interference by municipal authorities also 
affects service quality. On the other hand, there is an aspect of quality which apparently 
has improved: the extensionists are now much closer to the farmers and therefore are 
more aware of their needs and constraints, and can respond to their real demands.
• Technical and training support, as well as links to research, need to be specially designed 
for decentralised systems. In addition, a system of horizontal experience exchange 
between the decentralised extension units could ensure that they, although independent, 
are tied into a knowledge and experience system.
• As the services are free for the users, the accountability of the extensionists to the 
farmers is still rather weak, although there may be some social accountability in case 
extensionists are local. Adequate fi nancial participation for services which are private 
goods would enhance accountability. 
• Municipal committees for rural development should take up the function of prioritising and 
co-ordinating development activities. In these, representatives of the rural communities 
should have the majority. However these committees were not established everywhere 
and the rural community representatives’ control over them is mostly weak. 
• When conceptualising the approach it was thought that the municipalities would make 
use of private sector fi rms to fulfi l the legal obligations. However, most municipalities 
preferred to employ extension staff. It is unclear whether this is because suitable private 
sector actors are not available, or due to more political reasons.
• A decentralised extension system does not guarantee control by farmers. Local authorities 
may take decisions which are equally against the interests of the small farmers as a far 
away extension directorate. The same is the case for local development committees and 
similar bodies. 
• De-central, independent systems require considerable management capacity at the 
decentralised levels, and mostly considerable efforts and investment will be needed to 
develop this. 
Source of information Guadagni, Garfi eld (1997)
Locations and relevance Box 32, 33, 34 (ch. 7)
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Concepts illustrated • Financial participation 
• Options for public extension organisations
Approach and insights The public extension services in Tansania faced severe shortage of funds. In consequence 
the extensionists started to charge for their services. Within the frame of a participatory 
poverty assessment, it became apparent that this negatively affected the trust that villagers 
had in the extensionists. Further it reduced the reliability of access to inputs and increased 
their cost. Villagers perceived this deterioration of services as a major cause of increased 
poverty. 
Insights
• Financial participation should be introduced offi cially. Proper communication of the 
changes would reduce the damage to trust.
• Privatisation of services and the introduction of cost participation without mitigating 
measures have a high potential of increasing poverty.
Source of information Narayan (2000)
Locations and relevance Box 8 (ch. 4), chapter 7
Concepts illustrated Options for public extension organisations – cost-sharing arrangements with the private 
sector
Approach and insights In Kenya an input company entered into a cost-sharing arrangement with the public sector, 
and contributes to fi nancing extension on integrated pest management for vegetable 
growers. The company has recognised that integrated pest management is increasingly 
important, and that engaging in promoting at least some level of pesticide use should help 
to maintain or increase its market share. In this case a coincidence of public and private 
interest has permitted the public/private partnership.
Key insight
Alertness for coincidence of private and public interests may bring to light many more 
opportunities of public/private partnership for public extension organisations with fi nancial 
constraints. However, there is always the risk that the desire for an acceptable fi nancial 
situation results in the tendency to compromise on the public interests.
Source of information Andrew Kidd (DfID Nigeria), 2001
Locations and relevance Chapter 7
Case 30. Public extensionists – Tansania, Nigeria and other coun- 
 tries
Case 31. Public/private partnership for IPM extension – Kenya
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People who are involved with extension – from policy makers and national 
exten sion planners to fi eld extensionists and farmers – have many different un-
derstandings of the purpose, the functions and the tasks of extension. The un-
derstanding of what extension is, may range from a vehicle for transferring modern 
technology from research to farmers, to an approach for broad-based participatory 
community development. 
In this annex an overview of the understanding of extension underlying this study 
is presented. 
Core extension tasks – the extension elephant
The elephant metaphor shows the core tasks – or core advisory services – that 
an extension organisation usually performs in one way or the other. 
Training. Arranging and providing 
trai ning to client farmers and other 
sectoral actors to enhance their 
know ledge and skills in tech ni cal, 
economic, managerial and or ga ni sa-
tional matters.
Dissemination of information. Ga-
thering, processing and disse mi na-
ting re levant information from different 
sources, e.g. about promising new 
prac tices, pla ces to ob tain certain 
inputs, mar ket pri ces, new laws, rules 
and regulations, and many other sub-
jects. 
Assistance in problem-solving.  A further core task is to assist farmers in 
recognising bottlenecks, analysing problems and their causes, and developing 
solutions. 
Facilitation and animation. To encourage and facilitate individual and joint 
in itiatives, e.g. for organisational development, access to means of production, 
development of local innovations, exploitation of emerging opportunities, negotia-
tion with authorities, and many other processes.
Contents and methods. To be able to offer meaningful services, an extension 
organisation needs to design appropriate and relevant extension topics, based 
on combining research results, farmers‘ local knowledge, as well as ideas and 
information from a range of sources. Further, a variety of appropriate extension 
methods must be at the disposal of the extensionists.
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Planning, monitoring and evaluation. Setting objectives and priorities as well 
as planning extension activities usually should take place in collaboration with 
the clients. Of course, the implementation of activities needs to be monitored. 
Evaluation of extension activities in most cases should focus on results and impact 
rather than on activities conducted. The view of the clients is central to judging the 
effectiveness of the provided services.
The linking functions of extension
It is not suffi cient for an extension organisation to offer the above core services and 
interact with rural people. In order for extension to fulfi l its purpose (as defi ned in 
section 2.1), a number of functions linking the extension clients with other actors in 
the support services system – e.g. research, input supply, and markets – need to 
be performed. Although it does not need to perform all these tasks itself, extension 
has a role in ensuring that they are performed. These fun ctions are illustrated by 
the extension butterfl y. The core services appear in the body of the butterfl y, while 
the wings, the abdomen and the head represent links to other, different players.
Finding new things that work 
(left wing). Appropriate new 
technologies, practices and 
ways of doing things can only be 
developed through interaction 
be tween people performing re-
search functions (who may not 
only be researchers in the usual 
sense) and the farmers, who are 
the end users. This takes place 
with a limited number of people 
in selected areas. Ex tension 
has a role to play, mainly in the 
form of facilitation, to ensure 
that the process of fi nding new 
things that work, functions mea-
ningfully.
Ensuring that required in puts 
and ser vices are accessible 
(right wing). It is of little use to promo te improved practices and other new things 
that work if the clients do not have access to the inputs and ser vices required to 
adopt these innovations. There fore, extension has a role in en suring that such in-
puts and services are accessible. This does not im ply that extension organisations 
have to supply inputs; in most cases, it will be enough to facilitate links between 
their clients and input sources. 
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Ensuring a broad impact (abdomen). New things that work are of limited use if 
only those farmers who were involved in their development know about them. Thus 
they have to be disseminated from the pockets where they emerged, to farmers in 
thousands of villages. Extension must involve itself in the dissemination process, 
usually by facilitating farmer-to-farmer interaction.
Promoting a favourable policy environment (head). If unfavourable policies 
make improvements in farming diffi cult, the success of extension work is endan-
gered. Although an extension organisation usually is not directly involved in policy 
making, it should try to infl uence policy-makers to design policies favourable to 
its clients, and sometimes, to fi nd a balance between the interests of producers 
and those of the public.
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Economic theory distinguishes bet ween private and public goods. Two criteria, 
excludability and subtractability, determine whether a good or ser vice is closer to 
being public or private. Excluda bility means that those who do not pay for a good 
can be excluded from its use. Subtractability means that the use of a good by 
one user re du ces its availability to other users. Goods which are both, ex cludable 
and subtractable to a high degree, are private goods; goods which are nei ther 
excludable nor subtractable are pure public goods. 
A bag of fertiliser is an example 
for a private good, the air one for a 
pure public good. Goods with high 
excludability and low subtractabili ty 
are called toll goods (a park with an 
entry fee is an example, a pay-TV 
programme another one), whereas 
common pool goods are characteri-
sed by high subtractability, but low 
excludability (fi sh in the oceans are 
an example, as well as communal 
pastures and forests).
There is a continuum between the ex-
tremes of pure private goods, pure toll 
goods, pure common pool goods and 
pure public goods (the four cor ners 
of the diagram), and most goods are 
excludable and/or sub trac table to a 
certain degree.
Private goods benefi t the person who 
acquires them. Therefore peo ple are 
wil ling to pay for them and the pri vate commercial sector usually pro vides them, 
i.e. market for ces regu late supply and demand well. Toll goods are provided by 
the private sector as long as free-riding can be minimised. Common pool goods 
require regulation to prevent over use. Their management is often based on diffi cult 
political negotiation processes between all players that have a stake in it. 
Pure public goods that are freely available for everyone are rare. Clean water, 
for example, that is commonly considered a public good, has become fairly 
subtractable in many areas and thus turned into a common pool good that needs 
to be regulated, or even into a private good, by piping it, and thus making it 
excludable. Goods that are to a high degree public are generally not provided by 
the private sector because people are not willing to pay for them, as non-payers 
benefi t too.
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For public and common pool goods market forces cannot work optimally. Not 
optimal means in this case that if left to the market forces, demand and supply will 
be less than desirable from the point of view of benefi ts for the broader society. For 
example, if supply and demand for education or health services are left completely 
to the market forces, many people may not be willing or able to send children to 
school, or invest in proper health care. But the broader society benefi ts from a 
generally high level of education and health, and virtually every society and country 
provide public resources for education and health. Any society can decide to use 
its public funds to turn apparently private goods into widely available public goods 
or goods of public interest.
Extension services are in economic terms goods and therefore the concept ex-
plained here applies as well.
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Innovative Approaches to Financing Extension for Agri culture 
and Natural Resource Management
Conceptual considerations and analysis of experience
Dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of publicly funded extension services has led to 
the emergence of new paradigms on the fi nancing of extension, and the exploration 
of a range of innovative approaches. This publication aims at understanding the extent 
to which these new paradigms and the resulting new approaches can offer viable 
solutions to the problems with conventional government and donor-fi nanced extension 
services. 
Agriculture and natural resource management are closely linked to poverty reduction 
as well as issues like food quality, soil and water conservation, and bio-diversity. That’s 
why services in this domain concern not only the people of rural areas but have 
dimensions of public interest. If extension is only privately funded, the public interest 
dimension is disregarded. Therefore extension services are to be fi nanced by public 
as well as private funds. 
Financial participation of extension clients is desirable because it results in more 
effective services, accountability of service providers to clients, and empowerment 
of rural people. Generally speaking, also poor farmers are willing and able to pay for 
useful and profi table services. On the other hand fi nancial participation is likely to 
exclude certain potential users from access to services, and services with ecological 
benefi ts are hardly demanded. 
The public funds for extension can be used in a more effective way by result-oriented 
service mandates and by demand-side fi nancing mechanisms. 
Fostering extension organisations in the private sector is an alternative to channelling 
public and donor funds to public extension organisations and NGOs. These 
organisations offer services to their clients for payment. Besides farmers, public bodies 
representing public interests can be clients of such service providers, e.g. through 
service mandates. Through demand-side fi nancing these service providers can be 
made accessible to a clientele that would normally not use the services. 
Privatisation and decentralisation are common reform options for large public extension 
organisations. Privatisation by way of withdrawal of the state does not automatically 
lead to a functioning market for extension services, but results in services for small 
farmers being taken up by donor-funded NGOs.
There is no evidence that private service providers are generally better than public 
ones. Quality and effectiveness of services are more determined by accountability 
mechanisms and organisational management than by the public or private nature 
of institutions. Therefore, generally speaking, reforms that make public extension 
services more effective are just as promising as privatisation. 
